Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphasizes that his proposal for amending Article 9 of the Constitution is aimed at dispelling any room for doubts about the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces under the postwar Constitution. That is a question that successive governments have answered by taking the position that the war-renouncing Article 9 does not deny the nation the right to defend itself against enemy attacks. Merely clarifying the legal status of the SDF may seem to make little practical change to Japan's defense posture. Abe says the constitutional restrictions on the SDF's missions will "basically not change" under his proposed amendment.
That should not be taken for granted, however, until we know how the SDF's status and roles will be defined in the amendment. Concern has been voiced that even if the original text of Article 9 is kept intact, as Abe suggested, adding a new clause legitimizing the SDF could effectively invalidate the disavowal of Japan maintaining "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potentials" — a provision that served as the basis to restrict the mission of the SDF as a "minimum necessary force for self-defense" that does not constitute a "war potential" — thereby lifting such restrictions. We need to watch out for a more detailed proposal to come before judging on its implications.
Since the prime minister set a time frame in his push for constitutional amendment — expressing his hopes that a revised Constitution will be implemented in 2020 — and singled out Article 9 as the target for change, Abe has urged his Liberal Democratic Party to draw up a draft amendment by the end of the year. Reports suggest that the LDP would seek to initiate an amendment as early as in the regular Diet session next year. Abe, who apparently views amending the Constitution as a key component of his once-avowed "departure from Japan's postwar regime," has clearly shifted his amendment campaign into overdrive.