The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, an advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, last week announced a set of policy guidelines aimed at reviving Japan's moribund economy. The comprehensive program, titled "Basic Policies Concerning Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform," points in the right direction.

The question is whether it is feasible. The answer depends on the administration's resolve to live up to its commitments. But making that resolve stick will require the cooperation of everyone concerned, including the bureaucracy, which is not always receptive to change. On this score, Economic Minister Heizo Takenaka, the chief architect of the program, does not appear to be as confident as he once was. For one thing, he no longer calls it "big-boned," meaning hard-hitting.

The program gives top priority to bad-debt writeoffs in the banking sector. Cleaning up the debt mess is essential to leave the "decade of stagnation" behind us and enter a new decade of vitality. The package also calls for reform in seven selected areas, including the privatization of inefficient public corporations, an overhauling of the social security system, the streamlining of central-government grants to local governments, a reduction of the mountainous public debt, and the development of human and physical infrastructures in growth sectors like information technology.

Details will be mostly worked out by bureaucrats. That is where the program will likely meet stiff resistance, not only from government offices anxious to keep their special privileges, but also from politicians tied to special interests. If Mr. Koizumi and his team yield to these conservative forces, the momentum for reform probably will be lost, possibly for good.

Some of the reform plans will be tested financially during the budget-making process that begins in August and continues through late December. The administration is committed to limiting debt issues for fiscal 2002 to not more than 30 trillion yen, yet it must push a range of priority measures, such as building an environmentally friendly recycling system, coping with the falling birthrate and the aging population, reviving the regional economy and promoting urban renewal. All this makes it absolutely necessary to reorder spending priorities. Of course, tax revenues must be used more effectively.

The program sets the next two or three years as an "adjustment period" in which to clear bad bank debts, by far the biggest roadblock to economic revival. During that period it is projected that the economy will stay almost flat. The big question is whether the public -- which has already endured a decade of economic stagnation -- is willing to accept zero growth for such a long time. It is widely understood that there can be "no gain without pain," as Mr. Koizumi himself puts it. But as reforms begin to bite, many people will probably begin to have second thoughts.

The prime minister must stay tuned to the public, which now solidly backs him, and do his utmost to secure its continuing support for his program. For that, he and his colleagues need to attend more "town meetings" and other ad hoc forums to listen to what ordinary people have to say and, if necessary, reflect their views in government policy. But that alone is no guarantee that the public will accept the pain of adjustment.

The key word here is credibility. To lock up public support, the administration must be able to give the people reasonable assurances that a better life will come after the end of the adjustment period. And to give such assurances, tangible steps must be taken, such as providing "safety nets" for the elderly, socially disadvantaged people and workers displaced as a result of technological innovations and corporate restructurings. In other words, the government must also feel the pain.

It will be better if such relief measures are worked out with the help of private groups, such as nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations, which probably have better ideas than politicians and bureaucrats about specific ways to build a better society. Leaving the work exclusively to the bureaucrats -- who are by nature conservative -- could rob it of the flexibility that is needed for effective action.

The reform program has been crafted with the participation of private economists and corporate managers. Were it not for their cooperation, the bold plans in the works -- such as shifting part of the central government's tax-collecting authority to local governments, reshuffling the rigid uses of captive taxes like road levies, and approving of a few years of zero growth -- would have been shelved. The program is not perfect, of course. Further private-sector input will be necessary to improve it.