As reported in this paper on Aug. 17, there is strong opposition in Japanese government circles as well as among some nuclear policy experts to the possible declaration of a "no first use" policy by the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is said to have conveyed personally to Adm. Harry Harris, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, that deterrence against countries such as North Korea will be jeopardized and the risks of conflict would rise. If these reports are true, Abe needs new advisers. North Korea can be razed and turned into a car park with massive U.S. conventional strikes — there is no need to use nukes.
A "pure" no first use policy limits the use of nuclear weapons to retaliation after nuclear attacks. A qualified no first use policy permits nuclear retaliation against attack by any weapon of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological), but not conventional weapons. Successive official documents have explained the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a wide range of threats on the U.S. and its allies, with WMD or large-scale conventional forces. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review did acknowledge that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks was continuing to diminish as the ability to deal with them using increasingly accurate and powerful conventional munitions increases.
Now there is a buzz in Washington policy circles and the arms control community that in the endgame of his presidency, Barack Obama may, as commander-in-chief, unilaterally declare, perhaps during his final address to the U.N. General Assembly next month, either a pure or a qualified no first use U.S. nuclear policy. Contrary to Tokyo's officialdom, such a policy change would make Japan, the region and the world safer. The balance of risks and gains decisively favors a no first use policy. A continuation of the status quo rests on underestimating the dangers of first-use policies while exaggerating the risks of no first use.