Last month, the leaders of North and South Korea stunned the world with an announcement of plans to meet in Pyongyang in June at the first ever summit between the two nations. It is an event fraught with both danger and opportunity.
It is easy to dismiss the meeting as a cynical ploy by the North Koreans, timed to extract maximum concessions from the electorally weak South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung. The North has a history of demanding tribute as the quid pro quo for participation in various diplomatic forums, so much so that it is now is now the largest U.S. aid recipient in Asia. Last year, a visit to Beijing by Supreme People's Assembly Chairman Kim Yong Nam netted 150,000 tons of grain and 40,000 tons of coal, and the North Koreans were reputedly demanding from the Chinese a package worth $800 million for a visit by Dear Leader Kim Jong Il.
The South has a history of "checkbook diplomacy" as well, for example in its provision of $3 billion in loans to the Soviet Union when diplomatic relations were normalized between Moscow and Seoul. Given these proclivities, the mind reels at the thought of how much it took to clear this diplomatic market three days before the South Korean elections in which the party of incumbent President Kim trailed at the polls.