HONOLULU -- With the inauguration of President George W. Bush's administrations, anxiety levels about future U.S. policy in Asia remain high. In Tokyo, there are apprehensions that Japan will be liked too much; that Washington will expect more from its steadfast ally than Japan is prepared to deliver. In Beijing there are concerns that China won't be liked enough, given Bush's references to it as a "strategic competitor." On the Korean Peninsula, there are fears that North Korea won't be liked at all; that a more hardline Republican administration will refuse to bargain with Pyongyang or adequately support South Korea's "sunshine policy." Elsewhere, there are questions about a continued U.S. commitment to the multilateral process and about how the new team will pursue traditional issues such as the promotion of democracy and human rights.

While trying to forecast U.S. behavior is always risky, I would argue that continuity is likely to be order of the day -- U.S. national interests do not change when administrations do. In most instances, policy adjustments will be tactical ones or represent shifts in emphasis. No early major surprises are anticipated, given that the Bush national security team contains many well-known (and well-respected) Asia hands.

Nonetheless, a certain amount of nervousness is to be expected whenever an administration changes -- remember the anxiety levels eight years ago when a relatively unknown Arkansas governor was about to take the helm in Washington? What follows are some suggestions to the Bush administration on how best to address these regional concerns.

* Japan. The Bush team has made it clear that top priority will be given to the maintenance of U.S. bilateral security relationships in general and to the Japan-U.S. alliance in particular. This is nothing new! Every major Asia policy statement issued by the Clinton administration highlighted the importance of bilateral alliances and the role of Japan as the "linchpin" or "foundation" of American security strategy in Asia. But over the past eight years, the Japanese have been victims of Japan "bashing" or "passing." No more! The Bush administration will likely be calling on Japan to be a more equal security partner. It will be important for Washington to send clear signals as to just what this means, and for Tokyo to send equally clear signals about how much more equal it wants and is prepared to be.

Bush must also perpetuate one of the Clinton administration's most successful Northeast Asia initiatives, the establishment of three-way cooperation on North Korea brought about by the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. This effort should be expanded to enhance coordination on a broader range of security issues.

* Korean Peninsula. Bush should send an early signal to both Koreas that he is committed to the process of engagement and fully supports South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy and the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. U.S.-North Korean missile negotiations should also continue but should not be allowed to detract from the broader Peninsula peace process. Bush must reaffirm President Bill Clinton's firm assertion that there will be no separate U.S.-North Korean peace agreement. Enhanced North-South dialogue on security issues should precede any new major U.S.-North Korean initiative.

* China. Bush will not be talking about a Sino-U.S. "constructive strategic partnership." But, regardless of the new chosen catchphrase -- and I would argue against the continued use of "strategic competitor" -- some form of "cooperative engagement and managed competition" is likely to guide relations between Beijing and Washington during the next four years (as it has over the past eight).

Absent some obvious Chinese provocation, Bush should allow the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act to lie dormant. Efforts to codify the TSEA would set a counterproductive, confrontational tone and impede even routine efforts to address Taiwan's defense needs. However, the Bush administration needs to remind Beijing that " no use of force" and "no change to Taiwan's status without the consent of the people of Taiwan" are as important to Washington as the other three no's -- no Taiwan independence; no two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; and no Taiwan participation in international organizations involving sovereign states -- are to Beijing.

One area where the two states are sure to disagree is over the issue of theater and national missile defense, Bush can be expected to proceed with TMD in continued close cooperation with Japan. Coverage for Taiwan should neither be ruled in nor out for the time being, unless Beijing forces the issue with renewed missile "tests" in close proximity to Taiwan, a la 1996. Meanwhile, a strategic dialogue with China is needed on NMD so that each side at least understands the other's legitimate concerns.

* Multilateralism. Bush also needs to signal U.S. support for the various Asian multilateral processes, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as APEC and others. He will, of course, be expected to attend the October 2001 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Shanghai (which makes an earlier visit to Japan and South Korea essential). However, some thought should be given to proposing that, in the future, the APEC Leaders' Meeting be held every other year, substituting an ARF Leaders' Meeting on the off years, in order to promote higher-level security as well as economic dialogue. In the interim, Bush's likely secretary of state, Colin Powell, must do a better job than his two Clinton-era predecessors in attending the annual ARF ministerial meeting.

* Democracy and Human Rights. Finally, the new administration should reaffirm America's commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights, but it needs to pursue this long-standing national objective in the less arrogant manner promised by Bush. Highest priority should be given to nurturing and supporting emerging democracies in nations such as Indonesia. This will require great patience and understanding; characteristics not typically attributed to American statesmen and politicians.