LONDON -- There is a bustle on the streets of Pyongyang that has been sorely missing for at least five years. The shops -- never consumers' havens -- have some goods on the shelves. Restaurants on Changgwang Street, North Korea's pale equivalent of Tokyo's Ginza, are open and serving. Even street vendors have a market for their wares. Things are beginning to move.

The economy seems to be on the rebound from a year or so ago, the lowest point since the aftermath of their "Fatherland Liberation War," which we call the Korean War. Factory chimneys that stood in serried ranks etched on the skyline 12 months ago are now broken by the occasional fuzzy pall of smoke around the tips, and there are cars on the road.

The fuel crisis has eased a little. Power cuts are rare events rather than daily features. The explanation provided is that this is due to the easing of demand as small hydroelectric schemes, pioneered some years ago in Kangye, come on stream, providing surrogate off-grid power supplies for individual factories and workshops.

The past five years has seen an estimated 3 million North Koreans, one in eight of the population, die of starvation. Yet North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is sufficiently confident that the corner has been turned and that the people have been victors in the arduous march. If the economical situation is better, the political situation is best. It is a source of some surprise that Kim is now being seen as a negotiating partner.

In the past 18 months the diplomatic corps has expanded as never before. The number of European Union states with which Pyongyang has diplomatic relations has leaped from five to 13, with France as the only serious holdout. August saw the British formally open their embassy in Pyongyang even as they wait to appoint an ambassador until North Korea permits the installation of the satellite communications technology they have in other embassies worldwide.

The question is, can it last? Politically the future of North Korea hinges on rapprochement with the South rather than on relations with Europe. But time is running out. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's term expires in January 2003. Yet the North seemingly continues to dither and procrastinate over issues as mundane as "family reunion," let alone the promised second summit in Seoul between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il.

The lack of forward momentum is putting Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" under enormous pressure in the South. The former reunification minister in the South, Lim Dong Won, was forced out of office by opposition complaints of undue concessions to the North without any quid pro quo.

Before Sept. 11, the Bush administration's increasing isolationism and unilateralism regarding the Kyoto Protocol, National Missile Defense, the U.N. World Conference Against Racism, and the Convention on Arms Reductions was helping to assuage Western Europe's response to Pyongyang. It looked as though North Korea would see an official embassy established with the EU in Brussels early in 2002.

Since Sept. 11, Europe has rightly stood fair and square with the U.S. in its response to terrorism, backing targeted military action in Afghanistan along with diplomacy and humanitarian aid. The danger is that European collaboration is over extended. The events of Sept. 11 neither correct the American foreign policy errors of the past nor make future U.S. policies infallible.

The current debate between the doves led by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and the hawks of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is important. The latter looks to use recent events as an opportunity to take care of "unfinished business." Of course, at the head of the list is Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but North Korea is listed time and again as a state that has used terrorism, and is mentioned -- along with Iraq -- as one of two possible state sources of high-quality anthrax. Europe and Japan must resist this logic, as following it would be disastrous.

Kim Dae Jung will visit Europe in early December. Encouraging the EU and its Spanish presidency to continue engagement with Pyongyang is likely to be high on his agenda. Yet, even if he succeeds, it's not entirely clear that the bustle on Pyongyang's streets is anything more than the economic equivalent of a the seasonal blooming of a desert.

This year's harvest will again be disappointing, slashed by flood, drought and lack of fertilizer. More food aid will be required, but with all eyes on Afghanistan the vital need may not be noticed. We must hope that it is; otherwise, the consequences might even overshadow those of Sept. 11.