Taiwan isn’t as susceptible to invasion as one would think

It is practically conventional wisdom that China’s invasion of Taiwan is nigh upon us.

Military officials, politicians and experts warn that the Chinese government and people are fixated upon uniting “the renegade province” with the mainland, that China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, is determined to make that his legacy and that the balance of forces is shifting in Beijing’s favor.

That last assumption is most worrisome. China has long harbored a desire for unification but has been thought to lack the capabilities to pull it off. If that is no longer true, then perhaps the most important factor in the equation has changed. But success is not assured and that doubt may be the very best deterrent to precipitous action by Beijing.

At the Shangri-la Dialogue earlier this year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the threat to Taiwan was “imminent” and that Beijing is preparing its military to be capable of invading by 2027. Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of the Indo-Pacific Command, agrees and has repeatedly warned that Chinese military exercises around Taiwan are not drills but are instead “rehearsals” for an invasion. In a Fox News commentary, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel identified nine signs that an invasion may be imminent.

Not all are convinced, however. Skepticism about the possibility of or prospects for a Chinese invasion reflect two broad arguments: Either the Chinese military can’t pull off an armed attack or the political leadership lacks the will to do so, primarily because of countervailing considerations.

The second explanation tends to prevail, but the first deserves more attention. A new study by a team of military experts from the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank, puts the military obstacles front and center.

The authors highlight the “inherent complexity” of the Taiwan scenario, much of which stems from the island’s physical characteristics. It is mountainous — the Central Mountain Range covers nearly 60% of the island — and no other place in Asia has tall mountains so close to the water.

The island’s coastline is “remarkably unsuited for amphibious operations.” One study identified just 14 potential invasion beaches. Those landing sites would provide the terrain for one of the largest and most complex military operations in history, demanding a fleet comparable in size to that used by the Allies to land in Normandy on D-Day.

Once an invading force got on the beach — an accomplishment in itself — there would be little territory for staging forces as most of the land behind the landing zones is either rice fields that would swallow tanks and heavy transportation vehicles or cities, which create an urban fighting nightmare.

That unforgiving terrain assumes additional significance if the Taiwanese population is prepared to use it. And, the Stimson analysts note, “Chinese military planners believe Taiwan’s population will mount a formidable defense of their island.” According to a 2024 poll, two-thirds of the population would be ready to fight in their own defense.

History offers reasons to be cautious. The U.S. planned for an invasion of Taiwan during World War II, dubbed “Operation Causeway,” but decided not to proceed. As one military historian concluded, “the more they studied Formosa (Taiwan, pre-Nationalist takeover), the less they liked it.” U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt came to this conclusion, write the Stimson authors, even though the U.S. military “was approaching its absolute zenith of strength and experience,” a decision that “underscored the challenge.”

In contrast, the authors add, China’s People’s Liberation Army has “a mixed record” of amphibious operations.

Others also reject the inevitability of a successful Chinese invasion. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual China report acknowledged that “an invasion of Taiwan would strain the capabilities of China’s untested armed forces. ... These stresses, combined with the combat attrition of China’s forces, the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency — assuming a successful landing and breakout — make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for China’s leaders.”

While Chinese capabilities have improved since then, doubts persist. Two Indian analysts last summer reviewed the research and found that “numerous credible evaluations find that China lacks the requisite logistics, leadership and experience to conduct a comprehensive amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait.”

Senior U.S. military officials concur. In June, U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Ronald Clark explained that China “has to cross an 80-mile (128-kilometer) wet gap that’s being watched by an unblinking eye, multiple countries working together to deter them from that activity today.” He concluded that China has little chance of succeeding in a crossing of that size and scale.

The Stimson report identifies four reasons why an invasion is unlikely: the risk of escalation to nuclear war; the potential negative domestic political consequences it poses for the Chinese leadership; the economic fallout; and the operational difficulties. I’ve focused here on that last factor, but the authors concede that the military argument against invasion, while strong, is in fact the weakest of the four points “because military challenges can eventually be overcome if leaders are willing to absorb the human and resource losses.”

(Experts will add that if they must resort to coercion, Chinese leaders would prefer a quarantine or other forms of economic action to avoid both these operational challenges and the diplomatic response to naked aggression.)

The Stimson authors highlight the attention China pays to Taiwan’s determination to defend itself, which can fluctuate. Most assessments conclude that Taiwan must hold out for at least two weeks before the U.S. can intervene in substance.

This underscores the significance of last week’s Washington Post report that U.S. President Donald Trump declined to approve more than $400 million in military aid to Taiwan this summer. The deal was said to have been “more lethal” than previous assistance to Taiwan and included munitions and autonomous drones.

The reasoning behind that decision is opaque. When asked about the news, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry merely said that “Taiwan is determined and will continue to strengthen its self-defense capabilities, cooperate with the United States and other friendly allied countries, jointly deter aggression and ensure regional peace and stability.”

Taiwan plans to spend 3.3% of its gross domestic product on the military next year, but the Trump administration wants Taipei to increase that figure to 10%. President Lai Ching-te has pledged to boost spending to 5% of GDP by 2030. While Lai’s ability to deliver on that promise is not guaranteed, Denny Roy, a China scholar at the East-West Center in Honolulu, warned in an email that “Taiwan no longer has the luxury of not doing its best.”

Roy is optimistic nevertheless that Xi is not going to launch that invasion. Elective war “is hardly a compelling proposition” for the Chinese government. He explained last year that Xi “reached the pinnacle of the Party hierarchy through a career of careful positioning and quiet ruthlessness, not by taking grand gambles. ... There is no convincing reason to expect him to rush to a military showdown over Taiwan.”

Those are comforting conclusions, but they also assume that we can count on leaders to act in a rational, calculating fashion. There may be more time than we think, but there is still no time for complacency.