The SDF has a big problem: Filling its ranks

Reports that a female Maritime Self-Defense Force member was harassed by a senior soldier, and that the military’s blundering attempt to address the situation only compounded the hurt, underscores the continuing difficulties that the Self-Defense Force faces as it adapts to a new era.

The SDF and the Ministry of Defense must transform their culture if Japan is to have the security that it needs in these dangerous times, and more importantly and of immediate concern, meet faltering recruitment goals.

The harassment of the soldier, which occurred from August to December 2022 and involved unwanted touching and lewd comments, resulted in her resignation. It was revealed this week that in dealing with the situation, the victim was forced by a senior officer to meet with and receive an apology from the offender, even though she had no desire to see him. Nor did the officer inform his superiors of the complaint.

Defense Minister Minoru Kihara called the response “outrageous and without regard for the feelings of the victim.” MSDF Chief of Staff Ryo Sakai called the incident “extremely regrettable,” adding that “We put so much pressure on her that she had no choice other than to quit.”

This incident follows that of former Ground Self-Defense Forces member Rina Gonoi, who a court found had endured sexual and physical harassment regularly between autumn 2020 and August 2021. Five GSDF members were dishonorably discharged and three have been charged with sexual indecency; a court will rule on the case in early December.

The defense bureaucracy has recognized the severity of the problem. The SDF set up a consultation system for individuals who claim to have been harassed, but it is underutilized. According to a survey conducted earlier this year, nearly two-thirds (64.2%) of incidents of reported harassment did not use the system. Defense Minister Kihara this week issued a directive that called for all relevant parties to promptly report on the status of their handling of harassment cases.

More must be done. The ministry and the SDF must make clear to all that they have a zero-tolerance policy and offenders will be severely punished. Failure to do so will continue to undermine morale within the SDF, prompt more retirements by capable soldiers and degrade Japan’s security. While there is no proof of causation, the number of female recruits for the SDF fell 12% this year, having previously risen every year since 2017.

This fall compounds the more general recruiting problem that the SDF faces. Since 1990 the strength of the SDF has fallen by more than 7%. In fiscal 2022, which ended in March of that year, the number of active SDF personnel was 228,000, 19,000 less than the goal of 247,000. The number of applicants has fallen by about 30% over the past decade.

In 2022, fewer than 4,000 people joined, undershooting the recruitment target by more than half. The last time the objective was met was in 2013, although Japan recruited more than 80% of its target every year since fiscal 2009, the earliest year for which comparable data is available, except for 2018.

The ratios of actual number of personnel to staffing goals over the past 10 years have fluctuated between 91-94%, a shortfall that prompted a panel of experts to conclude that the armed forces faced “an extremely high risk” of being weakened because of a lack of personnel.

There are three principal obstacles to meeting recruitment targets. First, there is the demographic challenge created by the shrinking number of young people in Japan. The population of Japanese aged 18 to 26 — the core of the SDF’s recruitment pool — fell from 17 million in 1994 to 10.5 million as of October 2021 and could go as low as 7.2 million by 2040. Those who enlist typically serve for two to three years with an option to continue; unfortunately, turnover is high with more than 80% of enlistees leaving after one or two terms.

The second challenge is related to this shrinking pool of potential soldiers. The SDF must also compete with the private sector for enlistees and those companies tend to offer better employment packages. In addition, the economy is performing relatively well with little unemployment, so civilian businesses have more resources to offer even more appealing incentives.

Third, there are image and morale problems with military service. The pacifism that has defined Japanese social thought throughout the postwar era has cast the military in an unfavorable light. That changed somewhat after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident when SDF soldiers were on the front lines of the response and displayed real heroism. This helped consolidate the image of the SDF as a force for good, helping in humanitarian crises and providing disaster relief.

More recently, however, the world has become a much more ominous place with tensions rising throughout East Asia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an important reminder that the idea of aggression is no abstraction and militaries are needed to maintain the status quo — and fight. Realistic though that thinking may be, it was a shocking realization for many Japanese. The end of such naivete may be helpful but it has had an impact on the readiness to serve. Finally, the scandals — including the incident last summer in which a Ground Self-Defense Forces trainee shot and killed two people, wounding a third — have darkened the services’ image further.

The SDF has tried to address some of these problems. The upper age limit for recruits was raised to 32 from 26 in 2018 to create a bigger reservoir of applicants. The mandatory retirement age for colonels, captains and lower-ranking personnel has been raised by one year for each rank, and the age for re-enrollment after retirement and the maximum age for recruiting lower-ranked SDF reserve personnel has been raised as well.

Salaries were raised and another increase is being considered. Expert panels have recommended steps to improve the quality of life for soldiers and the latest defense budget includes such measures as better meals, better accommodations and better base infrastructure, including child care and child-friendly housing, as well as support for spouses and advanced education for recruits who spend a fixed amount of time in service.

A key objective is increasing the number of female service members, from the current 19,000 or 8.3% of the force, to 9% by 2030. That requires better working and living conditions for women as well as a serious and effective program to combat harassment. No woman will join an organization where she does not feel safe or respected.

The administration of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida aims to increase Japan’s defense budget to 2% of gross domestic product to create an effective fighting force. Much of that discussion has focused on the acquisition of new weapon systems such as strike capabilities and new tasks for the SDF. None of that will protect Japan without the human infrastructure that is essential to their operation.

Some experts insist that new automated and unmanned systems will reduce the need for personnel. That is a piecemeal solution, however, and the introduction of those weapons and the transition to their use can be labor intensive. Meanwhile, the SDF is taking on new responsibilities in new domains, such as outer space and cyberspace, forcing personnel to do more with fewer human resources.

This imbalance between the expansion and upgrading of weapons systems and the staffing shortfall will ensure that the Kishida administration’s plan to buttress the nation’s defense capabilities will fall short of its objective. At its core, national defense depends on effective and committed personnel. The government must not lose sight of that basic truth.