A restart of Senkaku firing ranges is long overdue

A few years ago, Kyodo News published an explosive article on Washington’s decision in 1978 to suspend the United States Navy’s use of Taishojima, also known as Sekibi Sho, as a firing range out of fear that the U.S. would be entangled in a Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands.

Citing declassified U.S. State Department documents, the article uncovered new information on the reasons behind the decision, confirming some of the views I already held. The current impasse and tension over the Senkakus could be traced back to Washington’s vacillation at the time as it prioritized diplomatic convenience over territorial principles, which has undermined Japan’s rightful claims to the islands.

In 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration rejected a request by the American military to resume use of Taishojima, which along with nearby Kubajima, also known as Kobi Sho, had been provided to the U.S. for use as bombing ranges under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Japan.

Neither island had been used since then — last actual use dates back to December 1977, despite several subsequent requests by the U.S. Navy to reverse course — suggesting not only that the moratorium is still in effect for Taishojima, but that it has applied by extension, either formally or informally, to Kubajima.

In my 2014 book “The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute,” I speculated that either the usually timid State Department or the equally meek Japanese Foreign Ministry were responsible for the suspension — leaning in favor of the former. The documents highlighted in the Kyodo News article, published seven years later, confirmed this.

The decision to halt the use of Taishojima was made in June 1978, shortly after an April incident in which nearly 200 Chinese fishing vessels had amassed near the Senkakus, triggering tensions between Japan and China just as the two countries were discussing a bilateral peace treaty.

There are several theories as to why Beijing sent the boats: domestic political struggles; miscommunication between government agencies; a desire to pressure Japan to accelerate peace negotiations; or the assertion of Chinese sovereignty over the Senkakus.

Senior Chinese leaders later apologized to Japanese officials, saying that the incident has been a mistake and that it would not happen again — and therefore implying that Beijing recognized Japan’s jurisdiction over the islands. Ironically, the incident did lead to both governments expediting peace negotiations, which were concluded and ratified later that year.

Despite China’s implicit recognition of Japan’s jurisdiction — which the U.S. was aware of, according to other declassified documents I acquired — the State Department decided (problematically) that it did not want to get roped in the issue and instructed the navy to stop using the firing range that it had overseen for decades.

Kubajima had been used by the U.S. Air Force starting from 1948, then the navy was put in charge of it in 1955, and of Taishojima the following year. During much of the United States’ administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Washington paid rent to the owner of Kubajima (Taishojima was owned separately by the Japanese government, so the U.S. did not pay rent on it).

With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, Tokyo leased Kubajima and Taishojima to the U.S. military, paying rent to the former’s owner, as part of SOFA.

More than 45 years have elapsed since the State Department’s fateful decision to suspend the islands’ use, which understandably troubled Tokyo. The damage it has caused to the interests of the U.S.-Japan alliance is significant, as the following decades have seen China trying to chip away almost daily at Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkakus by undermining its administrative jurisdiction.

The fact that the U.S. government was — and still is — afraid to use its own ranges provided by its ally is a case in point.

Washington’s policy sends the wrong message to the Japanese government and its citizens, as well as other regional players.

It implies that Tokyo’s jurisdiction is imperfect — despite the U.S. returning administrative rights over the Senkakus to Tokyo in 1972 — and that Washington might not support Japan in case of conflict — despite repeated American statements that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkakus.

Furthermore, the situation creates a dangerous precedent, namely that China can, both in theory and practice, influence the United States’ ability to use facilities guaranteed by SOFA. It also opens the door to criticism of the U.S. for violating SOFA, since it has not returned the unused facilities to Japan, as required under the agreement.

The decision to suspend usage has also deprived the U.S. military and presumably Japan’s Self-Defense Forces — were the ranges to be shared through the joint committee established under SOFA — of much-needed air-to-ground and other ranges in Japan to maintain and improve their respective warfighting capabilities.

The hope is that the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump understands this situation and seeks to address it immediately, for the sake of the bilateral alliance with Japan and the preservation of peace and security in the East China Sea.