The Russian government made two bets when it sent troops into South Ossetia and Georgia last month. The first — that Russian forces could crush any opposition — was a pretty safe bet. While the Russian military has deteriorated significantly since the Cold War, it has more than enough firepower to defeat the armed forces of any former Soviet republics. The speed with which it defeated Georgian forces is proof enough of its enduring ability to crush tiny nations on its periphery.

The second bet had longer odds, but was still relatively safe: that the rest of the world would be unable to muster a unified response and that harsh words would substitute for substantive action. That calculation has also been vindicated. In the aftermath of the dismemberment of Georgia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has claimed a "sphere of influence" in the world.

Conflict between Georgia and Russia was long in the making. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has provoked Moscow since he took office in 2004, and Western leaders, most notably those in the U.S., did not discourage him. The governments in Moscow and Tbilisi escalated their actions until Mr. Saakashvili decided to end once and for all the South Ossetian dream of an independent state. His rash attempt to resolve the problem by force gave Russia a pretext to send in its own troops. The result was the predictable crushing of the Georgian military, occupation of parts of Georgia, and recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

International response has been tepid. The European Union, led by French diplomats, helped broker a ceasefire and withdrawal that would return Russian troops to positions they had before the August offensive. Moscow agreed, but Russia maintains troops in an external "buffer zone" that violates the terms of the deal. Last week, EU leaders condemned Moscow's failure to honor the deal, but could not agree on an appropriate response. The best they could muster was a threat to postpone talks on a new Europe-Russia partnership agreement on energy and economic relations. Yet the growing significance of those ties means European governments are unlikely to further delay talks that are already 18 months behind schedule.

The United States has been more vocal in its criticism of Russia and seemingly more ready to challenge Moscow. It dispatched warships to Georgia to test Russia's willingness to permit the delivery of aid. The number of NATO ships in the Black Sea has increased. NATO officials, however, say the change was based on a pre-crisis decision.

Washington is said to be contemplating the suspension of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries, but that would be largely symbolic. Also, the U.S. has announced a $1 billion aid package to Georgia, which would catapult the country into the top ranks of U.S. aid recipients. With U.S. backing, the International Monetary Fund is expected to announce its own $750 million aid package for rebuilding.

None of these moves is likely to dissuade Moscow. In a speech last month, Mr. Medvedev made clear his thinking about Russian foreign policy, without any reticence, in remarks consistent with other foreign policy pronouncements of the last decade. The new Russian president articulated five principles that would guide his administration. It would: observe international law, reject U.S. dominance of world affairs in a "unipolar" world, seek friendly relations with other nations, defend Russian citizens and business interests abroad, and claim a sphere of influence.

The last item is bothersome. "Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located. . .. It is the border region, but not only." That is surely a notion that will chill the hearts of East Europeans — "a new Europe" — as well as the states of Central Asia.

Most interesting is the reaction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the multilateral institution that groups Russia, China and four Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Rather than ratifying Russian actions, SCO leaders expressed "grave concern in connection with the recent tensions around the South Ossetia issue and urge the sides to solve existing problems peacefully, through dialogue, and to make efforts facilitating reconciliation and talks." While backing Russian involvement in assisting peace and cooperation in the troubled Caucasus region, they underscored the importance of territorial integrity — a reflection of China's concerns about its own separatist groups. The other heads of state are no doubt concerned about falling within Russia's sphere of influence.

Other governments must do more to convince Russia to observe international norms and respect international law. Isolation is not an option, but neither is the mere wringing of hands. While the idea of "spheres of influence" must alarm citizens of Eastern Europe, other nations must respect Russian concerns about its periphery. There is a middle ground between the two positions; Russia's partners and neighbors must seize it.