“National security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable.”

These were the words of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the Japan-U.K. summit held during Kishida’s January 2023 trip to Europe. After the start of the Ukraine war, Kishida described the strategic relationship between the two regions by saying that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” and he seems even more keenly aware of this today.

If we allow Russia to use force to unilaterally change the status quo in Europe, we permit China’s forceful expansion of its sphere of influence across East Asian waters. Both China and Russia are autocracies attempting to politically influence democratic states. Moreover, the Ukraine war has hardened their shared anti-Western stance into a nascent Sino-Russian bloc.

Japan and Europe are deepening their security cooperation in response to this “axis of Eurasian despotism.” Kishida’s recent visits to France, Italy and the U.K. reflect this development.

Japan and the U.K. concluded a reciprocal access agreement (RAA) during the January summit. Among other things, the agreement simplifies immigration procedures for military personnel when Japan's Self-Defense forces and the British military conduct joint exercises and clarifies legal jurisdiction in the event of a crime or accident involving a visiting service member.

In a Jan. 12 editorial in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak expressed his enthusiasm for Japan-U.K. cooperation, writing: “We will stand together for ... our economic security as China uses all the levers of state power to compete for global influence.”

The British government describes the RAA as “the most significant defense agreement between the two countries in more than a century.” The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 (and 1905 defense pact) was intended as a joint defense against the threat of Russian expansionism. Upon ratification, the Four-Power Treaty established between Japan, Great Britain, the United States and France at the Washington Conference of 1921 rendered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance defunct. While the British yielded to pressure from the U.S., which had begun to view Japan as a rival, the dissolution of the alliance was also one of the biggest failures of prewar Japanese diplomacy.

The U.K. is the second country with which Japan has concluded an RAA, following Australia in January 2022. Strengthening security cooperation between Japan and the U.K. should lead to more robust cooperation between Japan, the U.K. and Australia. A new security network is emerging to counter the axis of Eurasian despotism: While the U.S. has been the hub of the Asian alliance system, Japan is a “subhub” linking like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific and the European middle powers through security cooperation. It seems likely that Japan will go on to conclude RAAs with other countries, including France and the Philippines.

Following his visit to Europe, Kishida held a summit meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington, where Kishida informed a supportive Biden of his plan to incorporate American-manufactured Tomahawk cruise missiles into Japan’s defenses. These Tomahawk missiles, which can strike enemy missile launch sites, will comprise the core of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities. The aim is to build deterrence by adding counterattack capabilities to Japan’s existing missile defense. Japan has also agreed to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy.

Up until now, Japan has always purchased its fighter jets from the U.S., but this time Japan has chosen the “European option” in order to maintain and improve upon its long-term defense technology base. It is precisely Japan’s “will to defend itself” that has attracted like-minded Asian and European countries to a security network in which Japan operates as a “subhub.”

In the future, security cooperation with the Philippines will become more important. The Philippines, a U.S. ally, will become increasingly isolated as the South China Sea falls under China’s control. The Philippines’ strategic importance will also grow in preparation for a Taiwan crisis. It is thus essential that Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines strengthen trilateral cooperation.

There are still many challenges ahead.

First, Japan and Europe understand the challenge posed by China differently. In the case of Germany, some argue that Germany and Japan should fulfill their (respective) roles as the front line of deterrence against Russia and China — but this approach runs the risk of falling victim to China’s “divide and conquer” policy.

Meanwhile, the U.K. prematurely joined the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015, undermining the unity of the Group of Seven. Japan and the U.S., which did not join the AIIB, harbor a deep distrust of the U.K. as a result of this decision. There is still concern that the dizzying flow of Chinese money into London, the U.K.’s financial hub, will cloud a rational approach to British security policy.

Another issue is the cautious stance of the U.S. regarding a multilateral economic and trade architecture in the Indo-Pacific. We cannot establish deep economic ties with countries in this region if we continue to deny them market access. We must not forget that American pressure on Japan to reform and open up its market was a great game made possible by the fact that the U.S. market was open.

Finally, Japan, the U.S. and Europe must all decide how to strengthen their diplomatic powers, which are an essential component of building deterrence against the Eurasian-axis of despotism. Deterrence means strategic communication and it only works if there is dialogue. Above all, it is essential to hold regular top-level meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping to ensure good communication and mutual understanding.

Yoichi Funabashi is the chairman of the Global Council of the International House of Japan and former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun. This is a translation of his column in the monthly Bungei Shunju.