Japan’s energy plans endanger real climate solutions

Last year was not a bad one for me. My team at Climate Integrate, a climate policy think tank, expanded. A week spent practicing mindfulness meditation in Bali, Indonesia, enhanced my well-being. Most importantly, being named one of philanthropic organization Climate Breakthrough’s awardees has created an extraordinary opportunity to tackle innovative climate solutions over the next three years.

However, 2024 ended with deep disappointment. On Dec. 26, the Japanese government approved a draft that set weak targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions — a 60% cut by 2035 from 2013 levels — and showed its determination to continue using fossil fuels and nuclear power in the 7th Strategic Energy Plan.

This policy direction does not align with the urgent need to prevent severe climate change and falls short of the responsibilities of an advanced country like Japan.

Dubious is also the process that led to the new climate and energy plan. Numerous governmental committee meetings were held almost weekly throughout 2024, primarily under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The forums covered a wide range of topics, including natural resources, renewable energy, nuclear power, carbon pricing and the electricity market.

Additionally, the Environment Ministry and METI organized a joint committee to address countermeasures against climate change. Cabinet meetings also held discussions on the "green transformation," or GX, a strategy to promote Japan’s transition to clean energy sources.

My team and I monitored these meetings by watching them online, but given their frequency and breadth, it was nearly impossible for us, or anyone for that matter, to keep track of everything that was happening.

Within this complicated process, the Strategic Policy Committee, the main body discussing energy policy, also convened often. At each meeting, documents that had already been prepared by various subcommittees were presented. Members were given three to four minutes each to comment, but real debate was rarely encouraged.

For those familiar with the process, it was evident that the committees served not as spaces for open discussion but as venues for endorsing government-driven policies, replete with members who were sympathetic to these positions. The outcomes were largely predetermined, regardless of what was discussed.

During deliberations on climate targets in a joint Environment Ministry and METI meeting, a young committee member challenged the entire process and called for talks on more ambitious emission reductions targets to take place at a later stage, in December. This unexpected request led the committee to hold additional meetings, resulting in lively debates. Some members expressed their appreciation by pointing out that they were finally able to engage in meaningful conversations.

However, the overall direction did not change. A week later, two Cabinet meetings led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba quickly approved the draft plans as they were — without the additional talks having had any impact on them. One session lasted only 10 minutes, while the other went on for half an hour. The unfortunate reality is that, in Japan, there is a lack of political leadership championing more ambitious climate goals.

Throughout the process, METI, one of the most influential ministries, played a decisive role. Additionally, the committees’ bottom-up structure gave industry representatives the possibility to participate actively and a strong voice in safeguarding their interests. This approach reinforced path dependency, resulting in a renewed commitment to nuclear and thermal energy.

Growing demand for electricity in Japan, in part driven by advancements in artificial intelligence, has been used to persuade stakeholders to accept nuclear power and liquefied natural gas (LNG) as reliable sources. The government has decidedly reversed its previous commitment to reducing reliance on nuclear energy, made after the 2011 Fukushima accident, and approved the construction of new reactors. This is a huge policy shift, but one taken in the absence of public debates, hearings or consultations.

Using the same rationale, the government has emphasized the importance of maintaining thermal power and supported the expansion of LNG imports and construction of new gas power plants. The latter policy and a lack of commitment to phasing out coal contradicts the agreements made at the Group of Seven summit last year, which aim to “transition away from fossil fuels” and “achieve a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035.”

In contrast, renewable energy in Japan has not received the necessary support and attention. The current target is for renewables to make up 36-38% of the electricity mix by the end of this decade and the newly announced target for 2040 is of 40-50%. The lower end of this range implies that there could be nearly no growth in renewables after 2030.

The target for wind power, 4-8% by 2040, is surprisingly low given Japan’s vast potential for offshore wind: Its sea area is the sixth largest in the world. Several studies show that the wind power target could be increased by at least 25%, meaning that the new goal acts more like a cap than an incentive.

Renewables offer significant advantages in aligning with Japan’s guiding energy policy principle, encapsulated in the formula “S + 3E,” which stands for safety plus energy security, economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. Notably, solar and wind power can help reduce fossil fuel imports, mitigate fuel price fluctuations and improve the nation’s trade balance.

In addition, the costs of renewable energy are declining sharply while those of coal and LNG power generation are the same, if not higher, than solar and wind. Above all, the latter are proven technologies that can be deployed rapidly, significantly contributing to decarbonization.

Despite these benefits and strengths, the government’s arguments, including in drafting the energy plans, have focused on the negatives of renewables, such as instability in supply, local opposition and limits to land use. Failed offshore wind projects in the United Kingdom and price hikes in Germany have been presented as bad cases of renewable energy promotion.

The model scenario used by the government made assumptions that favor fossil fuels and nuclear power, suggesting that renewable energy would be costly due to additional expenses associated with managing intermittency, such as batteries and grid developments — regardless of the various methods available to flexibly manage daily and seasonal fluctuations to mitigate these costs.

What we have observed is a lack of balanced and open discussion. The decisions made so far amount to a dangerous gamble that assumes we can maintain the existing industrial structure and fossil-based economy without making crucial changes needed to prevent a devastating climate crisis.

The problem is not just the choices made but the mechanism underpinning them, grounded in a “cannot/should not change” attitude embraced by the inner circle of decision-makers. To really transform society, it is essential that those outside of this group influence the process. It is up to us. We can’t be left behind, but must ensure our voices are heard.