There has been considerable debate since last month's historic North-South Korea summit about the meeting's impact on the peninsula's neighbors and benefactors. The conventional wisdom seems to be that China fared best. However, I would argue that all four major powers have come out ahead and that the United States, Japan, and even Russia may end up gaining relatively more in the long run. If managed carefully, the summit process can result in a multiple "win-win" outcome.

China: China has been - and should be given credit for being - an effective facilitator and interlocutor between the two Koreas. The secret meetings that helped set up the summit were hosted in Beijing, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's highly publicized (after the fact) visit to Beijing demonstrated the continued close relationship of these two allies. Beijing has, in fact, taken many steps over the past several years to position itself as a trusted friend of both North and South, and its stock has clearly risen as a result of its presumed behind-the-scenes role both in helping to bring about the summit and in moderating the North's behavior.

If one accepts that China's long-range goal is to replace the U.S. as the security guarantor on the Korean Peninsula, however, then the summit was not all good news for Beijing.

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's post-summit comments on the continued need for a U.S. military presence on the peninsula, even after reconciliation or reunification, serve Washington's long-term interests much more than Beijing's. This is especially true if, as alleged, Kim Jong Il tacitly accepted this argument. (It also, of course, serves Seoul's long-term security interests and demonstrates the continuity and consistency of Kim Dae Jung's long-stated security policy.)

United States: There were some in Washington (especially in the Pentagon) who initially appeared nervous, especially after reading the Joint Declaration's commitment "to resolve the question of reunification independently" (emphasis added). There was concern that America's South Korean allies would forget what has not changed; i.e., that the North still possesses the world's fourth-largest military and does not yet seem prepared even to discuss military confidence-building measures, much less force reductions or the signing of a North-South peace accord. Kim Dae Jung's remarks since then reconfirming the U.S.-South Korean alliance should have Washington resting more easily.

The only thing worse than Seoul forgetting that not everything has changed is for Washington to pretend that nothing has changed. While officials in Seoul and Washington may see the rationale for a continued U.S. presence after reunification, people and politicians in both countries will be increasingly questioning that assumption. Both sides need to start building the public case for a continued security relationship today.

Simply stating that "we see no reason yet to adjust our force presence" or that "we plan to stay even after reunification" are not persuasive and could even prove counterproductive. The U.S. should acknowledge that, as significant changes in the threat environment change, Washington will - in close coordination with its allies - adjust the force presence, downward or upward, accordingly, while also stressing that the U.S. is committed to providing security assurances "as long as the Korean people want the security relationship to continue." This approach provides a useful reminder that the U.S. is not forcing its presence upon the peninsula but is there at the behest of, and on the behalf of, the Korean people. Then Washington, in close coordination with Seoul (and Tokyo) must convincingly make the case for continued engagement after reconciliation or reunification, before less-informed public sentiment makes a continued U.S. military presence unsustainable.

Japan: Kim Dae Jung has also continued his evangelical efforts at improving Japanese-Korean relations, encouraging Pyongyang to cooperate more fully with Tokyo and likewise encouraging Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to plan a summit visit of his own in order to move the reconciliation process forward. The successful summit and Kim's public urgings in support of Japanese-North Korean rapprochement can give Tokyo both the incentive and political cover it needs to move forward. (It could also create friction between Seoul and Tokyo if not handled adeptly.) Tokyo was pleased and highly appreciative that Kim raised Japan's concerns about North Korea's missile-development plans during the summit and must be heartened (as is the U.S.) over Pyongyang's pledge to continue to freeze its missile test program. While the path ahead will still be rocky, the July 3 establishment by Tokyo of a National Organization for the Promotion of Normalization between Japan and North Korea, headed by Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama should help facilitate the process.

Russia: Russia is also taking some dramatic steps to reintroduce itself into the Korean Peninsula equation. President Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang while en route to the Okinawa G8 summit demonstrates Putin's wish to be a player in East Asian politics - even if the decision to go to Pyongyang before his first ever official visits to Tokyo or Seoul indicates that he may not have his diplomatic priorities in order. Russian Foreign Ministry officials with whom I have spoken in recent weeks have stressed the need for North Korea to feel secure in its dealings with the South and U.S. and have stressed that Russia, along with China, is best poised to provide these assurances.

The Sino-Russian "strategic partnership" notwithstanding, Russia appears concerned about North Korea's growing closeness with China, even though it is seemingly not prepared to match Chinese economic support to the still-bankrupt Kim Jong Il regime. However, with Seoul (and presumably Washington and Tokyo) prepared to get out their own checkbooks, Russia apparently sees its own insertion into the equation as a low-cost means of reminding the other major powers that Russia also has high stakes in the peninsula game.

Russia's renewed involvement also provides Pyongyang with renewed options and decreases its near-total security dependence on Beijing. One would anticipate that Putin will make a push during his visits to Beijing, Pyongyang, Okinawa and, presumably, Seoul (if not in July, then soon), for a broader six-party dialogue, in order to give Russia and Japan a seat at the table along with the two Koreas, China and the U.S.

One final thought on Russia: As Putin makes his move to become more engaged in peninsula affairs, this might be a good time for the U.S., South Korea and Japan to press Moscow to contribute to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization as well.