NEW YORK — Imagine that you enter the shower, turn on the water and nothing comes out. You call a plumber who tells you there are holes in the pipes and that repairs will cost you $1,000. You tell him, instead, to turn up the water pressure.

Well, this is the logic behind the U.S. Federal Reserve’s second round of “quantitative easing” (QE2) — its strategy to keep flooding the money pipes until credit starts flowing freely again from banks to businesses.

You wouldn’t expect this to work in your shower, and there is little reason to expect it to work in the commercial lending market. The credit-transmission mechanism in the United States — and elsewhere — has been seriously damaged since 2007.

Small and medium-size businesses in the U.S. depend on small and medium-size banks for access to vital credit, yet too many of these banks remain zombies, unable to lend because their balance sheets are littered with bad commercial and real-estate loans from the boom years.

The U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, was an opportunity to force banks to disgorge bad assets — and thus repair the credit pipes. Instead, banks were obliged only to take equity injections from the government, which they consider politically toxic. As a result, the banks have been focused on returning the bailout funds at the earliest opportunity, rather than using them to boost lending.

The net result is that, even though the Fed has pushed its short-term lending rate down to zero, most banks will lend only on the basis of vastly greater collateral, and at much higher real interest rates, than before the bust. So now America plows on with the cheap option: Flood the pipes and see what comes out.

Make no mistake: Something will come out, though not necessarily where it should. We have already seen the liquidity intended to boost U.S. bank lending instead leak through the cracks into markets as diverse as agricultural commodities, metals and poor-country debt.

What is remarkable about this is that some of QE2’s most prominent cheerleaders actually think that wherever new demand shows up is fine and dandy. After all, it is only “aggregate demand” that matters to the Keynesian faithful. To worry about the composition of demand is silly; it only complicates the algebra.

Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, who berates the Fed for not opening the monetary sluice far wider, showed the follies of the crude Keynesian approach nearly a decade ago. In August 2001, he wrote that “The driving force behind the current slowdown is a plunge in business investment.”

But to “reflate the economy,” he told us, “the Fed doesn’t have to restore business investment; any kind of increase in demand will do.” In particular, “Housing, which is highly sensitive to interest rates, could help lead a recovery.”

A year later, with the Fed not having moved aggressively enough for him, Krugman divined that “it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that [it] needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.”

Wish granted.

Neither the U.S. nor the world can afford a sequel. Asia and the rest of the outside world, which relies on the dollar as its primary trade vehicle and therefore reserve asset, cannot be expected to watch passively as dollars continue to pour into their currency, commodity and asset markets, with no clear end in sight.

Europe, Germany in particular, has been highly critical of the U.S. approach of placing its central bank at the center of its recovery strategy. But the eurozone is doing the same.

Consider the Irish bailout sorcery. The Irish National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was set up in 2009 to clean up Irish banks’ balance sheets. But it does this by giving the banks newly conjured government IOUs — not euros — in return for dodgy debt. The banks then dump the IOUs on the European Central Bank, which then provides the actual cash.

Since NAMA swaps IOUs for bank debt at only about half its face value, the three-way transaction can result in a 1 euro capital loss for every 1 euro the banks get from the ECB. Of course, the IOUs now lodged with the ECB may themselves have to be written down, threatening to undermine the ECB’s own balance sheet.

What is the logic of this crazy carousel? German banks hold at least 48 billion euro in Irish bank debt, British banks hold another 31 billion euro, and French banks hold 19 billion euro.

Since June 2008, German, British, and French banks have withdrawn 253 billion euro worth of credit from Irish banks and other Irish borrowers — 70 percent of the total foreign funds withdrawn. These countries’ authorities are now trying to shield their banks from losses by feigning neighborly concern for the Irish government.

For decades, the U.S. and Europe lectured the world on the importance of cleaning house in the wake of a financial crisis: in particular, repairing or resolving zombie banks. It is time to swallow our own medicine and resume the hard work of repairing our banking systems.

To rely instead on central banks to refloat the U.S. and European economies is an abdication of responsibility that will cost us dearly in the future.

Benn Steil is director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and coauthor of “Money, Markets, and Sovereignty,” winner of the 2010 Hayek Book Prize. © 2011 Project Syndicate

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