Germany’s growing military engagement in the Indo-Pacific — including its latest deployment of two warships to Japan — is intended to signal that Berlin won’t accept disruptions to key international sea lanes, its navy chief said in a veiled swipe at China.
Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack told The Japan Times in an exclusive interview that this is particularly the case as Beijing launches an “unprecedented” maritime armaments program, builds the world’s largest navy, creates artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea and “wants to gain control” over crucial sea routes.
“We cannot close our eyes to this as it would imply that we accept a new status quo,” he said.
People are “slowly realizing” that sea lines of communication — the vital arteries between ports used for trade, military and other purposes — “are everyone’s concern — no shipping, no shopping!” Kaack said.
If, in addition to conflicts or crises from the South China Sea to the Red Sea and beyond, other actors were to disrupt world trade with hybrid or asymmetric measures, the consequences would be “inconceivable,” the vice admiral warned.
Kaack’s remarks came as two German warships, the frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and combat support ship Frankfurt am Main, made port calls in Tokyo on Tuesday as part of a monthslong deployment to the Indo-Pacific — the navy’s second to the region since 2021 — that has already taken them to Hawaii for the U.S.-led RIMPAC multinational naval exercises.
Following the port visit to Japan, the German Navy is expected to conduct joint exercises with the Maritime Self-Defense Force, as well as the U.S., French and Italian navies in waters near Japan. The German ships are then expected to return to Europe after stops in South Korea and India.
While critics say Germany should focus on Europe, Kaack denies that Berlin’s defense diplomacy push into the Indo-Pacific — which comes amid intensifying fighting between Russia and Ukraine — comes at the expense of its support for Kyiv.
“Quite the opposite,” he said. “It is a logical complement to Germany's holistic approach to prevent crises, manage conflicts and promote peace.”
After the United States, Germany is the second-largest provider of financial assistance to Ukraine and will be for "as long as it takes,” he said.
At the same time, he argued, strategic foresight entails finding a balance to global challenges.
“Today, the security of a country is inextricably linked to global developments and, indeed, global threats — everything is intertwined,” Kaack said.
For this reason, he said, Berlin would be “ill-advised not to work together closely with like-minded partners in a joint effort to find answers to challenges — be it on our doorstep or far away in the Pacific.”
In this regard, Germany’s growing military deployments to the region, which Kaack says are “not directed” at any nation, aim to demonstrate that Europe’s largest economy “stands firmly on the side of those countries that are committed to complying with international law and do not accept it being called into question.”
According to the vice admiral, developments in the Indo-Pacific, both economic and geopolitical, have direct implications for the security and prosperity of Germany, a leading global exporter.
Risks posed by China and North Korea’s military buildups, as well as territorial rows in the East and South China seas and the situation around Taiwan, are of particular concern to Berlin.
“For this very reason, the (German) Navy sails all around the entire world instead of being present only in front of our own doorstep,” Kaack said. Stability in the Indo-Pacific, he added, is “crucial” to the competitiveness of German industry.
While Berlin’s first-ever China strategy, released in July last year, may have been more of a position paper than a more conventional strategy, it created a baseline, allowing the country's Defense Ministry and other parts of the government to expand security engagements in the region.
This has included bigger and more ambitious military deployments than its last forays into the region in 2021 and 2022.
“A major focus is on intensifying our partnerships in the region,” Kaack said. This includes deepening ties with traditional partners such as Japan and Australia, but also seeking new cooperative relations with other Indo-Pacific countries.
“Strengthening these partnerships is essential for being able to jointly respond to potential security challenges in the region,” he said.
Last month — just days after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida inked a new economic security consultation framework during a visit to Germany — Berlin and Tokyo held their first-ever joint aerial exercise.
But Kaack said that Germany’s latest Indo-Pacific deployment also serves purposes other than joint training and port visits.
“Not only does our physical presence show our partners that, together with them, we assume responsibility in the region — it also shows to all actors who question the international rules-based system of values that there is a strong alliance on the other side, which Germany is part of,” he noted.
