Washington's stance and policies on Taiwan are unlikely to change significantly regardless of who wins the island’s presidential and legislative elections on Saturday, a former director of the United States’ de facto embassy in Taiwan has told The Japan Times.
Douglas H. Paal, who headed the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) from 2002 to 2006, said in an interview that, regardless of whether the ruling Democratic People's Party (DPP), the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) or the “middle-ground” Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) win the vote, any differences in Washington's reaction would be "nuanced," and rather involve "adjustments in degree than in type.”
“Overall, support for Taiwan runs deep in both major U.S. parties, and I doubt that will change very much,” said Paal, who is currently a distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
A key reason why little or no U.S. policy changes are expected, said the expert, is that Beijing has made itself so “unattractive” that Taiwanese party leaders across the political spectrum will only have "limited bandwidth" to change the policies pursued by outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, who will step down after eight years because of term limits.
The U.S. has repeatedly said it seeks to work closely with whoever wins the vote, the outcome of which is expected to also have profound implications for Sino-U.S. relations as the two superpowers vie for influence over the strategically located island.
Polls indicate that the election is mainly a three-way race, with front-runner and current Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling DPP seeking to make his party the first in Taiwanese history to win three consecutive presidential votes.
The DPP has looked to deepen ties with the United States and other democracies, while Lai’s main rival, New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih from the opposition KMT, has called for a return to a policy of engagement with Beijing, framing the election as “a choice between war and peace.” In third place is TPP candidate Ko Wen-je, who has sought to position his party in the middle of the two others, advocating a mix of deterrence and dialogue in dealing with China.
At stake is how Taipei will manage relations with China over the next four years amid worsening cross-strait ties and a heightened risk of conflict between Washington and Beijing, the latter of which hasn’t ruled out seizing the island by force, despite growing indications that the U.S. may be willing to defend it.
Against this backdrop, Paal, who has worked for several U.S. administrations as well for the CIA and the State Department, says there is bipartisan agreement on expanding support for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, including via more military-to-military training and low-profile advisory teams.
“If the U.S. proceeds without public fanfare, it can do a lot more materially to advise and equip Taiwanese forces,” he said, adding that much could be achieved, for example, if military activities on or with Taiwan were not announced and U.S. troops stayed out of public view.
“This would not make cooperation secret, but rather discreet,” he said, noting that while China would be closely following such developments, its reaction would likely be muted if its "face" is not called into question before its people.
Paal expects the U.S. to proceed with more caution, noting recent attempts by President Joe Biden’s administration to avoid overtly pushing the policy envelope with Taiwan.
How long this arrangement will last, however, will partly depend on China’s reaction to the election results — including whether it continues to heap pressure on Taiwan, he said.
The level of U.S. military support for Taiwan will also likely depend on the defense policies of whoever wins the vote, with Paal saying that a Lai administration could enable much of these “discreet” steps, as well as follow through on the defense plans and commitments made by Tsai.
Both the KMT and TPP have also pledged to strengthen the island’s defense capabilities and keep military spending at a high level, but Paal argues that many in the U.S. are still unsure about the KMT's commitment to military self-strengthening and may seek to evoke a clearer statement from Hou if he emerges victorious.
Nevertheless, a KMT victory could also create an opportunity to question China’s flexibility and responsiveness to efforts by Taipei at reconstituting dialogue and minimal cooperation. Paal, however, is pessimistic that Beijing would change its approach to the island, even under a KMT government.
“Beijing would have to be the first tiger to change its stripes to reverse itself on recent developments in policy toward Taiwan and Hong Kong,” Paal said. “To do otherwise would require a KMT counterpart willing to do precisely the sorts of things that would enfeeble itself with Taiwanese voters, and that is not going to happen.”
Paal also said a KMT victory would require Washington and Taipei to work out how Taiwan is to be positioned in relation to the “democracy vs. autocracy line” that currently dominates Washington foreign policy.
“Taiwan is demonstrating its democratic credentials, but a KMT-led government in Taiwan may want to be seen less as a U.S. card in opposing the mainland,” he said.
But this doesn’t mean that a KMT government would be the only one presenting challenges to the U.S.
Questions have been raised as to how Washington should deal with mostly Beijing-linked accusations that Lai may be seeking to formally declare independence should he win the vote, something that has continued to pop up throughout the campaign but that the vice president himself has denied.
To allay concerns, Paal says U.S. officials will repeat “at every opportunity” that Washington expects Lai, as in the case of Tsai, to respect the maintenance of a dynamic status quo. The months between the January election and March inauguration, he said, “could entail intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy.”
But Washington’s level of support may also be determined by developments far from the island.
As the U.S. votes for a new president in November, Paal believes that a key factor will be how prominent the China-Taiwan dispute becomes in U.S. domestic politics. Taiwan is unlikely to play a dominant role anytime soon, he said, as Washington faces a myriad of other pressing domestic and international issues, including inflation and the wars in the Gaza Strip and Ukraine.
“The U.S. is already at its limits in providing certain advanced munitions for Ukraine and Israel,” Paal said. “Taiwan has moved down the ladder because a crisis there is not imminent. Should that suddenly change, hard choices would present themselves.”
Paal argues that few in the United States are likely to attribute much importance to the Taiwan issue during the campaign unless Sino-U.S. relations veer toward conflict.
“American voters seldom raise foreign policy to a decisive role in elections, and Taiwan is well down the list of priority concerns this year,” he said, adding that the U.S. will likely be dealing with “a far more existential choice between candidates of its own."
“Choosing between the elderly, liberal Biden, and the unpredictable and unaccountable (former President Donald) Trump is enough to frustrate most reasonable voters, and their respective positions on issues like Taiwan would fall well behind considerations such as basic suitability for office,” Paal said.
Should Trump win, his character and track record would make it “utterly difficult” to foresee how this would affect U.S. Taiwan policy, Paal said, while noting that Biden would probably pursue continuity should he win a second term.
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