Breaking down the LDP’s punishing defeat

Just a month after becoming prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba and his Liberal Democratic Party were handed a punishing defeat, losing a whopping 64 seats along with their junior coalition partner, Komeito.

This was a major defeat for the former ruling party, who failed to win even enough seats to secure a simple majority with Komeito. This will have profound policy implications going forward as the government adjusts to a new normal in Japanese politics. To understand these implications, it is necessary to break down how this happened and what comes next.

How did this happen?

The LDP under Ishiba was vying for at least a simple majority of 233 seats in the Lower House, which seemed achievable since the ruling coalition held 279 seats going into the race. However, the opposition parties rallied enough public support and handed the former ruling party its worst loss since 2009, with the LDP and Komeito securing only 215 seats in total.

The defeat was not due to a lack of personal effort from Ishiba. The prime minister traveled a total of 84,302 kilometers across Japan to stump for LDP candidates. Along the way, he attempted to sell his vision of a government that would “protect the rules” and revitalize the economy for working class Japanese.

However, Ishiba’s message failed to resonate following a series of missteps since his surprise victory in the party presidential race a few weeks ago. It started with his Cabinet appointments.

Despite promising a new type of government, his choices for ministers reflected old school politics as he awarded longtime allies and punished opponents. Only four ministers were younger than 60 and only two women earned senior appointments. It was not the sort of Cabinet that a prime minister promising modern politics would put together.

The problems with Ishiba’s picks were immediately evident in public opinion polling, at historic lows for a new prime minister. Whereas most leaders enjoy at least a brief honeymoon period, Ishiba was immediately faced with a disapproval rating higher than 30%.

The next misstep came with the immediate announcement that Ishiba would be dissolving the Lower House and calling a snap election.

This was a reversal of his previous statements that he would not do so until he had discussed the matter with opposition parties. The flip-flopping became a rallying point for the opposition, who claimed that Ishiba — purportedly the bastion of an LDP that would protect the rules — was no different from those who had manipulated the system for their own benefit.

The other problem in calling a snap election is that Ishiba did not have the opportunity to develop a coherent party policy platform. His first week in office was spent walking back his previous statements about an “Asian NATO” and a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement to allow for Japanese bases in the United States — with neither agenda mattering much to the average voter, in any case.

The final misstep was failing to address discord within the party, particularly among the conservative base. The previous administration of Fumio Kishida had created deep fissures within the LDP in response to faction-related money scandals, and Ishiba neglected to patch them up before rushing into the election.

In some cases, exiled party members won against LDP candidates, and in others, there was waning support from local conservative voters who found alternative candidates in Nippon Ishin no Kai and the Democratic Party for the People (DPP).

What comes next?

An immediate question for the LDP is deciding what to do with Ishiba. Invariably, there will be some who will call for his immediate resignation based on his inability to win a mandate from the public. However, this debate will be heavily informed by the first hurdle for the party, that is, forming a coalition government.

The LDP must now entice independents to come back to it and for a third coalition partner to join. With only 215 seats in hand, the LDP-Komeito coalition needs 18 extra seats to secure a simple majority. There are only 12 independents (some of whom were exiled from the LDP prior to the election, owing to scandals), meaning that the LDP will likely look to Nippon Ishin (who won 38 seats) or the DPP (28 seats) as a third partner.

However, both Nippon Ishin and DPP previously said that they would not form a coalition government with the LDP — a move likely to increase their bargaining power. The DPP is the likeliest target for Ishiba, given its closer alignment on policy, especially as the party ran on a platform to raise wages. Nippon Ishin may share some of the conservative positions of the LDP, but its insistence on making higher education free for all is likely to be a major sticking point.

What about policymaking?

We should expect a period of paralysis in the government as the LDP scrambles to form a coalition. This means that near-term political decisions on anything remotely sensitive will be difficult to make.

If the LDP succeeds in forming a coalition government, its junior partners will have a much stronger hand in influencing the agenda. For the past 12 years, Komeito was more of a watchdog than an actual policymaker, but since the LDP can no longer pass legislation without coalition partners' votes, Komeito will have significantly more influence over policies and priorities.

In situations like this, two things tend to happen.

The first is that the government significantly slows down pursuing any new policies because of the amount of negotiation and debate required before legislation reaches the Diet floor. What this means is that policy tends to follow the same trajectory it was on prior to the disruptions, without much deviation.

The second is that the bureaucracy increases in importance when it comes to policy formation and implementation. The government still has to function and it is Japan’s traditionally strong bureaucracy that fills in the political gaps.

While understanding this scenario is useful for making sense of what is happening, there are still many unknowns — making for the most dynamic period in Japanese politics in the last 15 years.

Longtime political observers understood that Ishiba’s rise to prime minister would usher in a new era of politics, and he has certainly done that — just not the way he would have hoped.