The vice admiral described Germany’s ties with Japan — including the navy’s “strong” and “friendly” relationship of “deep mutual trust” with the MSDF — are particularly strong.
“Our cooperation with Japan has significantly intensified due to our common strategic interests and the geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific,” he said.
The German Navy has obtained “valuable insights and learning experiences” from its interactions with the MSDF that are helping it further develop its own capabilities in the region and beyond, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine warfare and maritime surveillance, he added.
The two navies are now conducting joint exercises “whenever possible,” he said. This includes everything from simple navigational maneuvers to complex exercises such as surveillance and air defense — cooperation that has been facilitated by a defense pact the strategic partners signed in January that eases the exchange of supplies and logistical support while allowing the use of each country’s military facilities during drills.
Kaack’s remarks come as the German Navy envisages new structures and objectives for 2035 and beyond. The aim is to further develop the force into a modern, versatile and operational fleet that is regionally rooted but can act globally.
To achieve this, the navy is implementing a number of initiatives to meet the requirements of global operations. These include augmenting its fleet with state-of-the-art frigates, submarines and support ships that are also equipped to carry out extended missions.
Like the MSDF, the German Navy also plans to increase the use of unmanned systems. According to Kaack, those systems would be perfect for monitoring vulnerable areas.
“I am thinking in particular of the monitoring of critical undersea infrastructure such as gas pipelines,” he said.
Overall, Kaack said the aim is to enable Germany to not only act as a reliable ally, but also support partners, prevail in multidimensional operations as well as continue using the navy as a flexible instrument of German foreign and security policy.
“We also want to retain a 360-degree overview — and this, of course, also includes the protection of the sea lines of communication and the commitment to the rules-based international order.”
Q&A transcript
Q: With the war in Ukraine intensifying and European countries struggling to increase aid levels to Kyiv, how come the German Navy is sending a frigate and a replenishment vessel on a seven-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific?
A: The Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 (IPD24), in which we are taking part together with the German Air Force this year, is not at all in conflict with our support for Ukraine. Quite the opposite. It is a logical complement to Germany's holistic approach: prevent crises, manage conflicts and promote peace.
We are contributing to the implementation of the German government's Indo-Pacific Guidelines and sending a sign of support to our partners in the region, just as we stand for a rules-based international order and the security and freedom of the sea routes.
Q: In what ways are these maritime diplomacy engagements important for Germany's security? What are these deployments meant to achieve in concrete terms?
A: People are slowly realizing that the sea lines of communication — the vital “veins” for seaborne supply, so to speak — do not only span the world, but above all they are everyone’s concern — no shipping, no shopping! If, in addition to the conflicts or crises existing from the South China to the Red Sea and beyond, further actors were to disrupt world trade with hybrid or asymmetric measures — the consequences would be inconceivable.
You may remember the container ship Ever Given blocking the Suez Canal three years ago and the resulting effects on the global supply chains. And this was not even intended, but an accident.
For this reason, we must also be “globally committed” with our ships and aircraft. This also means that we do not neglect existing international commitments, such as those in the Mediterranean. Being the smallest German Navy since 1956, however, we cannot do everything. We need to examine, prioritize and make things more flexible in order to fulfill our priority mission of being "regionally rooted,” which we have been assigned as a result of this turning point in history we are living through.
During IPD24, the German units – comprising the frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and the combat support ship Frankfurt am Main – participate in various maneuvers and exercises, such as recently in the “Rim of the Pacific” off Hawaii. They are also involved in established operations, such as the renewed enforcement of the U.N. arms embargo against North Korea. In addition, they pay numerous port and industry visits. This clearly shows that Germany has a navy on which our partners and friends can rely.
Exercises such as RIMPAC in particular improve our operational capabilities and strengthen mutual understanding and trust between the participating states. True to the motto: "Know your friends before you need your friends.”
