China draws geopolitical lessons as Ukraine war grinds on

While the conflict in Ukraine has provided China’s military with valuable insights into modern warfare, Beijing is drawing mixed geopolitical lessons about the risks of using force, the limitations of Western sanctions and the challenge of a direct clash with the U.S. and its allies.

Although China now has greater access to Russian resources, markets and military technology, its steadfast refusal to condemn the Ukraine invasion and distance itself from Moscow has further strained ties with the West.

This is particularly the case with Europe, which has not only grown closer to the United States but also to U.S. allies in Asia, especially Japan.

As a result, Washington and its allies seem more determined than ever to compete with Beijing, redirecting critical supply chains, restricting the export of key technologies and strengthening military partnerships amid warnings that a crisis akin to the Ukraine war could also erupt in Asia, most likely over Taiwan.

Indeed, for several governments in the Indo-Pacific region, the Ukraine war has deepened anxieties over Beijing’s intent, accelerating their decisions to build up deterrence capabilities both individually and collectively, said Amanda Hsiao, a senior China analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank.

“This, in turn, has compounded Beijing's feeling of encirclement and the perception that it is facing an increasingly hostile external environment,” Hsiao added.

Beijing has been feeling the pinch, resulting in Chinese leader Xi Jinping accusing the West of engaging in an “all-round containment, encirclement and suppression" of China that has brought "unprecedented severe challenges."

Key to understanding the geopolitical lessons China is drawing from the war is the evolving nature of Beijing’s ties with Moscow and their shared vision of a post-Western world order where the U.S. is not the sole superpower.

There is no doubt the Ukraine war has put China in a bind, and this includes its own position on the invasion. As Bucknell University international relations professor Zhiqun Zhu explains, Beijing has long advocated for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which should have naturally led it to support Ukraine.

Although not a formal ally of China, Russia is the only major power that has stood by Beijing in the latter’s intensifying rivalry with the U.S., which is why China has refused to condemn the invasion, instead placing the blame on NATO's eastward expansion.

“The strong and special relationship built between Xi and (Russian President Vladimir) Putin is too important to be downgraded at such a critical juncture,” Zhu said.

The dilemma, he said, is that even if China wanted to side with Ukraine, the hostile relationship it has with the West makes it unwise for Beijing to ditch Moscow.

“The longer the war grinds on, the more the U.S. and its allies will be distracted from their larger goal of containing China,” he noted. In this sense, a protracted war in Europe may be beneficial for Beijing, which is why many believe China needs to support Russia for its own national interest.

Although Beijing has yet to openly support Russia’s military, there is a clear desire among Chinese thinkers and strategists to prevent a Western victory, or at least one that results in regime change in Moscow or an erratic Russia, as indicated in a report released earlier this month by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

The report says many intellectuals in China want Beijing to stand by Moscow to prevent a U.S.-led victory, as they see the Ukraine war as yet another manifestation of their country's growing rivalry with Washington.

“At the strategic level, there is a sense among thinkers that a structural logic binds China and Russia closely together. Simply put, if the U.S. is China’s principal rival, it is crucial that America does not defeat and humiliate Russia,” according to the report, which draws on extensive off-the-record interviews with Chinese thinkers and strategists.

At the same time, Chinese thinkers suspect that U.S.-led initiatives targeting Russia in Europe share the same motivation as efforts against China in the Indo-Pacific, including those via “the Quad,” AUKUS, and other initiatives, the report said.

This view has led Beijing to either draw new lessons from the Ukraine conflict or accelerate the application of existing policies.

One of the biggest lessons is that politics and security trump economics.

As the report says, the official thinking for many decades was that economic interdependence with Western powers would act as a deterrent to conflict with China.

But the war in Ukraine has led some Chinese observers to question that assumption.

Indeed, harsh economic security policies being implemented by the U.S., Europe and others mean that trade and business relations will be less likely to deter conflict. The West is moving swiftly to reduce overdependence on the Chinese economy, particularly critical raw materials, while also curbing the export to China of cutting-edge technologies such as semiconductors.

Beijing seems to be grappling with the fact that the Ukraine war has drawn U.S. allies and partners closer together, said Ian Chong, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

The economic reliance on the U.S. and its allies, he said, has also exposed a key vulnerability to China’s rise. To mitigate these risks, China has sought to boost domestic consumption and improve self-sufficiency in key industries, while also developing closer ties with countries in Africa, Latin America, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. It has also hit back at Western tech curbs by tightening its control over rare earth minerals used in computer chips and other components.

The Asian powerhouse is also investing heavily in domestic science and technology to cut dependence on Western high-tech imports.

One of the main reasons for China’s emphasis on self-reliance is that — just like Russia — the country will almost certainly be sanctioned by the West in the event of a conflict.

“The way in which the West came together on economic and financial sanctions on Russia showed Beijing the credibility of the West's resolve, and the means that the West has to respond to an act of aggression,” Hsiao said.

But China has also learned that it could weather at least some of the sanctions if it prepares accordingly. For instance, Beijing has understood the need to accelerate the stockpiling of key supplies, internationalize its currency and reduce its reliance on the U.S. dollar. Not only is China doing more international trade in yuan than ever before, it is also encouraging other countries to adopt the yuan for international transactions.

Another Ukraine takeaway for China is that the U.S. and its allies are very likely to intervene in any Taiwan conflict, although it is unclear exactly how.

The ECFR report says many Chinese thinkers believe Washington might not get directly involved to avoid a conflict with a nuclear-armed superpower but would instead arm Taiwan following the Ukrainian model and seek to build a united front with regional allies, particularly Japan.

“In this context, scholars expect a rapid military build-up to take place in the Indo-Pacific, and view formats such as the Quad and AUKUS as part and parcel of U.S.-led efforts to tilt the regional balance of power to Beijing’s disadvantage,” the report said.

Experts such as Chong draw several conclusions from this. One is that Beijing may be learning that the U.S. system of allies and partners is a challenge it needs to face should it decide to further pursue its expansive claims.

Another is that the use of force in the region may be difficult, costly as well as unpredictable, and that it may need more effective military preparations.

“Competition with the U.S. is unlikely to abate, so China may decide to be more prudent in picking its battles and plan for the long run, focusing more on bolstering its self-reliance even as it continues to develop its military capabilities,” Chong said.

Most Chinese intellectuals cited in the ECFR report do not think Beijing will be the first to initiate a conventional conflict over Taiwan, arguing that Xi’s responses to date have been largely reactive in nature. While they do not exclude the possibility of a war over the island, they believe it is unlikely for the time being.

At the same time, they reportedly see in the Ukraine war an opportunity for Beijing to exploit Western weaknesses to make China more secure, both domestically and internationally, improving ties with emerging economies, presenting itself as a peace broker and stepping up self-reliance efforts.