SEOUL -- "Things have begun moving slowly," South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung recently said in reaction to the Bush administration's announcement it will open negotiations with Pyongyang. No doubt, the government in Seoul is trying hard to sound upbeat. Foreign Minister Han Seung Soo added, "Bush's decision will help form a favorable atmosphere for the holding of a second summit" with North Korea.

While such announcements may make it sound like U.S.-South Korean disagreements over how to deal with the North Koreans have disappeared, in reality gaps remain.

Bush's statement signals a shift, at least on the surface. His administration's softer tone on the North Korean "rogues" shows that the Bush team finally seems to understand that it makes little sense to use hostile language in reference to a country or a government with which one is planning to diplomatically engage.

In terms of international public relations, the first few months of the Bush administration's Korean policy have been a disaster. Bush's team caused the greatest political damage in South Korea, where they, knowingly or not, offended a president who may be the most pro-American leader this country has ever had and alienated a population that is sick and tired of political subordination.

"The Blue House is terribly disappointed," a close associate of the president confides.

The people, too, are highly dissatisfied with the effects U.S. policies have had on their nation's affairs. According to a recent opinion poll, 66 percent of South Koreans feel the U.S. are responsible for the present stalemate in inter-Korean relations. Even more worrisome for the U.S., three out of four South Koreans in their 20s believe the hardening of U.S. policy toward North Korea caused the breakdown of the reconciliation process.

Many South Korean opinion leaders don't trust the new tone emanating from Bush's lips. In substance, these analysts argue, nothing has changed. As one friend says, it is only old wine in a new bottle.

But a careful analysis of Bush's June 6 statement and a comparison of his policies with those of his predecessor reveal that U.S. policy has changed in more than one respect.

First, there is the scope of the negotiations the U.S. aspires to have with the North Koreans. Asked to explain the basic difference between the incumbent's policy and the Clinton administration's approach, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said: "We have expanded the areas of dialogue by putting conventional forces on the agenda."

This is no small matter. Until Bush took power, it was understood that Seoul should take the lead in all negotiations concerning conventional forces. Bush's stance signals a significant repudiation of this consensus. This change contrasts sharply with the position held by the South Korean president, who believes that the matter should be resolved through inter-Korean confidence-building measures and arms-reduction talks.

Indeed, the residents of the Blue House are mystified at the rational behind the Americans' sudden policy shift, which doesn't make political sense as it inevitably brings to the table the issue of U.S. forces in the South, something Seoul wishes to avoid at this early stage of negotiations.

In addition to this significant matter, discrepancies exist between the U.S. and South Korea regarding the level of U.S. talks with the North. The Bush administration is keen on conducting these talks at the low level of diplomats and technocrats, which is a drastic change from the level the Clinton administration employed in its successful negotiations with Pyongyang.

This policy shift does not make South Korea happy. "Starting dialogue at a lower level means delays," says South Korea's ambassador in Washington.

And he is right. Anyone with even a basic understanding of political decision-making in North Korea should know that all serious matters are decided at the highest level.

In a report published by the Council on Foreign Relations that contains a list of recommendations for the president, U.S. experts emphasize, "Serious results-oriented diplomacy must involve top levels of the DPRK leadership."

They go on to say, "dialogue must start at the level of vice foreign minister or higher." This suggestion regarding a procedural matter may seem technical but it is in fact highly political. The future of U.S. policy on North Korea will show to what extent Bush takes this dialogue seriously and how interested he is in tangible results. Not much should be expected if the process is confined to exchanges of senior diplomats.

The CRF experts also urge Bush to follow a "step-by-step approach" as opposed to the comprehensive strategy he presently favors: "Proceed in stages, beginning with the issue of missile exports, then address development and current deployments," they say.

The same report also reminds us that the rough outlines of a possible missile deal is actually already on the table: Accordingly, Pyongyang previously agreed to stop all exports of medium and long-range missiles and related technologies in exchange for assistance in categories such as food. The North Koreans also agreed to freeze the deployment of new missiles.

Not bad for a beginning, a well-meaning observer might assume. But for Bush and his team, this deal has one serious flaw: it was offered to President Bill Clinton. "The policy in Washington today is to be different than Clinton," an American friend said, explaining why the Bush administration insists on starting all over again from square one.

That this time-consuming replay has a negative impact on inter-Korean relations doesn't seem to bother anyone in the Republican administration.