Seven years after coalition forces invaded Afghanistan and drove the Taliban from power, the war slogs on. The initial euphoria from the "victory" has dissipated. Officials are increasingly concerned about the Taliban's resurgence and the durability of the government of President Hamid Karzai. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognized the need for a new approach. Its leaders have agreed to begin to target Afghanistan's opium trade, a move that could deprive the Taliban of the funds it uses to finance its forces. Just as important, the coalition now looks set to adopt the lessons of Iraq and reach out to those elements of the opposition with whom they can craft a political reconciliation agreement. There is a long way to go before such a deal can be reached in Kabul, but recognition of the need for such an approach is a critical first step.

In a recent interview about the situation in Afghanistan, British Brig. Gen. Mark Carleton Smith conceded that "We're not going to win this war" and the public should not expect "decisive military victory," a view shared by a French counterpart, Gen. Jean Louis Georgelin, who agreed that "there is no military solution to the Afghan crisis."

Those remarks are more nuanced than they seem. Those men — and plenty of other officials agree with them — are arguing that in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, the military cannot resolve the conflict on its own. Gen. Carleton Smith explained that it would be "unrealistic and probably incredible" to think that coalition forces could eliminate the local armed bands that have plundered the country for centuries. Rather, the objective should be "reducing it to a manageable level of insurgency that's not a strategic threat and can be managed by the Afghan Army."

That will permit a real and enduring victory, which will be based on political reconciliation among all the political factions that are prepared to join the democratically elected Afghan government. And yes, that will have to include some members of the Taliban. U.S. and NATO officials acknowledge as much. Some talks have begun, and they should be pursued with vigor and honesty. But the condition for participation in those talks is commitment to democracy and a readiness to work with the existing government — or contesting it through the ballot, not by force of arms. Coalition officials take heart from the success of the "Sunni awakening" in Iraq: outreach to former opponents of the regime in Baghdad turned Sunni tribesman there against al-Qaida. A similar effort could succeed in Afghanistan.

But while the Kabul government must reach out to potential partners, it is just as important that armed resistance be defeated. That, too, requires a new approach. Last week, NATO leaders agreed to let their forces target Afghan opium crops in an attempt to deprive the Taliban of money derived from the drug trade. Afghanistan supplies over 90 percent of the world's opium and heroin; it is estimated that about $100 million each year makes its way back to the Taliban to finance their weapons purchases. NATO forces had been unwilling to target those crops for fear of alienating ordinary Afghans who often depend on that crop for their livelihood. Some NATO governments also believe that Kabul should lead that effort.

But the Taliban's resurgence prompted a rethink of that forbearance. NATO officials agreed to let individual nations, on a voluntary basis, consistent with United Nations resolutions and NATO plans, and with the Afghan government's approval, target the drug trade by going after drug lords, burning poppy fields and destroying laboratories and other facilities. In practical terms, it means that British, Canadian, Dutch and U.S. forces have been given a free hand since they operate in the southern part of the country where the insurgency is strongest and opium production is highest.

NATO nations have also been asked to increase force levels in Afghanistan. The U.S. force commander in Afghanistan has requested as many as 20,000 more troops to supplement the 51,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); another 20,000 U.S. forces operate outside that command structure. Those increased troop levels will be critical in helping stabilize the country in the runup to the presidential elections that will be held later next year. The last such ballot in Afghanistan vindicated the decision to invade: The massive turnout, in the face of threats from the Taliban, showed that Afghans want the freedom and democracy that they have been given. They deserve our continuing support and assistance.

The changes in NATO's Afghan approach represent a return to the basic tenets of strategy. Military force alone cannot produce enduring political outcomes. Peace depends on reconciliation — or as Clausewitz sagely noted, war is politics by other means. Astute leadership requires a constant check to ensure that the ends and means are aligned. This balance is especially critical as Japan assesses its own involvement in Afghanistan.