The whole world is now watching events unfold in Eastern Europe, as earlier this week Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the formal deployment of his country's forces into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
The move was a clear violation of international law, as well as multiple agreements designed to preserve a cease-fire and maintain the integrity of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Now, Russia’s latest manufactured crisis has gripped the western world.
But what does any of this have to do with Japan?
Certainly, that is a question that may be on some minds as they have seen the Japanese government energized on the issue. Recently, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has talked directly to his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as other world leaders. His administration has been preparing to impose sanctions against Russia for its illegal acts. Further, several senior Liberal Democratic Party officials have called on the government to learn from past mistakes and take swift action in response.
In short, the Japanese government is demonstrating more resolve than they have in years past, particularly when compared to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Kerch Strait incident in 2018 when Russia captured three Ukrainian naval vessels.
What is driving Japan’s response? There are four considerations for the Kishida administration in determining how to address Russia’s aggressive and illegal play in Ukraine.
The first is the precedent it threatens to set for certain status quo-changing behavior. Russia is creating false justification for carving territory off of a sovereign country and then using its military forces to accomplish a fait accompli — that is, an action that once done is difficult to undo. The Japanese government, who is concerned about China doing the same thing in Taiwan and/or the Senkaku Islands, has likely deduced that such a precedent is dangerous and demands recourse.
This leads to the second consideration for Japan, which is the need to reinforce the rules-based international order. If certain players are seeking to change or exploit the rules in ways that create existential crises, it is incumbent upon others to reinforce those rules whenever challenged; hence why we see so many countries right now championing the “rules-based international order.” For much of the international community, this is not just a buzzword, it is the architecture that underpins relations among countries in the post-World War, United Nations system.
While these are two considerations that compel a strong response from Japan, there are two others that generate arguments against action. One of them is the impact on Japan’s energy resources. The shutdown of nuclear reactors following the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March 2011 necessitated supplemental energy deals, some of which come from Russia. For example, Japan is now the world’s largest liquefied natural gas importer, with nearly 10% of those imports coming from Russia. Moreover, there are already projects in work between Japanese and Russian companies to expand their energy cooperation.
Given all this, an argument could be made that Japan must avoid putting those energy deals at risk. There will invariably be some inside the government pushing that position, but those individuals will face a hard truth: With Germany freezing cooperation on the $10 billion Nord Stream 2 pipeline, their argument will ring hollow as other countries will look at Japan and see the world’s number three economic power clinging to its energy deals instead of taking action against a country that continues to sow the seeds of conflict.
Finally, there is the on-going Northern Territories issue. Russia and Japan have not concluded a formal peace treaty since World War II owing to Russia’s continued administration of the Northern Territories — four island groups (Etorofu, Shikotan, Habomai and Kunashiri) that are north and east of Hokkaido. Japan maintains that the islands are part of its sovereign territory and the government desires resolution once and for all. However, Russian counterparts will invariably hold hostage any progress in Russo-Japanese political relations amid potential Japanese responses to the crisis in Ukraine.
Of course, none of these considerations are fundamentally different from what we saw in the 2014 Crimea incident; rather, the things that have evolved are internal to the Japanese government. As I argued earlier this month in the Japan Times, the Japanese government is embracing multilateralism and recognizes its need to take on a bolder and more resolute role on the world stage.
There is also the fact that Kishida has been through all this before. He was the foreign minister during Russia’s annexation of Crimea; he witnessed the Group of Eight become the Group of Seven when Russia lost its position at the table; he was strung along by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and others who dangled promises of progress on Russo-Japanese political issues to elicit muted responses from the Japanese government. In a case of “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me,” it seems that Kishida is determined not to be fooled again.
With this recognition has come a desire for action, and while the government is still finding its feet in tackling these sorts of issues, it has indeed adopted a much more proactive and vocal role than years past. The willingness to declare concretely Russia’s actions as illegal and in violation of standing agreements is notable, as is the engagement with other world leaders. As for concrete punitive measures, reports indicate that Japan will expand existing sanctions on export restrictions for military-related items and technologies like artificial intelligence, microchips and robotics. The government is also considering freezing Russian assets and blocking loans.
The Kishida administration is still waiting to follow the lead of its U.S. ally and European partners, so Japan’s true mettle vis-a-vis the crisis in Ukraine is still yet to be displayed. However, with Russia’s continued advance, we will soon find out.
MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.
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