Last month Japan passed legislation that opened the door to sending the Self-Defense Forces on missions to Iraq. In principle, this was a very positive step forward for those who had hoped to see Japan play a greater role in international security affairs.

Since the passage of the legislation, though, the Koizumi Cabinet seems to be backtracking. It had been suggesting that Japan's specific contributions to operations in Iraq might not be determined until November. Now, with the recent terrorist bomb attack against the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, the decision may be pushed back further. If Japan remains indecisive in its contribution in Iraq despite the now-established legal framework, it will not only hurt Japan's national interest but also could damage its foreign credibility.

There are several possible reasons why Japan has not yet determined where and when it will dispatch SDF personnel in Iraq. Some argue that the security situation in Iraq is not stable enough for Japan to send SDF to a clearly defined "noncombatant area." These critics argue that if the SDF suffers casualties, public opinion in Japan, which has been growing more supportive of the SDF's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and humanitarian disaster relief, could turn against such missions.

Others argue that Japan's domestic political schedule -- the Liberal Democratic Party's presidential election in September followed by the Lower House election -- has made Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi politically risk averse. Koizumi, they argue, needs to save his political capital for upcoming domestic political battles, and he cannot afford to make any decision that could jeopardize his position.

Although somewhat convincing, these views do not adequately consider Japan's national interest. Burden-sharing as a U.S. ally is only part of the rationale. In fact, sending SDF troops on support missions to Iraq is not only in Japan's political interests but also its economic interests.

Japan's heavy dependence on the Middle East for its energy resources (approximately 88 percent today) is a well-established fact. It is in Japan's interest therefore to contribute to stability in the Middle East. How Japan develops its relations with a post-Hussein Iraq, the country with largely uncultivated oil reserves, is critical in its continuous efforts to diversify energy sources. It is in Japan's interest therefore to participate in shaping the future of Iraq so that it can build its own relationship with a new government in Iraq.

Participation in the reconstruction of Iraq is also in Japan's political interest. While often criticized as blindly following U.S. policy, Japan in fact has a history of exercising an independent approach in its policy toward the Middle East. Disagreement between the two allies over policy toward Iran is one such example. Having "boots on the ground" -- SDF forces in Iraq -- helps Japan make an independent assessment of the Iraqi situation and thus enable Tokyo to formulate Iraq policy without solely relying on information from other countries.

Last, it is simply irresponsible of Japan to continue to rely on other countries in protecting its national interests abroad. War against terrorism and against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global efforts, and thus every nation in the world has to share some responsibility in countering these threats. Japan cannot continue to escape its due responsibility by hiding behind an argument that is understood solely in the context of the Japanese polity.

Some may argue that dispatching the SDF is not the only contribution Japan can make in Iraq. This is a legitimate argument. In fact, it is important for the Japanese government to come up with a comprehensive policy toward Iraq. However, it is also a fact that Koizumi made the dispatch of SDF a centerpiece of Japan's contribution to Iraq by publicly stating his will to pave the way for their dispatch. Now, he has to follow up on his words.

Of course, the decision Koizumi and his government make on Japan's contribution to Iraqi reconstruction will come with a certain degree of political risk. But Koizumi should not be afraid of that risk. Instead, he needs to make his decision based on his views of Japan's national interest (not according to a domestic political calendar), and present his case to his fellow politicians as well as the Japanese public.

The 1991 Persian Gulf War was a traumatic experience for Japan. Despite its generous financial contribution to the coalition military operation, Japan was criticized for its checkbook diplomacy, and the international community considered its postwar dispatch of minesweepers to be "too little, too late."

Over a decade later, despite its significant contribution in Operation Enduring Freedom and the ongoing Afghan reconstruction efforts, Japan faces yet another prospect of similar criticism if it fails to make a robust contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq. The onus is now on the Koizumi government to make a difficult decision on whether to send SDF troops and thereby share the risks with other nations.