For decades now, the mere mention of the word Munich has invoked an image of craven appeasement. In the name of preventing more "Munichs," the postwar Western world has seen fit to intervene in a variety of conflicts, from Indochina to Kosovo.
Curiously, few seem to have bothered to inquire how others see Munich. Japanese conservatives, for example, have a completely different view. For them, the 1938 Munich Conference concessions by then British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain allowing Nazi Germany to move into Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland, were seen as a stroke of brilliant diplomacy. But for Munich, Japan probably would have won its war in Asia and the Pacific, they argue.
As they see it, the British move, supported by France, encouraged Adolf Hitler to look East and attack Poland rather than West into France. From there it was but a short step to Hitler's launching his foolish invasion of the Soviet Union, which guaranteed Nazi Germany's eventual defeat. With Germany defeated, Japan no longer had any chance in its own war against the Allies.