In addition to these operational tasks, we place a clear emphasis on the initial and advanced training of our personnel — our most valuable resource. It is the people who share a passion for going to sea, taking to the air or doing all the brainwork and paperwork required for keeping our Navy up and running that enable us to accomplish our missions.
Q: Is Berlin concerned about German interests in the region? If so, why?
A: It definitely is. The dynamic development in the Indo-Pacific region, both the economical and geopolitical, has a direct impact on Germany. Our security and prosperity are closely linked to the stability in this key region.
For this very reason, the Navy sails all around the entire world instead of being present only in front of our own doorstep — because Germany, one of the world's leading export nations, continues to rely heavily on the free movement of goods and free sea routes in order to be able to export and import commodities, goods and products to and from all parts of the world. The Indo-Pacific is crucial to the competitiveness of our industry and the prosperity of our country.
Q: Are these deployments also meant to send a message to countries such as China, Russia and North Korea? If so, what's the message?
A: The Indo-Pacific deployment is not directed against anyone. Rather, we want to send the message that Germany stands firmly at the side of those countries that are committed to complying with international law and do not accept it being called into question.
China, for example, has launched an unprecedented maritime armaments program and now has more than 350 ships in its navy. This puts the People's Liberation Army Navy well ahead of the U.S. Navy in numbers alone. For years, China has been building artificial islands in the South China Sea and, together with its navy, wants to gain control over sea routes — which takes us back to the "sea lines of communication." They extend from Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. We cannot close our eyes to this as it would imply we accept a new status quo.
Q: What does the German Navy learn from these now-regular deployments to the region and its interactions with partner navies? Could you give us some examples from the lessons learned during IPD24?
A: Our first IPD with frigate Bayern three years ago was a strong signal and an important experience at the same time. Subsequently, the security cooperation between Germany and our Southeast Asian partners has intensified considerably.
The value of such deployments is immeasurable for us as a navy. We learn how to cooperate even better and more effectively in multinational operations, and we grow even closer together with our partners.
Let us take another look at our first participation in RIMPAC, the largest U.S.-led maritime exercise in the world. We worked hand in hand with navies from the entire Asia-Pacific region and beyond for more than five weeks. What a gain! Such complex exercise scenarios always strengthen not only our own operational readiness, but also the interoperative relations with our partners. And this is a very valuable effect in our current security situation.
Moreover, we deliberately send a frigate of the latest type and a combat support ship with a wide range of capabilities, from replenishment at sea to medical support provided by hospital component. On the one hand, we ourselves can put our new type of frigate through its paces, and on the other hand, the combat support ship helps us increase our endurance. This also involves benefits for other missions of the German Navy.
Q: In what ways do these deployments of only one or two warships contribute to regional security?
A: Adm. (Samuel) Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, already answered this question during the visit of Federal Minister of Defense (Boris) Pistorius. Germany’s contribution to the Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 counts fivefold. Not only does our physical presence show our partners that, together with them, we assume responsibility in the region — it also shows to all actors who question the international rules-based system of values that there is a strong alliance on the other side, which Germany is part of.
Q: How would you describe the current state of ties between the German Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force?
A: The relationship between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the German Navy is strong, friendly and characterized by deep mutual trust. It is a marvelous sign of appreciation that almost simultaneously German units will be visiting Japan and Japanese ones Germany. And the fact that (former MSDF chief) Adm. Ryo Sakai and I are good friends is certainly no secret.
Q: How are the two navies cooperating, and why has the level of cooperation intensified in recent years?
A: Our cooperation with Japan has significantly intensified due to our common strategic interests and the geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific. And this holds true for several key areas.
Among other things, we conduct joint exercises whenever possible. These range from simple navigational maneuvers to complex scenarios such as air defense at sea or sea surveillance. This cooperation improves not only our tactical competence but also our ability to cooperate at the operational level.
In addition, we have established an intensive exchange of expertise and experience covering areas such as underwater medicine and amphibious operations. Visits and cultural exchanges, for example when Japanese training vessels call at German ports, promote the mutual understanding and intercultural competence of our crews.
