An election in Tuvalu that saw a pro-Taiwan prime minister lose his seat in parliament is fueling speculation that the tiny Pacific island nation could become the next country to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China following Nauru, which switched sides last month.
But how big a loss would Tuvalu's diplomatic shift be for Taipei?
With only 12 diplomatic partners left, the loss of yet another would be regrettable but wouldn’t bring about much change to Taiwan’s status or its ability to operate in the world, especially as the self-ruled island is already implementing a more pragmatic approach in order to circumvent diplomatic obstacles.
Indeed, experts argue that Taipei would probably benefit from shifting its energy and resources away from its decadeslong competition with Beijing over formal recognition.
“Diplomatic partners used to matter more when Taipei was competing with Beijing to represent China, but it no longer wishes to do so,” said Ian Chong, a professor and expert of international relations at the National University of Singapore (NUS).
Countries that have official ties with Taiwan recognize the “Republic of China.” Should they all break ties, then there would be one less reason for Taiwan to maintain that official title, which suggests some direct connection with China, Chong added.
Whether Tuvalu will actually change sides, however, remains unclear, as the country has yet to choose a new prime minister.
Former finance minister Seve Paeniu — one of the top contenders to replace outgoing Prime Minister Kausea Natano — was reelected to parliament in late January after pledging that he would review the nation’s ties with Taipei.
But he is not the only candidate for the position. Enele Sopoaga, who was prime minister from 2013 to 2019, has emphasized that he has no interest in flipping diplomatic recognition.
"You can read my lips: I will not make any slightest change. There is no need to even look at that issue right now," the lawmaker told Taiwan’s Central News Agency.
Officials from regional powers such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand and China are closely following events in Tuvalu, waiting to see who legislators will select for the top job at a time when Pacific island nations are becoming increasingly important in the intensifying Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry.
But while the strategic location of these islands might be important for regional powers, their significance for Taipei is limited.
“After seeing one diplomatic shift after the election, I think a second one would sting even less,” said Lev Nachman, a political science professor at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University.
“Many Taiwanese no longer pay much attention to these events, as they are not that meaningful for everyday life on the democratic island,” he added.
The loss of Nauru — the 10th country to sever ties with Taipei in eight years — was sudden, as it came only a few days after Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won a pivotal presidential election that could set the stage for continued confrontation with China.
Lai’s victory made the independence-minded DPP the first party in the island’s history to win three-straight presidential terms, a vote of confidence for a party that has long emphasized that Taiwan is already a de facto sovereign nation.
Beijing tends to force states it enters into official diplomatic relations with to take on some version of a declaratory “One China” position that tends to exclude official recognition of Taipei.
In this context, the possible loss of Tuvalu — a nation of just 11,000 people — has exacerbated concerns about Taipei being increasingly ostracized internationally.
But is this really the case?
Taiwan had diplomatic ties with 56 states when the United Nations switched recognition to Beijing and booted out Taipei in 1971. That number has now shrunk to 12, with most remaining countries being small states in Latin America and the Pacific. Amid Chinese pressure, that figure may continue to shrink.
Official recognition provides Taiwan with partners that can speak up for it and make proposals on its behalf at key international institutions.
Maintaining them also helps counter Beijing's claim that the island is a Chinese province.
“If the diplomatic losses continue, then this could lend more legitimacy to the claim that Taiwan is not a country because it does not even entertain real diplomatic ties with other nations,” said Simona Grano from the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis.
However, in terms of Taiwan’s importance in the world as a critical stakeholder in resilient supply chains and as the main manufacturer of semiconductors, “this would not change much,” Grano added.
Taipei understands this.
Following Honduras’ decision to switch sides last year, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen stressed that her government would no longer engage in “a meaningless contest of dollar diplomacy with China."
Besides being outmatched in this arena, analysts say another important reason why checkbook diplomacy is increasingly less of an option for Taiwan is that using taxpayer dollars to buy recognition for potentially unclear gains is seen as less acceptable in the young democracy.
“Trying to outbid Beijing to keep diplomatic partners is like paying ransom for hostages,” said Sean King, a Taiwan expert and senior vice president at New York-based advisory firm Park Strategies. “It only encourages more such demands for cash.”
Indeed, Paeniu told The Washington Post that the decision over diplomatic recognition “boils down to whichever country ... offers the greatest support to achieving Tuvalu’s development priorities and aspirations.”
Wen-Ti Sung, an expert on Taiwanese politics and cross-strait relations at the Australian National University, has a similar view.
“Taiwan cannot indefinitely match China dollar for dollar in buying friends, so it must value quality over quantity,” he said.
That means that Taiwan must prioritize building ties with friends and partners who share fundamental values.
And that is precisely what the self-ruled island has been doing in recent years, switching to a more pragmatic approach of expanding unofficial ties with like-minded democracies, particularly powers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, India and European nations.
Indeed, growing unofficial ties with these nations has become far more important for Taiwan, as they bring far more in terms of diplomatic, economic and security support than its remaining formal alliances with mostly small states.
“Alternative para-government diplomacy will play a key role for Taiwan's international outreach,” Sung said.
Whether interparliamentary diplomacy, local government exchanges or cultural and sports exchanges, all of these will strengthen goodwill between not just presidents and ministers, but also the people, he said.
NUS’ Chong agrees.
“Informal diplomacy is the most viable option available to Taipei, given Beijing’s pressure,” he said, adding that this has already become “the new normal.” By doing so, Taiwan is also limiting the impact of Beijing’s pressure tactics, as the move enables substantive international participation in everything but name.
“Taipei can also do more to raise international understanding of its situation and unique status,” Chong noted, pointing out that he doesn’t think there is particularly strong interest in Taipei to compete for formal recognition anymore.
In an interview with The Japan Times last March, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu stated that if any country wanted to bolster relations with Taiwan — whether in politics, diplomacy, culture or trade — Taipei would not consider their relations with Beijing as something that precluded this.
However, he stopped short of saying whether Taipei was open to dual recognition.
Beijing firmly opposes dual recognition, and uses this opposition as a key component of its efforts to isolate Taiwan.
But with Beijing’s strategy failing to prevent Taiwan from forging quasi-formal ties with key nations, it is unclear what China could do about it.
“Beijing could seek to punish states that have more substantive ties with Taipei, as it has with Lithuania and Czechia,” Chong said.
However, these efforts would have limited effect unless the states in question are significantly dependent on China.
This is important, Chong said, as states and their populations “are gradually learning to factor in Chinese pressure, making them less pliant to Beijing’s demands in the future.”
With your current subscription plan you can comment on stories. However, before writing your first comment, please create a display name in the Profile section of your subscriber account page.