Behold, Russia has got a new czar. No, the Romanovs did not rise from their graves. No, the Russian people did not invite a Romanov cousin, Prince Charles, to claim the throne of his Russian ancestors. No, the authoritarian Russian president, Vladimir Putin, did not crown himself Vladimir I. He just replaced the CEO of the biggest Russian company, Gazprom.

Gazprom is not just the largest Russian company, controlling 94 percent of Russian gas production and owning 100 percent of the domestic gas-pipeline network. It is also the largest gas company in the world, with 25 percent of world output and 23 percent of global reserves. Gazprom is the largest supplier of gas to Europe. Countries like Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Austria have become its dependents in terms of gas delivery. Gazprom accounts for 8 percent of Russia's gross domestic product and for the lion's share of its hard-currency earnings. In other words, this leviathan is a super-player in Eurasian politics.

The metaphor normally applied to Gazprom is a state within a state. The corporation was created by a special decree of Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin, back in 1992. Basically, it took over from the gigantic Soviet gas industry, one of the few viable sectors of the empire's economy. Under the communists, gas exports paid for all the Soviet Union's costly imperial adventures, such as the war in Afghanistan and the space race. The reason the Soviet economy did not collapse altogether under the mismanagement of the Kremlin megalomaniacs was precisely the steady influx of hard currency from its gas industry. The people who ran that industry had to be as hard as nails, pragmatic and sly. One of them was Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Chernomyrdin presided over the painful transition period from hammer and sickle to double-headed eagle. He was successful. Everything else in Russia was falling apart. The gas industry thrived. The Kremlin was impressed. Chernomyrdin was invited to quit his post at Gazprom to become Russia's prime minister. He stayed in that position until spring 1998, when he fell victim to the power struggle among the oligarchs.

After his departure, Rem Vyakhirev guided Gazprom. Vyakhirev proved to be an awesome successor to his former boss. Under him, Gazprom grew into a major player in Russia's domestic politics, often dictating crucial political decisions to the Kremlin itself. Gazprom is only partially owned by the state, and Vyakhirev was quick to use the ambivalent status of his monopoly to acquire more political influence for Gazprom and for himself. He was constantly accused of asset-stripping and nepotism -- but these were hardly unique activities in the muddy waters of the post-Soviet economic mess.

Gazprom spent tons of money to build up a strong gas lobby in the Russian Parliament. The company did not care whether a candidate was leftwing or rightwing, a liberal or a communist. All he had to do to get Gazprom's ear was to promise firm allegiance to the company's interests. However, in the explosive political climate that developed, Gazprom miscalculated. Now Parliament does not mean anything and the future of the country is basically being shaped, single-handed, by its tough, ambitious leader, President Putin.

For Putin, Gazprom has been a headache. Not only is Russia financially dependent on its revenues; Gazprom controls the gas supply to other post-Soviet nations like Ukraine, which gives it powerful leverage over political developments in those weak and volatile states. Putin seems to have grand plans for the post-Soviet geopolitical space. He definitely wants Russia to command -- if not to reunify -- it.

Gazprom has also been a key participant in the new version of the Great Game -- the fierce international competition for the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea region. This involves not only the politically marginal countries of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan but also the two key Middle East nations of Turkey and Iran. Putin seems to be following the motto of the penultimate Russian czar, Alexander III, who once said, "I am my own minister of foreign affairs." The Russian president has been trying to monopolize all foreign-policy decision-making, which means that destroying Gazprom's independent diplomatic stature is a must for him.

So far, so good: The stubborn and independent mogul, Vyakhirev, has been replaced by a Putin protege named Alexei Miller. Miller's mandate is clear: to increase government control over the company. In principle, that could stop the leakage of Gazprom's assets, thus bringing more money to the state. The shareholders -- international investors included -- might be able to count on more accountability and fairness, which would boost trust in the economic resurrection of Russia.

However, Miller is not well-known, and it is questionable whether he will be up to the task. Of course, his promoter, Putin, was not well-known, either, before his career skyrocketed less than two years ago. But sometimes the job of a viceroy (and Miller will play exactly that role as CEO of Gazprom) is harder than the role of the king himself. A king can often get away with unrealistic promises and easy populist slogans; his image is largely constructed from flattering newspapers photographs and clever TV clips. A viceroy has to build his reputation on something different: revenues and day-to-day effectiveness.

Another reason for possible concern is the suspicion that Putin is accumulating more power than he can prudently exercise. It is bad enough for a nation to house a state within a state. But it is even worse for it to have no economic pluralism at all. Even given all the allegations about the corruption that plagued Gazprom, under its previous leaders the company contributed strongly to the system of checks and balances in Russia. So what do the current changes in Gazprom signify: a step forward, toward an advanced free market, or a step back, toward a state-run economy?