BEVERLY HILLS, Calif. — When Eric K. Shinseki, the first four-star U.S. Army general of Japanese- American ethnicity, was still his service branch's chief of staff, he became a symbol of doubt about official competence in pursuit of the Iraq war.
Regardless of whether he deserved the accolades or not, Shinseki became viewed, by the media especially, as the man who would not bow and scrape to the White House, even as he was the quintessential patriotic, oft-decorated career military man.
At that time — half a dozen years ago — most of our generals and admirals were known for being supinely supportive as the Bush administration chased its tail in Iraq. This occurred at an enormous cost while the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan deteriorated. But in 2003, Shinseki suggested in testimony before Congress — albeit only in passing — that nothing less than several hundred thousand more troops than officially envisioned were probably needed if the United States was to have any hope of quelling sectarian and anti-American violence in Iraq.