SEOUL -- It turns out that the construct of the "axis of evil" was more than an applause line in the 2002 State of the Union speech by U.S. President George W. Bush. What it really has come to convey is the interaction between axis members, which was little appreciated by Bush speechwriters at the time.

After the quick military victory in Iraq, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il crouched underground as military action against Pyongyang appeared imminent. However, the prolonged insurgency that followed the lightning military thrust has turned the tables for the time being. Use of force against North Korea is no longer a short-term option, particularly in an election year with ongoing insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the broader war on terrorism.

Thus Kim was given wiggle room, and he used it to the hilt, delaying the next round of six-party talks. He signaled his desire for concrete concessions up front -- not vague security assurances -- before participating, such as fuel oil and his country's removal from the U.S. terrorist list.

That's why Bush must be savoring the aftermath of recent diplomatic movements in his direction: First, Iran negotiated a safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency last month, and then Libyan leader Col. Moammar Gadhafi announced that he would renounce weapons of mass destruction. Gadhafi, especially, threw a monkey wrench in Kim's hardline strategy by urging other nations to follow suit.

In this regard, it was revealed that the Libyan strongman had not only been secretly negotiating with U.S. and British officials but that intrusive inspections by intelligence and nonproliferation experts had already taken place by the time Libya agreed to totally dismantle its entire stockpile.

To follow up, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei is due to personally oversee the beginning of the effort this week. So where does that leave Kim?

For one thing, Kim's customer base has been drastically cut back. Iraq and Libya are no longer in the WMD market, while Syria and Iran are under such close monitoring that any sales Pyongyang might be contemplating would be too risky. And lest Kim should decide to go the drug route, the recent seizure of methamphetamines and heroin in the Gulf of Oman was a stark reminder that shipments of contraband cargo could be equally hazardous.

Similarly, the curtain has come down on Pyongyang's efforts to barter its missiles for Islamabad's centrifuges. Apparently, Pakistan was the crucial nuclear connection for at least two of the three members of "the axis of evil" -- Iran and North Korea -- as well as wild card Libya. Centrifuge-design refinements were made in Abdul Qadeer Khan's government-financed laboratories, the brain behind the Pakistani atomic bomb.

The fingerprints left behind in Libya will very likely point to matching templates for both the North Korean and Iranian uranium-enrichment programs. The bottom line is that, while we may not know where Kim's medicine chest is buried, we probably already know what's in it!

North Korea is not alone in being directly affected by developments far from home. The whole soul-searching debate in South Korea in recent months over the terms and conditions for the dispatch of its noncombat forces to Iraq, now set for April, has split the South Korean public. While the United States remains South Korea's closest ally, Seoul did not hide its misgivings over Washington's military action against Iraq, fearful it could be repeated in a showdown with North Korea. It is also reluctant to forgive much of Iraq's $1 billion-plus debt.

Koreans, both North and South, are sensitive about their history, which has often meant being on the receiving end of great-power politics. China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. have all taken turns putting their political and military stamp on the Peninsula's geopolitical landscape.

Ironically, just as Seoul is building closer relations with Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo to better contain the North Korean threat -- offsetting its security dependence on Washington -- it finds itself enmeshed in global politics, most often the result of U.S. policy. And so does Pyongyang.

Evidence of that is likely to come this month ahead of the second round of six-party talks. While Pyongyang has scoffed at the U.S., South Korean and Japanese offer of multilateral security assurances without prior resumption of fuel shipments under the Agreed Framework and without its deletion from the U.S. terrorist list, change is in the air.

Although narrowing this divide will be difficult, the momentum has now shifted in favor of the U.S. and its allies. With Kim's market prospects for missile sales all but dried up, his options have narrowed. Only economic assistance can plug the hole in his budget and that means negotiating a deal with the U.S.

While North Korea is renowned for its shrewd bargaining abilities, time is simply no longer on its side.