With just a few days left before Indonesia’s national election, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto is closing in on a goal he has long sought: to become the president of Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous state.
Despite his checkered military past, surveys have consistently shown Prabowo as the candidate to beat, with polls indicating that he might get over 50% of votes in the first round and avoid a runoff.
Should he win Wednesday’s three-way presidential race, analysts expect the 72-year-old, ex-special forces commander to bolster his country’s defense capabilities and try and reclaim Indonesia’s central role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all the while balancing out relations between the United States and China and maintaining close ties with Japan.
This is Prabowo’s third time to run for the country’s top job, after losing in 2014 and 2019 to incumbent President Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, who is constitutionally barred from running for a third term.
The two other contenders — Ganjar Pranowo from the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle and independent Anies Baswedan, both former governors in their 50s — have mostly been neck-and-neck, but still far behind Prabowo.
Prabowo, who is running for the Gerindra Party, has worked hard to change his prior strongman image and appeal to Indonesia’s younger voters, especially those under 40, who account for around 52% of the country’s more than 204 million eligible voters.
“Many such voters do not recall his days as an enforcer for the Suharto regime,” said Nate Fischler, Asia-Pacific analyst at U.S.-based intelligence firm RANE.
“His tone and approach during this campaign, as opposed to 2014 and 2019, is much softer.”
But arguably his smartest campaign move has been to bring in Jokowi’s son, 36-year-old, Surakarta mayor Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate, meaning that he now benefits from the endorsement of an outgoing president that remains very popular in Indonesia.
This is important as many voters are likely to cast their ballots for the candidate they view as the most likely successor to Jokowi’s policies.
“The most basic explanation for why the other two main candidates are not as popular is that they don’t have Jokowi’s support,” said Fischler, while noting that the move has also prompted criticism of “nepotistic dynasty building and democratic backsliding” from Jokowi’s detractors.
While all three candidates portend substantial foreign policy continuity with Jokowi, Prabowo has vowed a more visible leadership role for Indonesia, particularly as an interlocutor between the Global North and Global South while avoiding joining international military coalitions.
Analysts agree that Prabowo is the most experienced of the three candidates in defense and foreign policy, having a military career that spans back to the 1970s and having served as Jokowi’s defense minister for the past five years.
The former general has also spearheaded efforts to modernize Indonesia’s armed forces, rendering him the only candidate with experience in that particular area. He is also expected to continue an economic strategy that has seen Jakarta deepen business ties with Beijing.
Angguntari Sari, a lecturer in international relations at Universitas Katolik Parahyangan, explains that Prabowo has promised to follow up on many of Jokowi’s foreign policy goals, which includes maintaining a stable relationship with Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbors.
In terms of the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes, the expert pointed out that Prabawo is unlikely to take sides, adding that his main focus is to make sure Jakarta has a strong defense force to protect Indonesian territory against foreign encroachment.
The other candidates have similar goals but different views on how to realize them.
For instance, Ganjar agrees with Prabowo on enhancing the country’s naval capabilities, particularly around the Natuna Sea where he advocates the exploitation of gas reserves. But, unlike Prabowo, he has also emphasized the importance of dialogue with China to ease tensions.
Sari explains that Ganjar envisions a more proactive and multilateral approach by, for example, seeking to reform ASEAN’s unanimity principle to make it easier for the bloc to take a stance on regional tensions and endorse a temporary agreement with China while ASEAN finalizes a maritime code of conduct, she added. As such he is likely to have the least confrontational policy toward China in the South China Sea.
Anies, on the other hand, is the only candidate who has explicitly criticized the country’s incumbent foreign policy — widely seen as an instrument to secure foreign investment and increase Indonesia's economic growth — as being excessively pragmatic and transactional.
“Of all the three contenders, Anies is the most internationalist and value-based candidate,” said Sari.
Lina Alexandra, head of the Department of International Relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia, noted that Anies’ vision is to make Indonesia “more proactive, no longer a fence-sitter,” though it is still unclear what kind of value-based foreign policy strategy he wants to pursue.
In terms of ties with Washington and Beijing, analysts believe Indonesia will continue its hedging strategy, regardless of who wins but particularly under a Prabowo presidency, with Jakarta getting closer to either of them whenever economic interests are involved.
Last November, Jakarta expanded ties with Washington to a comprehensive strategic partnership, in a move that opened the door to more robust critical mineral trade and deepened defense cooperation. However, Fischler believes that U.S. concerns about the quality of Indonesian nickel, as well as Jakarta's desire to balance between Washington and Beijing, will likely impose an upper limit on collaboration.
Jakarta is aware of this dilemma but many in Indonesia view it as a price worth paying as maintaining strategic autonomy will be critical to prevent Jakarta from getting drawn into ever-intensifying Sino-U.S. competition.
One key question though is how Washington would react to a Prabowo presidency, given the ex-general’s controversial human rights record. In fact, Prabowo was once barred from entering the United States for years owing to his checkered past.
“Despite his human rights record, the United States will likely want to cooperate closely with him, given Indonesia’s potentially pivotal role in the emerging great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and the desire not to let the country fall under China’s sway,” said Fischler.
According to Joshua Kurlantzick from the Council on Foreign Relations, Prabowo might even upgrade his country’s defense cooperation with Washington. The expert has cited U.S officials as saying that Prabowo has been working well with the Pentagon while Jakarta and Washington have built a tighter security relationship. Whether the other contenders would do so remains unclear.
The same will likely apply to Japan, which is rapidly expanding its footprint in Southeast Asia.
“Japan has dealt with those who have violated human rights in the past,” said Kei Koga, an associate professor at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University. “Tokyo’s basic stance is to engage, not to shut out, so Japan can deal with Prabowo."
Experts agree that all candidates will look to Japan as a critically important foreign trade partner as well as a source of investment and development assistance to help balance out economic relations with China, a key element of Jokowi’s Japan strategy.
But Koga argues that while Ganjar or Anies would likely offer more continuity in bilateral relations — focusing on energy security and a gradual enhancement of defense ties — bilateral defense ties could advance much faster under Prabowo.
“This is because Japan is now eager to offer Indonesia military aid under its Official Security Assistance program, which could enhance Indonesia’s military capabilities in key areas such as maritime domain awareness,” said Koga.
Another critical area will be the new government’s policy toward ASEAN.
Given the current perception of ASEAN as being somewhat overshadowed and paralyzed in terms of its external policy, some ASEAN members like the Philippines have begun looking for alternatives.
“But if Indonesia — as the largest country in the bloc and a symbolic leader of ASEAN — were to lose interest, it would affect other member states’ perception as well,” Koga said, adding that in that sense, Indonesia’s role will be “very important.”
However, after having passed the ASEAN chairmanship to Laos this year, Indonesia will be in less of a position to bring about a major shift within the bloc.
While Prabowo is widely expected to get the most votes on Feb. 14, it is unclear whether he will win an outright majority since he not only needs to secure more than 50% of total votes cast, but also at least 20% of votes in more than half of the country's provinces.
Should Prabowo fail, he must contest a June 26 runoff vote with the second-place finisher, a scenario not seen since 2004. This could be a much tougher proposition as some parties could form coalitions against him.
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