What Trump’s return could mean for Afghanistan

When American President Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he was an unfamiliar figure in Afghanistan. People were anxious about this new personality and wondered whether he would understand the intricacies and challenges that they faced, particularly the multitude of issues related to terrorism.

At the time, Afghanistan was also witnessing neighboring countries — China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan — entertain warmer ties with the Taliban. This made it difficult for the democratic leadership in Kabul, surrounded by authoritarian states, to navigate the huge challenges it faced.

Now that Trump is president again, hopefully, he will recognize the failure of the peace talks with the Taliban that resulted in their return to power in 2021 and acknowledge the lack of sincerity on the part of Pakistan and other regional actors. The new administration is already getting tough by cutting financial aid to the Taliban and pushing for the return of American weapons and ammunition.

While these moves may not be enough to force the regime’s collapse, they are significant. They should be supplemented by air strikes to destroy Taliban military equipment, which would help Afghanistan resist and eventually overthrow the barbaric government.

Leading up to this phase, the pre-Taliban leadership of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, who governed Afghanistan from 2004 to 2021, had tried to advance people’s freedom and rights, including freedom of expression and of the press, and government accountability. The judiciary was engaged in punishing terrorists and parliament was becoming increasingly vocal and powerful, holding ministers accountable, overseeing the president’s office and pursuing corruption cases.

However, these steps did not align with the interests of regimes in the broader neighborhood, who feared that if Afghanistan’s model of governance succeeded with the help of the United States and its NATO allies, their own citizens might demand a similar system and relationship with the West.

These states believed that the only way to maintain their iron-fist rule was to ensure the failure of the new Afghan government. Afghanistan is a landlocked nation, leading Pakistan and former Soviet countries with strong ties to Russia (excluding Tajikistan) to use the U.S. and NATO’s reliance on air and ground routes running through their territories to work against Afghans’ interests by collaborating with Taliban terrorists.

For example, Washington turned a blind eye to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps pouring money into Afghanistan to curry favor with officials there, fearing it would create problems for Tehran. It was difficult for the U.S. to deal with the fact that Iran and other neighboring countries were building ties with the Taliban — financing, training and supplying them with weapons to kill American, NATO and Afghan soldiers and civilians — while their diplomats operated freely in Kabul.

These bad actors used their access to Afghan politicians to feed them disinformation, sowing mistrust and chaos and preventing the national unity government from functioning, for example, creating continuous challenges by pulling ministers and candidates for other roles. This meddling mined Afghanistan’s electoral process, requiring the U.S. secretary of state to resolve issues that should have been dealt with internally — which, in turn, was portrayed as proof that Kabul was an American puppet, further delegitimizing its leadership.

Afghan officials were not without fault. Some knowingly or unknowingly fell into this trap, undermining the state’s institutions and legitimacy, which weakened the system and contributed to its eventual collapse.

Given the complexities, it was hard for Afghans to know whether Trump understood their situation when he first entered the White House. We heard about his South Asia strategy, in which his administration took a tough stance on Pakistan and emphasized the U.S. mission’s success in Afghanistan, making it clear that American forces would remain as long as needed.

Unfortunately, Trump was misled by former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and his colleagues, such as Faiz Hameed, the head of Pakistan’s spy agency. They convinced the president that peace negotiations with the Taliban were the way forward, highlighting their success in securing the release of American University of Afghanistan professors (one of whom, an Australian citizen, later returned to Afghanistan to express his support for the Taliban).

A deal seemed attractive to Trump because he thought it was deliverable, leading him to green light negotiations with the Taliban, much to Afghans’ displeasure: If the U.S. talked to the Taliban without Kabul’s involvement, this would further undermine the Afghan government.

Despite these setbacks, people rallied around the peace process, but the Taliban never negotiated in good faith. They insulted Afghan negotiators, calling them nonbelievers and threatening to kill them. Some members of the Afghan delegation were rumored to have ties with the Taliban, which only added to the challenges. The government in Kabul was being constantly sabotaged from within and outside, fraying it irreparably.

Now, at the outset of another Trump term, Afghans are widely disappointed with the suspension of the U.S. refugee program and wish that an exception had been made for Afghans. Unfortunately, the administration is also planning to shut down the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, which was managing the evacuation of Afghans who had worked for the U.S. government.

These people and their families risk their lives as the Taliban are reneging on their commitments by systematically hunting down, imprisoning and murdering the West’s Afghan allies. Underpinning these actions are the Taliban’s anti-Western ideology and their now complete co-option by authoritarian neighbors keen on eradicating any American influence in the region — primarily China, then Russia, with the help of Iran and Pakistan. The Taliban are also worried that these Afghans might take part in covert operations against their regime.

Afghans, however, remain hopeful that the U.S. will resume refugee admissions. We also fully support Secretary of State Marco Rubio taking action against the Taliban, announcing more bounties on its leaders and backing the International Criminal Court’s effort to prosecute its members for crimes against humanity. The U.S. should also allow law enforcement units to free American hostages held by the Taliban, an approach that would empower anti-Taliban Afghans, particularly in the U.S., to become more active in their fight against the regime.

Moreover, the U.S. should recognize the Taliban as a terrorist organization once again by adopting the bill introduced by Rep. Nancy Mace. The hope is that this legislation will be passed swiftly by Congress without the outside interference that was seen during the previous administration.

Afghans hope that Trump will consider their freedom, especially that of 20 million women and girls, a key issue for global peace.