A series of bomb attacks in downtown Baghdad have exposed the weakness of the new Iraqi government. It is not clear who or what is responsible for the bombings, and the list of suspects is long. But a government's first responsibility is to provide for the safety and security of its citizens: By any measure, the Iraq government is not measuring up.

The explosions last Wednesday struck the very heart of the Iraqi state. A series of coordinated explosions — truck bombs and mortar fire — hit the most important ministries in the government, killing nearly 100 people and wounding more than 1,000 others. Two massive bombs targeted the finance and foreign ministries, a devastating rejoinder to the government's plan to remove most of the concrete barriers remaining in the city and restore some sense of normalcy. The scale of the attacks and the prominence of the targets suggest life in Baghdad will not be returning to normal anytime soon.

The question now is whether the savagery is intended to warn the government, to re-balance the political equation in the runup to parliamentary elections scheduled for next January or to turn the clock back to the virtual civil war that raged four years ago. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed Sunni extremists and backers of former dictator Saddam Hussein for the attacks. Others see the hand of Shiite groups — co-religionists of the prime minister — who are battling Mr. al-Maliki for political supremacy.

No matter who is responsible, the attacks are a direct challenge to Mr. al-Maliki. They force all Iraqis to question whether the prime minister's government can secure peace. One of the first decisions taken by the government after the attacks was to suspend its plan to take down most of the concrete barriers that dominate the city.

Was Mr. al-Maliki's decision to push U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq's major cities by June 30 premature, a political ploy to assert a sovereignty that the government, in reality, is not prepared to assume?

Two months ago, the answer seemed cleared. The surge of violence that followed the "surge" of U.S. forces two years had receded. Mr. al-Maliki's call for redeployment of U.S. forces made sense — as well as appealed to the political instincts of leaders in Baghdad and Washington. U.S. President Barack Obama had campaigned on a pledge to get the United States out of Iraq. Mr. al-Maliki saw a U.S. withdrawal as proof that his government was making progress and was indeed capable of governing. As the man who oversaw the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, he was then positioned to capitalize on the success in elections next year.

More intense scrutiny raised serious questions about Mr. al-Maliki's government, however. Most obvious were concerns about the numbers and capabilities of Iraqi forces, both among the police and the military. They had little stomach for law enforcement or making peace. The decline in violence over the last year has encouraged carelessness and a false sense of confidence. When they did intervene, it was usually in sectarian clashes, promoting the image of a partisan and biased security force. The arrest of a dozen police officials in the aftermath of the attacks indicates that the danger is internal, rather than an external terrorist threat as the government had insisted.

Moreover, there is little indication that the government has made genuine efforts to promote reconciliation among the various Iraqi factions, or ethnic and religious groups. Instead, cohabitation within the halls of power reflects a division of spoils, rather than a genuinely nonpartisan approach to governing. The various groups have their fiefdoms; rewards hold the government together, not some shared sense of national purpose. The foreign ministry is run by a Kurd, lending credence to the notion that the violence is being triggered by conflicts over the spoils of power. Critics charge the government has not followed through on deals it has struck with Sunnis, and the attacks could be a warning to honor those arrangements.

It is not clear what Mr. al-Maliki can do. He needs an efficient and effective security force. The Iraqis do not seem capable of providing it yet. But he cannot ask the U.S. to come back into the cities and re-establish a presence. That would be too much of a retreat and could fatally undermine the prime minister. It would show that his initial decision was wrong and that he cannot govern on his own. In the strong-man culture of Middle Eastern politics, such an admission would be fatal to his political future.

The other option is working to establish a genuinely national government, one that transcends the sectarian mentality that has dominated Iraq for some time. That is a difficult, if not impossible, assignment, especially since it goes against Mr. al-Maliki's own instincts. But that is the only way that an enduring peace can be established in Iraq.