Throughout South and Southeast Asia, militaries have seized the reins of power or become increasingly involved in politics — more so than at any time in recent years.

Just 10 years ago, there were no militaries fully in control of governments in South or Southeast Asia. Today, in Myanmar and Thailand, the armed forces are in direct or de facto control of those countries. In states such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines, the militaries play growing — even dominant — roles in civilian politics once again.

The effects of renewed military meddling on democracies, societies and economies often are devastating. They tend to make it hard for countries to return to democracy, spark significant bloodshed and create governments that are terrible at ruling.

Yet although coups and more indirect types of military intervention are becoming common again, they are nowhere near as common as they were during the Cold War. Moreover, regional organizations, major powers and democrats within these countries themselves can adapt strategies that could help inoculate states against future military interventions and roll back their involvement in civilian politics.

Preventing coups and reducing military interference in domestic politics would have several important effects. Doing so would foster democratization and strengthen democratic institutions.

A reduction in coups could shift countries such as Thailand away from “coup culture”: The more coups you have, the more likely you are to have more. This would allow civilian politicians to govern without constantly worrying about being deposed. Less military interference also likely would reduce domestic rights abuses.

Reducing the power of the armed forces also would create better governance for development and prevent some humanitarian disasters. Because militaries are largely ineffective at running the day-to-day business of governments, relegating them to the barracks could improve the quality of governance within countries. Coups, like the one in Myanmar, also often cause humanitarian problems to spill across borders into neighboring countries, to include the spread of diseases via the massive movement of refugees.

Importantly, shifting militaries away from domestic politics could improve these armed forces’ abilities to do their primary jobs such as defending their countries and waging war if they are called upon to do so. In Thailand, for instance, the military’s focus on domestic politics has weakened its actual abilities to manage conflicts. Since the early 2000s, the Royal Thai Army has overseen a counterinsurgency strategy against separatist, ethnic Malay and Muslim militants in the country’s southernmost provinces. The army has badly mismanaged this effort.

Reversing the tide of greater military interference in domestic affairs in South and Southeast Asia requires action by regional organizations, leading democracies and democrats within these states themselves. Regional and global organizations should set clear standards for how coups will be treated and isolate coup regimes.

Organizations in Africa, like the African Union, overall have taken much clearer, tougher and more well-defined approaches to deal with junta's that came to power through coups in recent decades than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN should follow their lead and make clear that it condemns all coups and that governments toppled by force will be suspended from the organization while the military remains in charge. ASEAN has already moved beyond its traditional policy of noninterference in dealing with the current Myanmar junta, showing it has the capacity for intervention and change.

Global and regional powers, including the United States, Australia and Japan, can help prevent coups and reduce military interference in politics as well. For one, they should condemn coups unequivocally, even in countries of strategic importance, apply sanctions to coup regimes and support coup opponents. The mixed responses to coups by major powers emboldens more armed forces to become involved in politics. A 2017 study found that significant global condemnation of coups, including from powerful actors, reduced the survival time of coup governments.

Taking a tough stand would benefit the interests of major powers as well. Coups often prolong authoritarianism, instability, state violence and incompetent policymaking, making it harder for major powers to work with the affected states. The major powers have sometimes tolerated or even condoned coups as bulwarks against terrorist organizations, but the record is unclear on how effective military regimes actually are at combating terrorism.

Major powers also should provide significant amounts of humanitarian aid to the embattled opponents of coups. In the case of Myanmar, the United States and other leading democracies should pressure Thailand to allow large amounts of cross-border humanitarian assistance to be sent into Myanmar.

Regional powers in Asia also should work to convince China to cooperate to prevent coups and reverse military takeovers. Although Beijing generally pursues a stated policy of noninterference in other countries’ affairs, in reality China has pursued an increasingly interventionist foreign policy in many parts of the world.

Beijing likely recognizes that military takeovers often breed instability and damage its own interests. China has rhetorically backed the Myanmar junta and provided it with economic and diplomatic support. Yet the coup hurt trade relations, led to attacks on Chinese factories in Myanmar and potentially spread COVID-19 into China. A prolonged civil war in the country and pressure from Southeast Asian states and other powers could convince China to take bolder steps to resolve the situation in Myanmar.

Within countries, democrats should take steps to coup-proof their governments when they are in power. Once a coup has occurred, it often can be hard to reverse without significant outside assistance. For example, before coups occur, they should reduce military involvement in political and civilian affairs and hold the armed forces accountable for past actions

They should also publicly discuss past human rights abuses by soldiers to reduce the military’s sense of impunity. A leader such as Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, who was widely popular when he was first elected, could have taken these steps, which would have helped curb military impunity.

Democratic leaders also should empower a broader range of security agencies, such as the police, who can take over many of the civilian law enforcement functions that militaries often claim and use as stepping-stones to launch coups. Popularly elected political leaders should also identify military officers who will accept civilian command.

Wherever possible, elected leaders also should work to build public support for constitutional changes that dilute the power of the military. Such changes should establish clear provisions that give civilian leaders command of the armed forces, define the duties of the armed forces and empower institutions within the military, like inspector generals, to investigate and punish soldiers and military personnel who are corrupt and/or brutal.

Within South and Southeast Asian states, democrats failed in the past to take steps that could have prevented this return of military control. For people living under governments that have already been overthrown by military rulers, such as Myanmar, the path forward is difficult and will likely include significant bloodshed.

If and when democrats eventually return to power, they will have little time and limited room to reduce the influence of their militaries. Thus, they will need to act quickly and forcefully to limit the men in green and coup-proof their countries for the future.

Joshua Kurlantzick is a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. This article has been excerpted from a Council on Foreign Relations discussion paper.