HONOLULU -- The National Intelligence Council, which does strategic analysis for the U.S. government, recently published parts of its "2020 project" (www.cia.gov./nic/NIC_home.html), examining forces that will shape the world through 2020, region by region. The East Asia analysis posits three "broad trends" shaping the region:

First, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia will develop along divergent paths. "The countries of the North will become wealthier and more powerful, while the largest states in the South -- Indonesia and the Philippines -- will become poorer, more populous and more unstable." Yet as the two regions become more integrated, the South will become a source of transnational threats to the North.

Second, China will become more powerful and more influential in the region.

Third, "a range of powerful, transnational forces will affect East Asian societies, transforming human aspirations, political attitudes, state-society relations and patterns of governance. ... Societies will become more demanding of governments in different ways and with a range of new expectations."

The NIC analysis highlights nine drivers that will shape the future. While they are neither determinative nor certain to continue, they will influence government policy. They include:

* Demographics. Northeast Asian population growth rates will slow and should peak in the next few decades, making long-term economic growth problematic. By 2020, 25 percent of Japan's population will be over 65. How will pension programs, a pillar of any advanced society's social contract, be sustained?

In contrast, Southeast Asian populations will continue to expand. Even with positive economic growth, though, the most populous states could become poorer per capita. This could decrease literacy, which would exacerbate downward economic trends.

Urbanization will intensify, increasing pressure on infrastructure. Epidemics may result from rising concentrations of people. Migration is also likely to increase as individuals seek economic opportunity among their ethnic communities in other states. This could create political tensions if, for example, ethnic Chinese are blamed for hard times in Indonesia. In that case, China could be compelled to respond.

* Strains on natural resources and the environment. Competition for energy supplies is already intense, with China and Japan fighting for an oil pipeline in Russia. The South China Sea is an arena of competition among Southeast Asian states, and pressures will get worse as population growth intensifies demands on food and water supplies.

* Science and technology. Increasing reliance on information technologies will modernize societies and render them vulnerable to disruption. Political outcomes will be affected as growing numbers of people become interconnected and less subject to government control. More information does not guarantee a more responsible citizenry: Nationalism and extremism have already benefited from the Internet.

* Globalization. East Asia will continue to be integrated into the global economy. That should lead to institution-building as the region tries to come up with rules and distributes technology and knowhow. "Overall, [Southeast Asian economies] stand to gain more than they lose from Chinese growth," but they have to be prepared to adjust to changing circumstances. No matter what, disparities will emerge throughout the region and within countries. Crises could encourage countries to become more insular, nationalistic or regionally oriented, at the expense of global institutions.

* Future of conflict. Japan is likely to continue to have the most sophisticated military in East Asia. Constitutional revision is likely, which will allow it to more fully participate in its own defense as well as international operations. This new capability will create concerns, regardless of Japan's stated intentions.

South Korea will embark on a similar process as it bears more of the burden of its own defense and that of a reunited Korea. China's military modernization will continue apace.

With hot spots Taiwan and the the Korean Peninsula as well as territorial disputes and separatist movements, the possibility of armed conflict will be high.

* Major power dynamics. The United States will remain the predominant power in the region, but China's influence will rise. China will become a "regional center of gravity," and other states will give it more weight in their calculations. At a minimum, they will be less likely to cross its interests. The U.S. and China can work together, but "constructive economic relations will depend on the state of the wider political and security relationship."

Ominously, the report concludes that "Japan's will and capacity to play a larger role in the region will remain open to question."

The report identifies three other drivers: national and international governance, ideational flows, and trends in state structures.

Equally thought-provoking are papers that identify other inchoate forces shaping the future. They include "madmen," the future of force, nation-state failure, the role of science and technology, and social identity.

Two papers are especially intriguing. The first underscores the importance of "wild cards": surprises that no one anticipates. It's tough to focus on surprises because, well, then they aren't surprises. But the key isn't guessing which surprises will occur, but figuring out important surprises that could occur. Think of them as warning bells indicating that critical assumptions about the future are wrong. They tell policymakers to start worrying about radical divergences between expectations and reality.

Recent history would be a lot different if governments had been alert to the possibility of a financial crisis in Southeast Asia; at least they would have been looking for signs of a crash.

The East Asia "scenario" identifies five possible wild cards: a China crash, stalled multilateral trade negotiations, failing democracy in Southeast Asia, protracted communal conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, and a technology-led economic boom that leads a resurgence of national pride and breeds regionalism, which in turn undermines the global economic order. Frankly, none seem too wild for me.

Just as intriguing is an assessment of "the lessons of history." An unblinking backward gaze can tell us a lot about how to think about the future. It certainly encourages speculation about alternative futures since there are as many pasts as there are futures. I'm not talking about "victors" history. Which time frame do we take, and whose perspective? And when taking the long view of history, it is impossible to miss the wild cards that changed futures or transformed or marginalized trends.

Take one basic assumption: Our belief that the commitment to economic growth will trump war looks foolhardy when read against the historical record. Of course, optimists say this present is different because we can learn from past failures. Sadly, there are too many past failures for that claim to be convincing.

Every era has a past to learn from: Yet there have been too many wars and too many economic busts to be convinced that any era is necessarily wiser than its predecessors. That's a happy thought to ring in the new year.