MOSCOW -- The current crisis in the Middle East is a conundrum for Moscow. Russia's involvement in the area has traditionally been painful and controversial, heavily loaded with historical associations, cultural stereotypes and racial prejudice. Rarely did Russian diplomacy score a success there, while defeats have been numerous.

The Russian empire was an exceptionally anti-Semitic country. Physical violence and political discrimination against the Jews spurred their massive exodus overseas at the turn of the last century. One of the few words the Russian language has contributed to the international vocabulary is pogrom. The plight and subsequent displacement of Russian Jews became a powerful push for creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin initially supported the idea. The Arab countries looked pro-Western and corrupt in his eyes, while Zionism promised an independent international stance and even leaned toward socialism in its economic outlook. But soon after the creation of Israel, the dictator succumbed to anti-Semitic paranoia. He started viewing Soviet Jews as Israel's fifth column and launched purges against them. A number of Jewish doctors were even accused of planning to poison him. Only the dictator's timely death from a stroke prevented another Holocaust, Soviet-style.

Stalin's successors shared his anti-Semitism. Also, by the mid-1950s the Middle East saw a number of revolutions that combined national liberation movements with socialism or Marxism. Moscow enthusiastically supported leftwing factions in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The newly independent states quickly allied with Moscow against the West -- and Israel.

During the next 30 years, many Arab leaders got their weapons -- and sometimes orders -- from Moscow. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat became Moscow's favorite pet. Israel stood for the "evil one."

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the situation changed. Rejecting almost everything associated with the Soviet past, the new elites dumped Arafat and other "progressive" Arab leaders, mended relations with Israel and cracked down on anti-Semitism within the country.

The honeymoon with Israel did not last long, though. By the end of the 1990s, Russia began retreating toward traditional political sentiments. Moscow started courting old allies like Syria and Iraq and befriending Iran. Yet, for a number of reasons, both domestic and international, it is impossible for the Kremlin to view the Mideast situation in black and white.

The traditional anti-Israeli stand has been considerably weakened by economic cooperation with the Jewish diaspora worldwide. Pro-Israeli lobbying has entered Moscow's corridors of power and cannot be discarded. No matter how strong authoritarian tendencies in Russia might be, the country is part of the global economy now and cannot afford the luxury of choosing its friends and enemies by ethnicity or faith.

Furthermore, after two exhausting wars against Islamic nations, first in Afghanistan and then in Chechnya, anti-Muslim feelings in Russia are running high. Although many rank-and-file Russians may be anti-Semitic, many more are anti-Muslim, anti-Arab and anti-Third World in general. Numerous terrorist acts of the past decade on Russian terrain have been perpetrated by Chechen militants or at least attributed to them.

President Vladimir Putin, although far from being a pro-Western liberal, was only too glad to ally with Washington following the Sept. 11 attacks. Russians in general are inclined to interpret the current international turbulence as a powerful manifestation of the so-called clash of civilizations, viewing the Muslim world as a collective adversary.

It is also clear to the Kremlin that it does not have much leverage over former allies any longer. Having once let a client state go, it is extremely difficult to tame it again, particularly when it can be easily seduced by a new power like Saudi Arabia, choking in wealth.

No matter what the Kremlin might think about Arafat vs. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it must acknowledge the fact that Chechen militants on the Russian territory are part of a larger terrorist network involving the same Arafat, Syria and Iraq. In this situation, it would be sheer madness to support the Palestinian cause unequivocally.

Until now, Putin's diplomacy in the Middle East has been balanced if not overly subtle. Maintaining military ties with Iran and to a lesser extent Iraq, he appeases the Muslim world and demonstrates to the West that Moscow's influence in the Middle East is still considerable, even if past its prime. Condemning terrorist attacks coming from the camp of Islamic militants, he supports Russia's claim to be part of the "civilized" world, a U.S. ally in the war on terror.

Of course, Putin realizes that the crisis in Palestine is causing much confusion and embarrassment in Washington as well. There is little disagreement between Russia and America on that. Neither nation knows how to manage this hotbed of terrifying violence.

But if President George W. Bush is serious about his intention of punishing Iraq for supporting international terrorism, this could potentially lead to a conflict with Moscow. In 1991, the waning Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to back operation Desert Storm; in 2002, there is hardly any way to make Moscow support a large-scale military campaign against Saddam Hussein.

It's not that Putin likes the Iraqi dictator or his policies. He will, however, oppose another war against Hussein to prove his independent stature in the world arena, particularly to European countries appearing lukewarm to the anti-Iraqi punitive action envisaged by the American side. Also, Iraq is close to the oil fields of Central Asia much coveted by Russia, and oil is what makes the Russian economy tick.