Last week, I made a trip to Bengaluru, also known as Bangalore, and Bangkok.

Both India and Thailand traditionally believe in a diplomacy centered on "balancing.” Both wish to maintain their independence from other countries, make as few enemies as possible and strive to establish friendly relations with all nations. However, I got the impression from my visit that their conventional approaches may eventually have to undergo some changes.

Let us start with India. To begin with, Japanese people who recognize the name "Bengaluru" are likely to have a certain familiarity with the country.

The city sits at 950 meters above sea level, therefore, despite being located in southern India, the climate is mild, and the city is popular with foreigners. It has long thrived on agriculture, but more recently it has become known as India's "Silicon Valley" due to the emergence of industries such as aerospace, IT, machinery, electronics, automotive, biotechnology and defense.

Bengaluru — a city 11 million people call home — is the capital of the state of Karnataka. The state's total area is 190,000 square kilometers and its population 70 million, so it is roughly half the size of Japan in both these metrics. If Karnataka were a country, it would be a medium-sized one.

Traveling there, I realized once again that each Indian state represents a different India that cannot easily be seen if one limits their time to New Delhi. While Karnataka's governor belongs to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, this is a largely ceremonial role and power in the state government is held by the Congress Party, to which the chief minister belongs — which signals the heterogeneity of Indian democracy.

This is because state governors are appointed directly by the central government. While this is similar to the relationship between the president and prime minister in countries like Germany and Israel, it is almost unimaginable in Japan.

The Synergia Foundation, a Bengaluru-based think tank, hosts a conclave every two years, which I attended for the first time. What struck me was how comprehensive the symposium was, with the participation of many experts not only in diplomacy, but also in military affairs, security, advanced technology and futurology hailing from India, Europe, the Unites States, the Middle East and Asia. I had never attended such a meeting before and was left with the impression that the debate on security issues in India is evolving.

Of particular interest was the large number of participants from the Middle East, including Israel. The new "Quad" diplomatic framework in the Indo-Pacific — uniting India, Japan, the U.S. and Australia — and another in the Middle East called I2U2 — which includes, India, the U.S., Israel and the UAE — are moving in parallel. It seems that India’s priority is to strengthen relations with countries like the U.S. and Israel rather than opt for non-alignment, as it has traditionally done.

I once heard someone say that India is shifting from a Russian-made weapons system to a Western one, but in the meantime, it is deepening ties with Israel, which has expertise in maintaining and upgrading Russian-made weapons. This way, India can deter China even if it is cut off from a supply of spare parts from Russia. My trip to Bengaluru confirmed this trend.

There seems to be a similar change happening in Thai diplomacy, albeit on a different scale. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states on its website (in Japanese): "While traditionally favoring an omnidirectional approach to diplomacy, Thailand has developed a more flexible outlook, changing its stance in relation to major countries according to domestic and international circumstances.”

After exchanging views with Thai intellectuals, I am of the view that a shift may indeed be occurring.

I was struck by the generational transformation the country's intelligentsia is undergoing, with a tendency among more senior intellectuals to discuss Thai diplomacy from the perspective of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, or Southeast Asia as a whole. On the other hand, younger intellectuals, while not necessarily representing the majority, seemed to view Thai diplomacy from a more global perspective and were more inclined toward a different approach to China rather than conventional omnidirectional diplomacy.

In particular, the capturing by Hamas of a large number of Thai hostages during its Oct. 7 attack on Israeli soil suggests the need for Bangkok to deepen its reach not only in its immediate regional neighborhood but more distant lands, such as the Middle East and Europe, as well.

Thailand recently inaugurated a new government led by the Pheu Thai party, an incarnation of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's party, after a general election in May. "All politics is local" the saying goes, but it seems to me that Thailand cannot afford that kind of leeway.

My visit to India and Thailand brought to my attention the simple truth that relations with both countries are extremely important for Japan. Tokyo's desire for stability in international affairs is fundamentally consistent with their diplomatic stances in that they both oppose attempts to change the status quo by force.

Japan should further deepen strategic dialogue with India and Thailand while respecting their omnidirectional approach and the shifts it is undergoing.

Kuni Miyake is president of the Foreign Policy Institute and research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies. A former career diplomat, he also serves as a special adviser to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s Cabinet. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Japanese government.