For many, Japan is an unrepentant nation that is unwilling to look hard at and make amends for its actions during the first half of the 20th century. This perception is typically contrasted with that of Germany, which spent the same period warring with its neighbors but is largely seen as having come to terms with its past.

Walter F. Hatch, an expert on Asian politics and professor emeritus of government at Colby College in Maine, argues against this assessment in his compact and compelling book, “Ghosts in the Neighborhood.”

Ghosts in the Neighborhood: Why Japan Is Haunted by Its Past and Germany Is Not, By Walter F. Hatch. 192 pages, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS, Nonfiction.

“Japan has repeatedly expressed regret for its past behavior in China and Korea, but to no avail,” he writes. The key difference between Japan and Germany, he insists, is the regional context. “What actually distinguishes Germany from Japan has been its use of political institutions such as the EU and NATO to demonstrate a credible commitment to cooperation. Germany has proven that it can be a reliable partner, while Japan has not.”

In practical terms, a generation of German leaders “tied their hands in a knot of regional ties,” constraining their independence and autonomy to show a commitment to reconciliation and a future in which the fates of all those countries were intertwined. This convinced involved nations of German sincerity.

Sylvie Goulard, a French member of the European Parliament and former senior government official, explains to Hatch, “You don’t create trust or mutual understanding through speeches. You get there through action, through joint projects. And that’s what French and German leaders did in the 1950s. They dedicated themselves to a joint initiative to forge a new Europe, a peaceful and prosperous Europe.” For proof, Hatch cites a 2021 poll in which 84% of French citizens said Germany was a reliable partner for France, a level of trust higher than for any other European or North American country.

The Japanese have done no such thing and Hatch blames the United States. Washington promoted institution-building and multilateralism in Europe, encouraging the foundation and consolidation of the EU and NATO. In contrast, after World War II, the U.S. preferred a hub-and-spokes model in Asia, one that allowed Washington to dominate relations with each regional partner. The promotion of bilateralism denied Japan the opportunity to work more closely with its neighbors and demonstrate “a genuine and credible commitment to cooperate.”

Hatch argues that the U.S. made different choices in the two regions because “its political elites have identified with Europeans while they looked down on Asians.” American leaders “felt no such affinity for or identity with Asians, whom they viewed as ‘backward.’”

Hatch is careful to point out, though, that this doesn’t mean that Japan (or Asian countries) aren’t autonomous or sovereign nations, manipulated by Washington. Rather, he explains, “on the most contentious issues, they have not enjoyed much autonomy.”

The message of this important analysis is that institutions, especially multilateral ones, can play a critical role in reconciliation by demonstrating a national commitment to cooperate. Ceding some autonomy and authority shows a readiness to trust neighbors and work together to benefit all those collaborating under the same framework. That should put the ghosts in the neighborhood to rest.