HONOLULU -- We were shocked and dismayed to learn that the Pentagon has allegedly been instructed to develop contingency plans calling for the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a chemical or biological attack on the United States. We say "allegedly" because we are relying on (at best) secondhand accounts of the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review. We haven't had direct access to this classified report -- but, then again, neither have the overwhelming majority of those who have joined the chorus of protest against this congressionally mandated review.

The shock and dismay comes from the revelation -- if true -- that more than 10 years after the United States and its allies issued a firm warning to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein that the use of chemical or biological weapons against Desert Storm forces would result in retaliation "by all available means" (read nuclear weapons), the Pentagon is just now getting around to developing contingency plans for such an option against Iraq or others who are known or suspected to possess chemical or biological (or nuclear) weapons. What took them so long?

Keep in mind that contingency plans do not lock you into a particular course of action; they merely entail the development of a range of possible responses to an anticipated crisis. Developing a plan does not mean that nuclear weapons automatically, or even inevitably, will be used. The primary reason for factoring them in is to remind potential adversaries -- as the 1991 announcement effectively reminded Hussein -- that use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could trigger an equally horrific response. This is called deterrence.

It is also important to distinguish between the hyperbole surrounding the Nuclear Posture Review and what we know. First, the review is not a policy; it is a Department of Defense report, mandated by Congress, that "lays out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to 10 years." It is the latest in a series of reviews that began when nuclear weapons were first developed. The Department of Defense has cautioned that the review "does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning."

The key element of the new posture is the development of a "new triad" that consists of offensive forces (both nuclear and nonnuclear), defensive systems such as missile defense and a revitalized defense infrastructure that "will provide new capabilities" to meet new threats. Administration officials stress that the new posture is designed for a post-Cold War world, and it reduces U.S. reliance on offensive strike forces (such as bombers and missiles) and allows the U.S. to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,700-2,200 warheads.

To defuse the criticism that erupted after the report was leaked to The New York Times, U.S. officials have emphasized that the document does not envisage the use of nuclear weapons. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz explained last weekend that the objective is "to deter other people from using weapons of mass destruction against us."

The controversy that surrounds the NPR is the product of the argument that the U.S. could respond to nonnuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. The review notes that U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces, will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends."

The document then reportedly explains some of the scenarios the authors had in mind, including "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan." Similarly, the NPR allegedly notes that "a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new hostile leadership, or an opponent's surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities" should be considered an "unexpected contingency." This sounds to us like prudent military planning.

But, prudent or not, the thinking behind this policy does raise a serious question. There are unsubstantiated allegations that the NPR contemplates the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against states that possess WMD. This flies in the face of assurances by President George W. Bush and others that the review is all about deterrence, not attack. Moreover, it undermines one of the review's central conclusions -- that the new nuclear posture makes use of nuclear weapons less rather than more likely.

Most important, it flies in the face of political reality. Absent an actual chemical or biological (or nuclear) attack against the United States or its allies, first use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. is politically and morally indefensible. It is also unnecessary, and perhaps even counterproductive militarily.

One could argue during the Cold War that retaining the "first use" option made sense, given the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's staggering conventional weapons advantage. Today, there are no peer competitors. The only way an adversary could do significant harm to the U.S. would be to introduce WMD into the equation. For the U.S. itself to break the WMD taboo would be to put itself at a disadvantage.

What is needed to redress the fallout from the NPR is serious consideration by Washington of a "no first use of WMD" policy. Such a declaration would rule out the pre-emptive first use of nuclear weapons (which Americans as well as the international community would condemn), but it would put terrorists and their state sponsors on notice that all bets are off if they employ WMD against the U.S. or its allies. This policy is both prudent and realistic -- the key components of any nuclear posture.