SINGAPORE -- Profound similarities bind China and Vietnam together today more than ever. Twelve years after their brief border war in 1979, Hanoi and Beijing normalized relations in 1991 after resolving the "Cambodian problem" at the Paris Peace Conference. This normalization of relations put to rest a historically tumultuous 1,000-year relationship of enmity, subjugation, "liberation" and ideological collaboration.

Now, not only is Vietnam's rapprochement with its northern neighbor complete, but Chinese influence seems to have taken root in Vietnam. Although history is never completely forgotten, pragmatism is the rule of the day, and Vietnam is keenly observing and studying China's economic and political reforms. Vietnam is China's sharpest disciple in Southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese elite freely refer to the "Chinese model."

Hanoi and Beijing share a "special relationship" in at least five areas:

First, like their northern neighbors, Vietnamese leaders insist on stability before reform, wanting to avoid the sort of chaos that followed the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union. Vietnamese leaders have adopted China's leitmotif of "stability, development and reforms" in that order. As is the case with Beijing, Hanoi plans on a smooth transition from central planning to a market economy.

Second, Vietnam is closely following China's economic reforms and transformation. In October, Hanoi released a report to Parliament on the country's good economic performance. The mood was clearly upbeat as Vietnam was set to attain 7.3 percent economic growth for 2003, the highest in the last six years. The press compares Vietnam's growth to that of China with good reason. According to the World Bank, Vietnam's growth rate is second only to China's estimated 7.8 percent.

The World Bank estimates that China will again occupy the top spot in 2004 (7.4 percent growth), with Vietnam following a close second with at least 7.0 percent growth.

Vietnam is rapidly adopting Chinese-style economic reforms, especially regarding the transformation of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of a stock market and the restructuring of wages and social policies in its runup to membership in the World Trade Organization.

As is the case in China, Vietnam's main sectors of growth are manufacturing and agriculture (farming and fishing), but tourism and foreign direct investments should strengthen in the post-SARS period. Exports reached $14.9 billion in the first nine months of 2003, an increase of 16.7 percent over the same period the previous year. But, unlike China, Vietnam is running a trade deficit, with imports amounting to $18 billion in the same period. Its domestic demand is also much weaker.

More importantly, however, the development of private enterprise in Vietnam has been impressive. As is the case in China, communism in Vietnam coexists with the traditional enterprising drive of the Vietnamese. Small and medium-size enterprises and agricultural enterprises have consolidated in Ho Chi Minh City and Dalat, and private restaurants are transforming Hanoi into a bustling, lively city.

Third, the national slogan in Vietnam today is "regional and international integration," as it is in China. After its international embargo ended in 1993, Vietnam began its economic and political integration into the international community by joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1995 and then hosting the 1997 Francophonie Summit and the 1998 ASEAN summit. In 2001, Vietnam signed a trade agreement with the United States, and in December it hosted the 22nd Southeast Asian Games. This year, Vietnam will host the 5th Asia-Europe Meeting in Hanoi and in 2006, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. By 2005, Vietnam plans to enter the WTO, just three years after China.

Fourth, Vietnam's determination to reform using "the Chinese model" extends beyond the economic realm. A senior Vietnamese official has intimated that Hanoi is currently observing political and social changes in China as a model for Vietnam to follow. They reportedly are even studying Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents," suggesting that Hanoi may follow the Chinese Communist Party's reforms, especially in regard to instilling grass-roots democracy. (In the fall of 2002 there was a strong rumor in Vietnam that the CCP had sent a "brotherly" delegation to Hanoi and Vientiane -- before its 16th Communist Party Congress -- to inform the Vietnamese that the Chinese might eventually drop the word "communist" from the name of their party not too far down the road.)

Fifth, Hanoi has been deferring to Beijing in key diplomatic areas. For example, in 2001, Vietnam waited for a breakthrough in U.S.-China negotiations on the latter's WTO entry before it signed its own trade agreement with Washington. More recently, Vietnam sent its defense minister, Pham Van Tra, to the Pentagon less than two weeks after the visit of Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Cao Gangchuan.

It was reported that Vietnam's foreign minister made a last minute detour to Pyongyang (probably at the request of Beijing) during his October visit to China. Vietnamese officials also take pride in emphasizing the "institutionalized practice" of hosting summit-level exchange visits in alternating years; Vietnam's party chief and president both visited China in 2003, and Chinese leaders are expected in Hanoi in 2004.