As North Korea continues to enhance its missile arsenal, South Korea’s new conservative administration wants to tighten the screws on Pyongyang by taking a “peace through strength” approach.
One initiative is reactivating a channel to redeploy American strategic assets — and possibly tactical nuclear weapons — to South Korea, which was agreed upon when U.S. President Joe Biden visited Seoul late last month.
Officially called the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the framework allows senior officials from both countries to discuss “extended deterrence” measures against North Korea — but it was suspended in 2018 as the previous Moon Jae-In and Donald Trump administrations made diplomatic overtures to Pyongyang.
But Yoon Suk-yeol, the recently elected South Korean president, has shown less interest in talking with Pyongyang. Along with plans to expand U.S.-South Korea military exercises, the reactivation of this relatively little-known coordination body has been described by the administration as an important first step to send a tougher message to North Korea.
Yoon has long been an advocate of enhancing joint deterrence by redeploying U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. His efforts to achieve this — presumably via military exercises with carrier strike groups or port visits by U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines — come amid growing local support for having nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.
But Seoul faces hurdles in this effort.
In theory, the revival of the EDSCG framework has some benefits for South Korea. In practice, however, the actual redeployment of U.S. strategic assets would create so many operational headaches that Washington could balk at sending such nuclear-capable platforms and weapons. Furthermore, it could also be counterproductive in trying to get North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to stop weapons tests, let alone getting him back to the negotiating table.
Coordinating deterrence
While the EDSCG, which was formed in 2016 following a flurry of missile tests by Pyongyang, encompasses the full range of the allies’ military, economic, and diplomatic power, the group’s focus has been on U.S. strategic assets. That means that it could eventually set the stage for a rotational or even permanent deployment of such assets to the peninsula.
According to Sangsoo Lee, head of the Stockholm Korea Center at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, the consultative body will aim to provide an action plan to deploy U.S. strategic assets to South Korea.
“In their joint statement, Biden and Yoon used for the first time the words ‘nuclear capabilities’ as one of the means to respond to the North’s nuclear threats,” said Lee. This means that the assets likely to be deployed could include nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers, as well as strategic bombers, and possibly also tactical nuclear weapons, if needed.
At the same time, the move elevates Seoul’s role in U.S. nuclear decisions intended to protect South Korea, said Richard Weitz, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the U.S-based Hudson Institute. It also realizes a Biden administration goal to sustain strong bilateral defense ties with Seoul while discouraging South Koreans from pursuing their own nuclear weapons.
Kim unlikely to change tack
But will such an approach deter North Korean provocations?
Analysts argue that the strategy is unlikely to persuade Kim to change course. Moreover, it is unclear whether the approach will improve security or encourage diplomacy.
“The problem is that these displays of resolve, while perhaps reassuring for the Yoon administration, haven’t actually deterred North Korea provocations,” said Frank Aum, a senior Northeast Asia expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
For example, between 2013 and 2018, the U.S.-South Korean alliance engaged in enhanced deterrence demonstrations, including deploying B-2, B-52, and B-1B strategic bombers as well as carrier strike groups and nuclear submarines to the Korean Peninsula, in response to North Korean nuclear and missile testing.
But those moves did not change North Korea’s behavior. On the contrary, during those five years, Pyongyang achieved major advances in its nuclear program, including three more nuclear tests and over 90 ballistic missile tests.
These developments suggest that the redeployment of U.S. strategic assets may even accelerate — or be used as justification for — future North Korean missile testing. Moreover, Aum said that such an approach will also likely influence Chinese behavior, as was the case when Beijing retaliated economically against South Korea after it allowed the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in 2018.
And while Biden reiterated on May 21 his willingness to meet with Kim if he proves to be “serious” and “sincere,” his two-word public message to the North Korean leader — “Hello. Period.” — conveyed a lack of enthusiasm that is unlikely to induce Kim to restore self-restraint in missile testing and return to talks, wrote Scott Snyder, director of the U.S.-Korea Policy program at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.
Discussions only — for now
There is also the question of whether Seoul and Washington might have different expectations from such an extended deterrence approach.
“Neither Seoul nor Washington is under any illusions about the credibility of the North Korean nuclear threat. But from Washington’s perspective, the decision to deploy strategic assets in South Korea is riddled with considerations,” said Soo Kim, a policy analyst and Korea expert at the Washington-based RAND Corporation.
“While the U.S. appears open to discussions on extended deterrence, that is probably as far as the administration will go for the time being, at least.”
The difference in the thinking, she argued, is related to the proximity of the threat. As much as the allies seek to be intertwined in their security interests, the fact of the matter is that Seoul has to live with the North Korean nuclear threat — literally kilometers away.
For Washington, the issue is much more complicated, as the redeployment of strategic assets could inadvertently heighten security sensitivities in the region, especially now with Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine and tensions between the U.S. and China.
In practical terms, the EDSCG is not likely to get Seoul where it wants to go, which is to actually have U.S. strategic assets deployed in the country to deter North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons, according to Soo Kim.
A broader alliance
Despite this, analysts agree that the EDSCG’s reactivation will help keep Yoon’s campaign promise of forging closer defense ties with Washington. Furthermore, the announcements made during the first Yoon-Biden summit have opened the door for the two countries to make greater inroads into the depth and breadth of alliance cooperation.
For instance, the two governments advocated a “conditions-based transition of wartime operational control” of South Korean forces to Seoul rather than one determined by a set timetable, which drove last year’s U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Weitz said.
They also said they would expand bilateral defense industrial cooperation, including by discussing a possible reciprocal defense procurement agreement, partnering on national security space issues, and making their defense supply chains more resilient, he added.
Moreover, Washington and Seoul outlined in their joint statement a vision for the next five years that broadened their view of longstanding security and defense challenges.
As analyst Soo Kim said, the joint statement was forward-looking in its emphasis on contemporary threats that are occupying an increasingly larger space in the debate, which includes cybersecurity, the defense of democracy and the rule of law, a multifaceted effort to counter the rise of China, and broader regional challenges.
“It’s a tall order for Seoul,” she said.
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