SEOUL -- Plying the Aegean like Ulysses of yore in Greek mythology -- full of self-doubt as to what awaited him at the end of his voyage if, in fact, he reached his final destination -- South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun returned from his maiden voyage to the United States on his feet, but just barely.

Give him high marks for successfully navigating past the Scylla of North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the Charibdis of the 50-year-old U.S.-South Korean alliance, at least for the moment. But in reality, this was a summit not of decision but of deferral.

While the joint statement issued by the two presidents at the end of their hour encounter was long on goals and short on specifics, the personal chemistry appeared to be right, making up for its brevity. But whether the two leaders had a genuine "meeting of the minds" or had merely made it through a minefield is more difficult to discern.

Roh was very firm that North Korea's nuclear program cannot be tolerated and that South Korea was in no mood to be led around by the nose under his leadership. That was music to the ears of U.S. President George W. Bush and his advisers, who were wary as to where Roh's real inclinations lay.

In return, the broad smile on U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's face in meeting Roh said it all. There would be no abrupt pullout of American forces north of Seoul -- past statements not withstanding -- unless South Korea was fully on board, taking into account geopolitical factors. This was music to Roh's ears. Upon leaving, Roh pronounced his fears dissipated and his hopes high. However, reading between the lines indicated that Seoul was ready to follow Washington's lead in dealing with North Korea while Washington, for its part, would go slow in a realignment, particularly taking care not to knock the wind out of the weakened South Korean economy.

While military forces may constitute a "trip wire" in a physical sense, the real trip wire as far as Seoul is concerned is its economy -- wired to geopolitical uncertainty, as Moody's has pointed out, that goes with the territory. No less important is the fact that the political legitimacy of South Korean presidents is increasingly a function of economic performance.

That's why the summit's aftermath is raising as many questions as the main event itself. On his return to South Korea, Roh was immediately confronted by the radical anti-American student organization Hangchonyeon (at commemoration ceremonies in Kwangju marking the anniversary of the uprising put down by the military government in 1980) as well as by members of his own party for caving into Bush. All this prompted the president to seek the solitude of a long weekend outside of Seoul where he could better contemplate the existence of his real political "soul."

Nor has the press been more understanding. One editorial even suggested that the phrase "easy to get along with" really meant "overly compliant," a total reversal of his previous posture of independence. Another suggested that Roh was going against the political flow of his own constituency for greater independence. If so, he will have to make a stronger case for an even closer alliance with the U.S. at a time when so many South Koreans see U.S. toughness -- not North Korean villainy -- as the real threat to South Korea's long-term interests.

It will take some time to assess how deeply Roh's base of political support has eroded by his swerve to the right and just how high a political price he has paid for falling in line with the Bush administration's brand of "hardball" diplomacy, in which access is a function of compatibility of policies, not the importance of the relationship itself.

Roh's "working" visit must also be seen in the context of a succession of summits by America's Asian allies. The day after Roh arrived back in Korea, his Philippine counterpart, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, was beginning a state visit, feted at a White House state dinner as a "front line" ally in the war on terrorism. Ironically, only a decade after U.S. forces were told to pack up at get out of Subic Bay and Clark field, Manila was back in Washington's good graces. Sometimes, asserting independence does pay.

Next in the procession was Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who flew in for a cozy summit at Bush's Crawford ranch. By contrast Roh went on a "working visit' that translated into one hour of presidential time. The subtext here was clear: Roh must earn his spurs if he wants a similar treatment next time around. Washington still harbors doubts over whether Roh will be tough enough to face down his critics and his own self-doubts when the going gets rough.

The irony linking Korea, the Philippines and Japan historically was played out a century ago in the infamous Taft-Katsura deal, in which a back-channel diplomatic sleight of hand orchestrated by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt paved the way for Japan's subsequent annexation of Korea. In return, the U.S. added the Philippines to its own expanding empire with the blessing of the Rising Sun.

We don't need to fear Japanese paramountcy over Korea today, nor American domination either. But we do have to fear a Korea that is not able to speak with a clear voice that reflects its own national interests and priorities. If, as Roh stated in his Rose Garden interlude with his American counterpart, that he no longer has fears -- only hopes -- that message may not be getting through as strongly as it should.