Pyeongtaek, South Korea –

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida enters the New Year with his public approval rating the lowest ever and still dropping.

He has just replaced yet another embattled minister — the fourth appointee to fall since the last Cabinet reshuffle a few months back. Meanwhile, voices of dissent from inside his party are spilling out to the public with greater frequency and vigor.

Under normal circumstances, this would be an “all hands on deck” situation in the Prime Minister’s Office, with Japan’s leader singularly focused on getting the party in line and winning back favor with the public.

Instead, Kishida continues to talk about tax hikes aimed at a doubling of Japan's defense spending and is now gearing up to travel to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States starting from Monday of next week. That all seems counterintuitive in a parliamentary system where the ruling party can swap the nation's leader at any time, especially when political prospects seem dim.

While Kishida's behavior may not seem to match his political circumstances, it reveals the three pillars of his survival strategy for 2023. First is giving personal focus to defense measures. Second is pushing off any drastic decisions that could further upset the internal dynamics of the Liberal Democratic Party. Finally, Kishida will go "all in" on the Group of Seven summit scheduled to take place May 19-21 in Hiroshima, after which he can make bolder moves as necessary.

There are several reasons why the LDP might seek to oust Kishida this year. First and foremost, his plummeting approval ratings gives the opposition a chance to gain ground in the forthcoming “unified elections” — the numerous municipal and prefectural elections slated to occur in April.

Furthermore, Kishida's perceived indecisiveness in managing domestic politics has left both him and the party vulnerable. Kishida's failure to deal swiftly with the Unification Church and other scandals has allowed fissures inside the LDP to expand, and intraparty opponents now see openings for making their moves, especially if Kishida continues to spend time away from Tokyo.

But Kishida has reportedly intimated to party heavyweights that he wants to stay in power at least until he can host the G7 Summit. Japan holds the G7 presidency this year and Kishida personally advocated for the summit to take place in his hometown of Hiroshima. He intends to leverage the meeting as an opportunity to advocate for his "world without nuclear weapons" platform and to demonstrate Japan's role as a global leader.

So, how does Kishida make it that far?

All indicators point to the fact that his goal is to play the "stability" card until the end of May. Kishida will attempt to illustrate through his rhetoric and actions that the political instability that would come from a change in administration is worse than keeping a prime minister who has suboptimal public approval ratings — that is, the devil you know is better than the devil you don't.

In line with this strategy, Kishida will continue to highlight global instability and the need for strong defense. That will not be difficult to do with heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula, China's behavior towards Taiwan and Russia's continued aggression against Ukraine.

So while there may be some political costs associated with discussing tax hikes, the corresponding discourse actually enables Kishida to keep security issues at the forefront of political conversations. As long as Japan’s security is in question, the notion of government stability increases in importance — or so the political logic goes.

Kishida will also avoid any sweeping decisions related to the LDP. He does not need everyone in the party to fall in line behind him right now — he just needs to prevent enough opponents from organizing the numerical support required to push him out. Some of his perceived "indecisiveness" may actually be by design to avoid the more polarizing decisions that others may be pushing for him to take.

Finally, the G7 summit offers a key milestone that Kishida can directly target. It is easy to argue that the LDP should not disrupt the government administration right before it is supposed to host a once-a-decade event for the country — particularly one that is taking place in the prime minister’s hometown. In this way, Kishida can argue that no matter how low his public opinion ratings get or how poorly the April Unified Elections go for the LDP, they should back Kishida for just another month until the G7 summit is over.

After the G7 gathering, Kishida's options open up. If the summit goes well, the prime minister could dissolve the Lower House and generate a snap election. He has already signaled that a general election must happen before he pursues tax hikes, so perhaps he is simply laying the groundwork for implementing this strategy. A snap election could help him reset the political clock and regain his footing as prime minister, something that Shinzo Abe was adept at doing in achieving his record-long tenure atop the government.

Alternatively, Kishida could execute another Cabinet reshuffle. A summer Cabinet reshuffle would be on the early end of the window for a routine swap out of ministers, but Kishida could opt for surrounding himself with a more popular, stable and effective cohort to enhance his political fortunes.

We also cannot rule out that Kishida has already made a deal with some of the party heavyweights to step down if they will back him until after the G7 summit is done. That is not to say that he must honor that deal — Abe was known to play the “circumstances have changed” card in backing out of his handshake agreements with other LDP lawmakers, so Kishida could be making the same sort of plays here.

The question is whether the party will allow him to do any of these things. Much will hinge on Kishida's public opinion and prospects for the April Unified Elections. The LDP has allowed a prime minister to run into single-digit approval ratings before swapping leaders (that distinction goes to the gaffe-prone Yoshiro Mori in 2001), but if political livelihoods are at stake, the LDP may not exercise as much patience here.

Whatever the scenario, we should not expect Kishida to go quietly into the night. After all, he politicked his way to the nation’s top job through an ouster of former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and he has been making moves necessary to stay in office as long as possible.

Kishida still has his dream of “new capitalism” that remains stillborn since the original announcement and he will be reluctant to join the long line of short-lived Japanese prime ministers. His actions of late have tipped his hand as to how he intends to outlive his current political prospects.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.