Although the balance of power in the U.S. Congress is still up for grabs, the midterm results are unlikely to alter the general direction of Washington’s tough stance toward China.
That said, what’s shaping up to be a Republican-led House of Representatives is likely to ramp up the pressure on U.S. President Joe Biden to double down on the zero-sum China policies that are setting the stage for a geopolitical struggle with significant implications for the Indo-Pacific region.
Either the Republicans or Biden’s Democrats could still secure a Senate majority with wins in both Nevada and Arizona, but control of the chamber may ultimately come down to a runoff next month in Georgia after neither candidate secured a majority of the votes.
“Democratic control of the Senate may give the Biden administration more flexibility on China policy than might otherwise be the case, but the tenor of Washington’s approach toward Beijing is unlikely to change regardless of whether the Democrats or the GOP control the Senate,” said Ian Chong, a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore.
Tensions between the world’s two largest economies have only escalated in recent months as Washington and Beijing spar over myriad issues, including trade, human rights and the status of Taiwan amid an intensifying competition over influence in the region.
Washington’s latest export controls on advanced semiconductors have raised the stakes in this competition, with experts describing the move — which also has bipartisan support — as part of efforts to degrade not only China’s military capabilities but also Beijing’s ability to compete with the U.S. economically.
The White House is also working on an agreement that would restrict foreign companies in the Netherlands and Japan — home to some of the largest makers of chip-manufacturing equipment — from selling such equipment to China.
Bipartisan consensus
Despite disagreement on an array of issues, there seems to be bipartisan consensus on what the parties view as the need to respond to China’s rise and the threat it poses to American interests.
The reason for this convergence is that, despite their domestic policy differences, the two parties often share a common view of the world and the United States’ role in it.
As a result, American legislators have introduced more than 400 bills or resolutions related to China since early 2021, according to data from the U.S.-China Business Council. Although only a few have been adopted, many of the bills secured bipartisan support and almost all portrayed Beijing as a competitor or adversary.
“The CHIPS and Science Act, for instance, passed with 24 Republicans supporting it,” said Nick Bisley, dean and professor of international relations at Australia’s La Trobe University, pointing out that while partisan mistrust will remain high in Congress, China policy will remain one of the few areas on which they can find some common ground.
Andrew Scobell, distinguished fellow of the United States Institute of Peace’s China program, agrees, saying there is “remarkable bipartisan consensus” that Washington and Beijing are engaged in serious long-term strategic competition.
“Americans will almost certainly remain united in the belief that China — under a repressive Communist Party dictatorship — continues to pose a dangerous threat to the United States.” The midterms are therefore unlikely to change the general direction of Biden’s already tough China stance, particularly as foreign policy is mainly the president’s remit. That said, a GOP-led House, and perhaps even Senate, will likely pressure Biden to double down on efforts to contain China, strengthen international coalitions and “compete more effectively" with Beijing.
Experts say these efforts will include pushes for more limits on trade and tech relations with Beijing, bolstered sanctions on Chinese individuals and organizations and greater efforts to restrict the activities of Chinese students in the U.S. The new Congress will likely also focus on intellectual property theft and accountability in the coronavirus pandemic, while forging closer economic ties with countries that exclude China.
In addition, the GOP will probably “try to limit some contacts between Chinese officials and Americans and pressure or require some organizations that deal with China to register as foreign agents,” said Michael D. Swaine, director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
The Republicans are also likely to push for increased defense spending in Asia and more economic decoupling, while encouraging or pressuring U.S. allies and partners to align their China policies with Washington.
“Leading Republicans now include harsh, zero-sum criticism of China as a central part of their platforms, reflecting little if any effort to deal with the complexities of the problem,” said Swaine.
“They think this resonates with the bulk of the U.S. public, who are concerned about China,” he added.
The Taiwan Policy Act
One of the key issues going forward will be Congress’ position on Taiwan.
In mid-September the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill that, if passed during the upcoming congressional session, could mark the biggest overhaul of Washington’s policy on Taipei since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
Known as the Taiwan Policy Act, the bill would provide at least $6.5 billion to Taiwan in military aid through 2027 and authorize up to $2 billion in loans and fast-track arms sales, while establishing a comprehensive joint military training program to increase interoperability with U.S. forces. It would also prioritize the transfer of excess U.S. defense equipment to the self-ruled island.
The original Senate version of the TPA contained several provisions that would have made the U.S.-Taiwan relationship more official, including designating Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally.” Most of these controversial provisions — which may have effectively ended Washington’s “One China” policy — have since been altered or removed in the wake of misgivings from the White House.
“The Biden administration was unlikely to go along with that as it would have been especially inflammatory for Beijing,” said Brad Glosserman, deputy director of the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University. “That isn’t to say the administration isn’t going to do — or isn’t already doing — more with Taipei. But it will go at its preferred pace, not that imposed by Congress.” While the amended bill has yet to become law, many of its provisions have already been included in the proposed U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2023, which is set to pass Congress soon.
In fact, the proposed NDAA envisages even more military aid for Taiwan — up to $10 billion over the next five years.
Any efforts to elevate relations with Taipei and integrate the island more closely with Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy will infuriate Beijing, which has vowed to unite the self-ruled island with the mainland.
Little room for compromise
Some experts claim the main goal of Washington’s hard-line policies is not only to support Taipei but also ensure that the U.S. prevails in its geopolitical competition with Beijing.
The U.S. government is being driven by the need to prevent China from gaining a dominant influence “in any key area,” as well as from using force against Taiwan and any of its allies and partners, said Quincy’s Swaine.
“There is the common, extreme belief, stoked by inflated threat assessments and political calculations, that China poses a near-existential threat to the United States, the global order, and peace and stability in Asia and possibly elsewhere,” he said.
This “rigid mindset,” Swaine said, leaves little room for moderation or compromise, but resonates with the political needs of many in Washington to find a common source for many of America’s problems.
“Both nations uniformly point the finger at the other and demand change while posing as innocent themselves,” he said. “That stance will almost certainly continue under the new Congress.” For many countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially those that have followed a consciously pragmatic approach to U.S.-China tensions, maintaining this balancing act and avoiding taking sides may prove unsustainable in the long run, as the two powerhouses’ ties continue to deteriorate, and a sense of growing bipolarity takes hold.
The danger in all of this, Swaine said, is that a hard-line, zero-sum approach to China ignores the workings of a security dilemma, namely how U.S. measures to bolster its defenses and that of its allies and partners are seen by Beijing as a growing threat to its own security. This greatly increases the chance of severe crises and conflict while closing off less extreme options for establishing a mutually constructive form of peaceful coexistence.
“As the Chinese seem to be pursuing the same general approach to the U.S., the impact on geopolitics in Asia and beyond could be disastrous,” he warned. “It could lead to a war over Taiwan, destructive efforts to radically decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies and other types of hostile confrontations that benefit no one.”
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