KYOTO –

At a regional security meeting hosted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Malaysia earlier this month, the Thai foreign minister, Gen. Thanasak Patimaprakorn, openly flirted with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi while emphasizing a profound friendship between the two nations.

"At this moment, we believe this is the best time for our relationship, especially for my personal contact with Minister Wang Yi who is a very nice and polite person," Gen. Tanasak said in describing Thailand's relationship with China, which, he claimed, goes back 1,000 years. "If I were a woman, I would fall in love with his excellency," Thanasak added.

There are a myriad of reasons behind Thailand's renewed comradeship with China. Since the coup of May 2014, Thailand has found itself being isolated by the international community. A number of Western governments have imposed tough sanctions against the military regime led by Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, who appointed himself prime minister.

While the European Union and Australia initiated their own punitive measures against the regime, the United States has gone further by seriously reviewing its strategic cooperation with Thailand.

Washington has always been at the cornerstone of Thai foreign policy. The two countries have long been in an alliance based on a military treaty, effectively strengthened by the annual military exercise code-named Cobra Gold. But the coup forced the United States to recently downgrade this important military operation.

Simultaneously, the United States also reclassified Thailand in the third tier of its "Trafficking in Persons" (TIP) Report for the second year in a row. Thailand is now relegated to the same category as states notorious for human trafficking such as Syria, Iraq and North Korea.

Faced with international sanctions, the Thai junta has desperately searched for new sources of legitimacy to sustain its existence. Thus, the overt flirtation from the Thai foreign minister to his Chinese counterpart was part of such a strategy. But it could become counterproductive for Thailand itself and the region.

The confession of affection from Thanasak to Wang would surely cause some discomfort among other ASEAN members whose relationship with China has long been marred by distrust and suspicion.

One of the most controversial issues shaping interstate relations in Southeast Asia has been the South China Sea dispute. Thailand's cozying up with China could further complicate the overlapping claims in those troubled waters.

For years, ASEAN has failed to come up with a unified stance vis-a-vis a solution to the South China Sea dispute. One main hurdle has been the different political interests of some ASEAN members in regard to the conflict. Non-claimants like Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar are reluctant to condemn China's aggressive stance toward their fellow ASEAN members that have claimed ownership of some parts or all of the islands. Hence, the strengthening of the relationship between Thailand and China could shift the regional balance of power.

Meanwhile, China's strategy toward Thailand has been very proactive. The two nations established diplomatic ties in 1975. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, they formed a loose military alignment against Vietnamese communists in Indochina. In the post-Cold War era, bilateral relations have remained healthy thanks to the absence of territorial disputes, the firm connections between the Thai royal family and the Chinese leadership, and the well-integrated Chinese community in Thailand.

The Sino-Thai free trade agreement, the first between China and an ASEAN country, took effect on Oct. 1, 2003. Thailand has subsequently constructed an alliance with China in a similar way it has done with the United States. The Cobra Gold exercise lent its form and purpose to Thailand's military rapprochement with China. Since the early 1980s, Thailand has purchased arms and military-related equipment under this partnership at "friendship prices."

Sino-Thai military links are among some of the most developed in the region — second only to Myanmar, China's quasi ally. Thailand is intentionally balancing its military and financial dependence on the United States by nurturing better relations with China. Although progressively advancing over the years, Sino-Thai defense ties have quantitatively and qualitatively lagged far behind the U.S.-Thai security relationship.

And yet Thailand now is evidently sliding into China's warm, embracing arms. Most Thai Cabinet ministers and powerful businesses in Thailand have significant investments in China. Thailand's Charoen Pokphand (CP), one of Southeast Asia's largest companies, has been doing business in China since 1949. Activities between Thai and Chinese business conglomerates are regularly conducted, with exchange visits and the sharing of business information.

Thailand has also welcomed China's soft power with arms wide open. More Thai students are now keen to learn Mandarin, prompting China to dispatch a large number of language teachers to Thailand. Clearly, Thailand's foreign policy toward China has been implemented through a win-win formula, based on their principal rule of "respecting each other's sovereignty."

From the Thai junta's perspective, the current flirtatious policy toward China is perhaps the only available choice. But critics question whether China really represents any solution to Thailand at this critical juncture of its political crisis. For one thing, unlike the United States, China is unable to provide a source of recognized political legitimacy to the Thai junta.

Moreover, the fact that China is willing to piggyback on the Thai military regime could do some serious damage to Thailand's democratization. China has just injected another dose of confidence among the Thai military leaders to hold on to their rule despite international pressure.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is an associate professor at Kyoto University's Center for Southeast Asian Studies.