With great fanfare, Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as president of Russia May 7 in the gilded splendor of the Kremlin, the former residence of the Russian czars.

Although he has already held power for four months, since Dec. 31 when President Boris Yeltsin stepped down, Putin has been careful not to reveal any coherent policy program. Instead he has been vaguely promising heaven and earth to both Western investors and Russian nationalists, capitalists and submarine captains, the prime minister of Britain and the president of Ukraine.

The list of honored guests at his inauguration resembled a list of survivors from Noah's ark. The most conspicuous trio consisted of former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the former head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. All three hate each other passionately and for good reasons: During the attempted coup in August 1991, Kryuchkov had put Gorbachev under home arrest and tried to kill Yeltsin, and after the coup failed, Yeltsin sent Kryuchkov into jail and Gorbachev into retirement. On May 7, these three bitter foes were supposed to forget all animosity and rejoice in Putin's ascent to power.

It is easy to read events like this as reflecting Putin's longing for compromise, as an effort to leave factional struggles behind and start the 21st century as a century of reconciliation and development for Russia. However, at the same time, the current lull might be misleading. After all, while Moscow was celebrating, guns were firing in Chechnya.

Of course, Putin should be granted a grace period before being assessed. Until May 7, he was only an acting president, not to mention a newcomer to big-time politics with no team of his own. By now, presumably, the formation of Putin's inner circle is complete and the competing drafts of all major decrees and speeches are resting on his table. In the next few months he should reveal his goals and the tools he will use to achieve them.

Russia now faces two types of problems: short-term and long-term. The short-term list is already known to any person who reads newspapers on a regular basis: the war in Chechnya, poverty, corruption and a crippled economy. There is no easy solution to any of these challenges. Even in a best-case scenario it will take Russia at least a decade to recuperate economically. As for Chechnya, the rebellious province will remain a bleeding sore for many more decades to come no matter what action Russia takes.

According to the Russian Constitution, a president is limited to two terms in the Kremlin. So technically speaking, even if Putin is re-elected in 2004, Russia will not see genuine prosperity and calm during his stay in office. But, of course, he can initiate major change for the better -- and for this be gratefully remembered for ever after. After all, what humans tend to remember most is change, not its consequences or causes.

Then there are the problems that are long-term but nevertheless extremely pressing:

* What is Russia's place in the world now? Is it still a great power or just a huge Third World country, embroiled in ferocious regional conflicts and domestic unrest like India?

* What should its military planning be? Should it once again choose guns over butter? And if so, for the sake of what?

* Can Russia psychologically reconcile itself with the collapse of the Soviet empire or will it launch a bloody reconquest of its former territories? What countries will fall prey if that is the case? Ukraine? The Caucasus? The Baltics?

* What should be done about the cracks in the Russian Federation? The case of Chechnya is just a precursor to what lies ahead. Russia consists of 89 provinces, and at least a dozen of these are already considering secession. How should such attempts be treated: with bombs and missiles like in Chechnya or with more investment? And if the latter choice is selected, where will the money come from?

* What should be the basis of Russia's national identity in the aftermath of the collapse of communism? Ethnicity? Religion? Language? Territory? And, mind you, there are dozens of ethnic groups in Russia besides Russians.

* How should the Westernization of the country be viewed? Should it be taken as a blessing, leveling ethnic and cultural differences and, potentially, transforming Russia into a bastion for multiculturalism and tolerance? Or should it be perceived as evil, corrupting Russians and destroying a glorious, traditional set of values?

There are three basic scenarios for Putin's presidency. He can side with promarket economic reform, civil rights and openness to the outside world. He can choose to be a father figure for the nation, a populist demagogue who clamps down on dissent and reintroduces the Iron Curtain to Eurasia's heartland. Or he can become a pathetic figurehead who reigns but doesn't rule, a puppet in the hands of seedy oligarchs -- like Yeltsin was in the last five years of his tenure.

Pretty soon we will know which scenario will come true. It does not take that much time for a politician to reveal his true self. Perhaps it will take longer than 100 days (especially when Russia is about to begin a long, summer vacation), but by October Putin's choices should become obvious.

Ironically enough, Putin might start with long-term objectives (national identity, great-power pride, a military buildup, patriotism), ignoring urgent but unpleasant challenges like the collapse of the health-care system and miserable living standards for the majority of Russians. So far Putin's priorities appear rather discouraging -- patronizing the navy instead of hospitals, and missile factories instead of schools.

This is exactly the type of thing you would expect from a person with a KGB background, but let's be fair. He was inaugurated only a week ago and perhaps there is a pleasant surprise awaiting us all in the future. Imagine if 10 years from now there was an exuberant flow of doctoral dissertations from students at Harvard and Yale titled, "The KGB as the Great Cradle of Reform in Post-Soviet Russia."