Another important aspect of our cooperation is logistic support, which is facilitated by agreements such as ACSA — the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. This agreement allows an efficient exchange of goods and services, which is crucial for the flexibility and support of joint operations.
Q: What has the German Navy learned from the MSDF and how do you plan to increase joint activities/interoperability over the coming months and years? What are the future plans?
A: The cooperation with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has already provided us with valuable insights and learning experiences that are important for the further development of our own capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. What I personally find particularly impressive is the precision and efficiency in the conduct of military operations. For the German Navy, the exchange of experience in the areas of anti-submarine defense and maritime surveillance is of particular value.
Q: What security role does the German Navy expect to play in the Indo-Pacific going forward? What's the intended goal?
A: A major focus is on intensifying our partnerships in the region. This includes deepening relations with traditional partners such as Japan and Australia, but also seeking new cooperative relations with other countries of the Indo-Pacific. Strengthening these partnerships is essential for being able to jointly respond to potential security challenges in the region.
Q: In which way will the German Navy's course for 2035 and beyond, both in terms of vessels and mission, be reflected in the Indo-Pacific?
A: The German Navy's course for 2035 and beyond is aimed at the further development of a modern, versatile and operational fleet that is — as indicated — regionally rooted and acting globally. This is supported by a number of strategic initiatives and developments that are also geared to the requirements and particularities of global operations.
At its core, however, the focus is on national and alliance defense. At the beginning of Russia's attack on Ukraine, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a turning point. For the German Navy, this means that we have to provide NATO with combat-ready naval units to be deployed on the northern flank to deter a potential aggressor.
By 2035, the German Navy plans to augment its fleet with state-of-the-art frigates, submarines and support ships that are also equipped for the conduct of extended tasks on the high seas. These ships will be fitted with advanced surveillance, communication and electronic warfare technology to improve the operational capabilities that are required for operations in expansive and challenging waters such as the Indo-Pacific.
But we also see the possibilities offered by the technological developments in the area of unmanned systems and will intensify our efforts there. The use of these systems will reduce the possible threats to our soldiers to the minimum extent necessary. These systems are also ideally suited for monitoring vulnerable areas. I am thinking in particular of the monitoring of critical undersea infrastructure such as gas pipelines.
Q: What do the German Navy's 2035 Fleet and Force Structure plans reflect about its intentions? Can you explain?
A: Our vision is a navy that is effective, resilient, capable of accommodating demographic trends and thus fit for the future — and that, as a reliable ally, supports our partners, prevails in multidimensional operations and continues to be available as a flexible instrument of German foreign and security policy.
The review of all aspects of the German Navy's operational readiness is a continuous process. In it, we also incorporate the findings and experience gained from the Russian war of aggression and draw conclusions for our own training, equipment and organization. Many of these findings have been included in the concept envisaged for the German Navy from 2035 onward as appropriate.
As the largest NATO Navy in the Baltic Sea, the German Navy has outstanding regional expertise and extensive reconnaissance capabilities that cover the entire regional area of operations above and under water. We are therefore also prepared to take on more responsibility and have indicated to NATO our willingness to assume regional command and control responsibility in the Baltic Sea region. We provide the command and control structure necessary for this by forming a regional maritime headquarters, which we have operational in Rostock in the form our already-existing international German Maritime Forces Staff (Deu Marfor).
As already mentioned though, we also want to retain a 360-degrees overview — and this, of course, also includes the protection of the sea lines of communication and the commitment to the rules-based international order.
Q: There are some that argue that Germany should focus more on the defense of Europe amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and tensions with Russia instead of deepening ties with the Indo-Pacific countries. What is your view on this?
A: As you may know, Germany, after the USA, is the second-largest supporter of Ukraine and will be for "as long as it takes." At the same time, strategic foresight entails finding a balance to global challenges. Today, the security of a country is inextricably linked to global developments and, indeed, global threats — everything is intertwined. For this reason, we would be ill-advised not to work together closely with like-minded partners in a joint effort to find answers to challenges — be it on our doorstep or far away in the Pacific.
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