Would Trump 2.0 rekindle the merits of volatility?

Imagine you are sitting at a table in Mar-a-Lago being served a piece of the “most delicious chocolate cake ever” when suddenly your host calmly explains to you that he just launched 59 Tomahawk missiles into Syria.

Imagine the leader of a decades-long archenemy comes to the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea and crosses into your territory to shake your hand.

Imagine your closest neighbor, which you share a 6,000-kilometer border with, refuses to sign an agreement when you are hosting a Group of Seven summit.

Former United States President Donald Trump did all the above to, respectively, China's Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. This unorthodox — some would say unpredictable — behavior shook friends and foes alike.

Is Trump’s unpredictability an asset for the U.S.? Should it be leveraged as the country faces what some call the most credible challenger to itself and the postwar international order? How do allies and adversaries see the opportunities and challenges of Trump's possible return to the White House?

In a recent discussion with Satoru Nagao, a fellow (nonresident) at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, we tackled these questions, coming at them from very different points of view.

For Nagao, Trump’s unpredictability would be an asset for the U.S. to leverage to pressure both its opponents and allies. During Trump's presidency, adversaries were perturbed by his off-the-cuff diplomacy and comments. They were unsure whether Trump was cajoling, feinting or making mistakes due to his lack of foreign policy experience, according to Nagao.

He moved a frozen relationship with Pyongyang’s Kim to a potential diplomatic breakthrough through several tete-a-tete meetings with the reclusive North Korean leader. He forced China into a self-sabotaging trade war and heightened the regime's sense of insecurity by accepting a telephone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.

In a speech delivered through then-Vice President Mike Pence at the Hudson Institute in October 2018, the Trump administration explicitly called China out by saying that “Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.”

Pence went on to say that “(Beijing) coordinates and sponsors the acquisition of American firms to gain ownership of their creations. Worst of all, Chinese security agencies have masterminded the wholesale theft of American technology — including cutting-edge military blueprints. And using that stolen technology, the Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into swords on a massive scale.

"China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies."

Trump's administration upended decades of U.S. foreign policy on China by labeling Beijing an adversary and stepping away from strategic and economic dialogues.

For Beijing, Trump’s behavior was destabilizing, unpredictable and novel, making its long-standing approach to bilateral relations with the U.S. difficult, at best, and requiring a whole new approach, at worst. Trump was a shock to China's Marxist-Leninist system, whose leadership prizes stability, predictability and, importantly, a steady and incremental march toward the long-term objective of overtaking the U.S. by achieving the so-called China Dream — the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and people.

While not a doctrine as such, Trump’s mercurial approach to bilateral relations deeply unsettled leaders in other capitals too, from Ottawa, to Tokyo, to Berlin. While Nagao’s analysis speaks to the strengths of the former president’s unpredictability, it is difficult not to highlight the problems with his bombastic and inconsistent foreign policy.

It injected huge uncertainties into the U.S. relationship with traditional allies like Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Canada and Australia. Furthermore, for Southeast Asian nations, it created a sense of insecurity about America's security commitments.

This was evidenced by the fact that levels of trust in the U.S. fell in polls such as the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute's State of Southeast Asia Survey and the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index. Both analyses showed that, not only trust levels, but diplomatic power decreased while Trump was president.

This sense of mistrust, instability and allies' fear of abandonment was partly rooted in the former president's threats to leave NATO and withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula, and pressure tactics to renegotiate the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

Now, as Trump campaigns to return to the White House, pronouncements that he will end the war in Ukraine on day one of his presidency, lock up political enemies and excise the deep state suffuse anxiety in states, such as Taiwan, who are in the crosshairs of authoritarian regimes that want to dominate their backyard.

Beijing and Moscow look to a potential Trump 2.0 as both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge of course is further unorthodox foreign policy that their inflexible political systems find difficult to respond to. A sudden imposition of tariffs, a peace treaty with North Korea, withdrawing or significantly increasing military and financial support for Ukraine, or ending ambiguity about the U.S. position on Taiwan all have the potential to increase tensions and strain both China and Russia.

On the “bright side,” Trump’s volatility may push allies and partners to distance themselves from the U.S., making Washington less effective in constraining Beijing and Moscow's assertive behavior in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and Eastern Europe.

Traditionally, the United State's comprehensive power has emanated from its economy, the size of its military and its adept diplomacy partly based on alliances and partnerships. If allies fear a second Trump presidency would cascade into a conflict, they may inadvertently contribute to Russia and China's decades-long foreign policy goal — isolating the U.S., heightening anxiety and eroding America’s comparative advantages as a peer competitor.

If Trump is elected in November, it is likely that his unpredictability will, once more, be a signature feature of his administration. Whether this is an asset for the U.S. and its allies is arguable. If so, Japan will need to find ways to work with Washington to protect its national interests.