The U.S. Senate voted July 21 to hold the line on procurement of the F-22 Raptor fighter jet. The vote was a victory for U.S. President Barack Obama, his secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert Gates, and defense budgeting sanity. The move effectively forecloses the prospect of Japan's purchasing the troublesome plane. That is not a bad thing. This country has better uses for its diminishing defense funds.

The F-22 is the world's most advanced fighter aircraft. It was designed in the 1980s to ensure U.S. dominance of the air against a future Soviet threat. That enemy vanished, but the F-22 did not: The U.S. has purchased 187 of them, spending $65 billion, or $350 million per plane.

The exorbitant price tag is not the only reason defense planners have been reluctant to buy more Raptors. The plane has been plagued with maintenance and operating problems. Its stealth technology has not performed as promised, pushing up maintenance costs. Even rain is apparently a problem for the plane's surface. As a result, the F-22 requires more than 30 hours of maintenance for every hour it is in the air. Its hourly cost of flying exceeds $44,000, again almost 50 percent more than that of the plane it is supposed to replace. The Pentagon estimates that just 64 percent of the fleet is currently "mission capable." There has not been a single F-22 mission in Iraq or Afghanistan.

That could be because the plane is not performing as promised. In its first operational test flight in 2004, the F-22 fully met only two of 22 key requirements. Two years later, it fully met five, and last year, when squadrons were deployed to U.S. bases, it met seven, less than one-third. Nonetheless, supporters sought to increase funding for the plane and inserted $1.75 billion into the defense budget to acquire yet more.

For some of those supporters, the big concern was the prospect of a Chinese fighter that might challenge U.S. air superiority. In reality, the more pressing threat was job losses. The plane is built in or gets supplies from 44 states — a deliberate strategy by the plane's manufacturers to develop a constituency for continued production. (Original cost figures were also reportedly low-balled because accurate ones would have made the project appear unacceptable from the start.) It is estimated that 11,000 jobs could be lost if the production lines are ended.

Mr. Obama, backed by Mr. Gates and most of the Pentagon brass, objected to continued funding. Mr. Gates said he had heard "no substantive" national security arguments for the plane. He also recognizes that every dollar spent on the F-22 is a dollar that is unavailable for other, more pressing security needs. Mr. Obama threatened to veto the entire defense budget if the additional F-22 funds were included. In a victory for sensible and realistic defense planning, the Senate removed the funds.

Instead, money will go to build multirole F-35 fighters, which will be primarily used to attack ground targets. The U.S. wants 2,400 of these jets, which will, according to defense planners, be better suited to counter future security threats. Moreover, F-35 production is reckoned to create 82,000 jobs, more than offsetting the losses triggered by cutting the F-22.

The U.S. decision is a blow to Japanese security specialists who badly want the F-22. Japan's fighter force is aging and in need of a replacement. For them, the F-22's price tag is irrelevant. More important is the fact that China is modernizing its air force. Their concerns should be assuaged by Mr. Gates' confidence: The U.S. will be flying more than 1,000 F-22s and F-35s by 2020, while China will not have any fifth-generation planes.

Some Japanese insist the F-35 is not good enough. They reason that if the U.S. has the F-22, then so should its ally, and they are prepared to double down: For them, U.S. readiness to sell the F-22 to Japan is a litmus test of the U.S. commitment to the alliance.

This is a flawed argument. Contrary to widely held assumptions, Washington's refusal to sell the plane does not reflect a fear of offending China. U.S. law prohibits sale of the F-22 to any foreign government. And Japan is not prepared to pay the cost of the plane — which would increase as a result of export preparation. (When arms are exported, certain items are removed or put in "black boxes" to prevent them from being reverse-engineered, copied or stolen.) Moreover, Japan's defense budget has been declining, and the costs of realigning U.S. forces as well as missile defenses have already consumed scarce defense funds. The F-22 is an unnecessary, unaffordable luxury.

Defense budgets should be prepared to respond to threats. Priorities should be determined by the probability and severity of those threats — not institutional inertia, equipment envy or industrial policy. The need for smarter defense procurement is increasing as the economy slows, resources dwindle and threats diversify. Indeed, by diverting precious resources, the acquisition of F-22s might even reduce Japan's security.