Japanese foreign policy has long operated under what scholar Kenneth Pyle identified as four core principles: accommodation, adaptation, emulation and localization. But as Tokyo confronts an increasingly assertive China and a more transactional U.S., these time-tested approaches are being recalibrated — and tested — as never before.

The U.S. is more than Japan’s security guarantor; it’s Tokyo’s comprehensive partner. China, in contrast, is an essential economic partner but does not share Tokyo’s world view. The shifting ground under both relationships requires Japan to abandon accommodation with China while deepening adaptive strategies toward an evolving and unpredictable U.S.

Historical precedent suggests that accommodation — adjusting policy to work within existing power structures — has served Japan well. But China’s contemporary behavior, especially since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, fundamentally differs from previous regional powers. Beijing’s Sino-centric worldview (rooted in centuries of tributary-system thinking), combined with its deepening partnerships with Russia and North Korea, creates an inherently incompatible strategic environment for democratic Japan, which prioritizes strategic autonomy and a free and open Indo-Pacific built on a shared set of rules and agreed-upon norms of behavior.