Regardless of election results, U.S. foreign policy is sure to trouble allies

In some important ways, it never really mattered who would win the U.S presidential election.

That’s a sacrilegious assertion, but bear with me. Of course, election outcomes matter a great deal. There are foundational differences in the perspectives, philosophies, preferences and policies of the two presidential contenders and their parties. Control of Congress will have an equally profound effect on the ability of either candidate to realize their respective visions.

There will be considerable consistencies in U.S. policy regardless of who wins, however, and, unfortunately, many of them will trouble allies and partners. Given the many uncertainties surrounding the election and the new administration that will emerge, it makes sense to focus now on those continuities, disheartening though they may be.

As I warned last week, doubts about U.S. commitment to allies and the readiness to fulfill treaty obligations will persist. This is the product of years of disappointment by (and often unrealistic expectations of) both Democratic and Republican administrations compounded — if not created — by fundamental changes in the structure of international society. The growing strength of its adversaries and its internal difficulties have helped undermine U.S. credibility in the conduct of its foreign policy.

The rising cost of action and deepening partisan divides mean that decision making in Washington is slower still. While the claim that politics ended at the water’s edge was always a beguiling fantasy, there were issues that once commanded a consensus but even they are now bogged down in squabbling. Decision-makers will be ever more distracted and the prospect of U.S. action more contingent.

One issue does command virtual unanimity, however: China. Politicians and the public now see that country as more than a competitor and increasingly like a foe. According to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) survey released last month, U.S. views of China have hit an all-time low, plummeting to just 26 on the Council’s 0-100 feeling thermometer — that is down from 32 in 2022. That aligns with Pew Research Center data from May that showed 81% of U.S. adults viewed China unfavorably, with 43% holding a very unfavorable opinion.

A majority, or 55% of the CCGA respondents, said the U.S. should actively work to limit the growth of China’s power, while just 40% backed friendly cooperation and engagement with Beijing. Combine that with hardening sentiment in Washington and the outcome is ordained. As Ali Wyne, a U.S.-China expert at the International Crisis Group, told the Washington Post, “Strategic competition between the United States and China is poised to intensify no matter who assumes the U.S. presidency in January 2025.”

Equally bleak is the trajectory of future economic policy. Globalization is no longer the default setting. Traditional U.S. support for economic liberalization, free and open trade and investment and recognition of the value of comparative advantage evaporated as policy makers in Washington were forced to acknowledge that the global landscape has evolved and the assumptions that guided those policies no longer apply.

Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh warned last week that Donald Trump moved the consensus on trade “until the next president couldn’t go back, or didn’t want to ... whatever happens next week, we will be living in Trumpland for decades.” (For the record, Ganesh asserted that this mindset is global, not just in the U.S.)

As a result, access to the U.S. market, long a card to play in trade negotiations, is no longer on the table. Industrial policy is enjoying a renaissance. Whether it is the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act or some cruder measure, U.S. governments will more actively intervene in markets and economic sectors.

Allies and partners can be certain that future administrations will continue to pressure U.S. companies and others to set up or return operations to the United States. “Friend shoring” will be tolerated but re-shoring will be preferred.

U.S. aid and assistance, squeezed by tightening budgets, will continue to shrink with administrations quicker to prioritize internal over foreign concerns. Money will remain available through “public-private partnerships,” but the U.S. government will be less directly engaged and more inclined to promote action by others. Expect lower aggregate amounts from Washington and its allies. China is burdened by its own problems, but it remains committed to overseas investment to secure resources and markets — and win influence.

Finally, support for some global and regional institutions will remain half-hearted. The rise of the rest and their readiness to make their voices heard has raised doubts in Washington about the ability of those institutions to advance or protect U.S. interests.

Membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) will remain off limits. Skepticism about the World Trade Organization will persist amid complaints about a creep in its authority through judicial processes rather than decisions by its members. At the same time, the WTO seems unable to deal with challenges like China’s "hybrid capitalism." Reform is off the table, which will only increase U.S. skepticism, indifference or hostility.

This approach to multilateral organizations and institutions is also reflected in U.S. policy on global issues like climate change. Leadership can no longer be assumed. Narrowly defined domestic considerations, which often reflect vested interests, will prevail.

In this world, allies and partners will feel increasing pressure to fill gaps left by the U.S. For Japan, this means that promises to double defense spending must be met. Failing to do so will threaten the country’s national security as well as the relationship with the U.S. Tokyo must accelerate efforts to thicken the weave of security relations in the Indo-Pacific.

Tokyo must step up diplomatic efforts to protect existing institutions and international law as well as promote new rule making. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s resuscitation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as the CPTPP is a powerful positive precedent. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s successful tenure as chair of the Group of Seven in 2023 should be a guide and model for future Japanese leaders.

In the region, Tokyo will need to work more closely with Canberra and Seoul on both economic and security concerns. Globally, the European Union will be a critical partner in efforts to gird a weakening international order and defend against Washington’s worst excesses.

Simply put, a leadership vacuum could emerge as the U.S. continues to reassess its place and role in the world. If its allies and partners do not step up, other, less congenial and less like-minded, governments will.