Last week, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba traveled to Vietnam and the Philippines for a round of Golden Week diplomacy. It is not unusual for Japan’s leader to spend the holiday period abroad given the hiatus from the usual demands of domestic politics. It was also not unusual for the prime minister to visit Southeast Asia; after all, Japan has done much over the past few decades to cultivate deeper ties with its partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

What is unusual about the trip is the consistency of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Created under the Shinzo Abe administration a decade ago, this diplomatic and security strategy has not only survived through four administrations, each consecutive leader has built upon it. In an era of increased strategic uncertainty, this consistency from Japan continues to demonstrate its utility in reinforcing the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region.

The genesis of the FOIP strategy stretches back to 2006 with the first Abe administration. While Japan had long implemented policies aimed at cultivating regional ties for economic purposes, Abe and his team recognized the need for deliberately incorporating other instruments of national power into its efforts, namely in the realms of diplomacy and security.

Development of this strategy was an iterative process. Starting as the “confluence of two seas” concept where the Abe administration highlighted the interconnectedness of interests and responsibilities between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, it evolved into the “Pacific Diamond” idea, which identified four critical points in the region: the Hawaiian Islands (the United States), Japan, Australia and India. The Abe administration understood the necessity for collaboration between the countries that now make up "the Quad.” But the strategic effort stalled during the period of revolving door prime ministers that began in 2007 and following the massive strategic shock from the triple disaster in 2011.

When Abe came back into power in 2012, his administration restored the effort to develop this regional strategy. While the Japanese government started implementing the strategy in practice after Abe’s return to office, it finally earned the name “Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy” in 2016.

Fundamentally, the strategy aims to preserve regional stability, to maintain individual nations’ sovereignty and protection from coercion and to ensure that the rules that underpin the international system are upheld. The ways of achieving this are broad, including partner capacity building, diplomatic engagement, infrastructure support, foreign direct investment, development assistance and security cooperation, among other things. It was a strategy that the United States and others have co-opted at least to some extent, adopting not only the name, but other elements of the strategy, too.

When Abe resigned as prime minister, there was some question as to what would happen to the strategy. After all, new administrations typically open windows for policy change.

But rather than eliminate the strategy, subsequent prime ministers have built upon it. Japanese leaders Yoshihide Suga, Fumio Kishida and now Ishiba have all continued to prioritize the FOIP strategy. As a result, Japan has deepened and institutionalized ties with partners and tempered the pace and impact of malign influence throughout the region, be it from China, Russia or others.

Ishiba’s latest visit to Vietnam and the Philippines illustrated the continued progress in implementation of this strategy. In Hanoi, Japanese and Vietnamese leaders called for the establishment of a vice ministerial-level “two-plus-two” foreign policy and defense meeting. They discussed measures to stabilize trade and production in the region amid economic uncertainty stemming from U.S. policy decisions, as well as the transfer of defense equipment as part of Japan’s Official Security Assistance.

The Philippines visit proved equally productive. While also addressing things like trade and industry, the two governments agreed to begin negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (a deal to improve interoperability and mutual logistics support), while also pushing forward on concluding their Reciprocal Access Agreement. Modeled after the Japan-Australia and Japan-United Kingdom RAAs, this agreement will cover the rights, duties and obligations for the Philippines armed forces and Japan Self Defense Forces operating in each other’s territories.

So, why is the consistency of the FOIP strategy so important? There are two fundamental reasons.

First, for national level strategies to be effective, there must be continuity of implementation. It takes time for effects to materialize. Governments must program budgets for the strategy, assign offices and personnel to carry out its initiatives and adjust policies along the way based on successes or failures. It is a yearslong effort that becomes more efficient and effective as strategic initiatives take root.

That point has certainly been true for Japan and the FOIP Strategy. For example, it took the better part of a decade for Japan to conclude its first Reciprocal Access Agreement with Australia, but the Japanese government has used that template in its engagements with the U.K., the Philippines and others. Official Security Assistance was not an institutionalized program until 2022, but is now a pillar for Japan’s partner capacity building in the region. The list goes on.

Second, this is a period of strategic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. As great power competition escalates, there will invariably be second and third order effects. This is already playing out with disruption to global economics through U.S. trade policies. The issues related to U.S. alliance networks, China’s territorial ambitions and the North Korean-backed Russian war of aggression serve to exacerbate a sense of unpredictability.

Japan’s consistency in its strategic approach does the opposite. It contributes to stability, particularly for smaller nations in the region that are reliant upon the international system for trade, security and other matters. This is true not only because Japan is a liberal democracy and an adherent to international laws, rules and norms, but because it has the diplomatic, security and economic clout to back it up. Its relative power and willingness to employ it in ways that benefit regional stability provide a breakwater against the waves that have come and will continue to swell.

So while Ishiba’s visit to Southeast Asia may have just seemed like another round of trips during a holiday week, they were emblematic of something much more than that. The engagements and their outcomes were reminders that Japan remains resolute to demonstrate leadership in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific, just as it has for the past decade.

[bio]Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.[bio]