In an age of great-power competition where countries like the United States, China and Russia jostle for geopolitical supremacy, middle powers from Mexico, India, to Vietnam are seeking to position themselves to make economic and security gains.

Among these nations, Vietnam stands apart. It works with the most powerful countries — including illiberal ones — but with little condemnation while making significant geopolitical and geoeconomic gains. Colloquially known as “bamboo diplomacy,” Hanoi’s foreign policy strategy has successfully maneuvered Vietnam into an advantageous position on the global stage amid a superpower tussle through its “firm but flexible” approach.

In a matter of three months, between June and September, the Vietnamese leadership engaged Russia, India and China, all the while bagging billions in investments from the U.S. and Western powers under the pretense of serving a manufacturing alternative to China. Earlier in the year, Hanoi welcomed Putin to Vietnam, subsequently, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh traveled to New Delhi and more recently, Vietnam’s top leader, To Lam, visited Beijing to elevate their bilateral partnership.

Vietnam has achieved what many in the Global South dream of. Nations such as India and China that engage in balancing are often caught in the middle of a U.S.-Russia or U.S.-Iran tussle and come under fire over their trade ties with nations under sanctions.

Hanoi, on the other hand, has proven itself valuable to several regional and Indo-Pacific superpower nations. It has successfully played regional rivals such as India and China for infrastructure, U.S. and China for critical and advanced technologies and stood alongside Russia, China and India in issues affecting the Global South.

Nations in the Global South have lessons to learn from Vietnam’s balancing act. While some of its success can be attributed to simple geographic destiny, its political, economic and security calculus are well calibrated.

Firstly, in infrastructure development, like most developing countries, it has been a recipient of loans and support from large multilateral banks for its infrastructure development.

For example, while Hanoi capitalizes on investments in its infrastructure and manufacturing sites under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it has engaged Japanese and Korean investments and, more recently, India’s Adani Group — perceived as India’s answer to the BRI — for critical infrastructure investments such as deep-sea shipping ports and airports. As market theory would suggest, the increased competition is offering Vietnam better bargaining power in the global arena.

Earlier this year, Adani announced plans of building infrastructure projects such as a port in the Vietnamese city of Da Nang and expressed interest in developing several airports in the country. China’s state-owned enterprises and Adani have been competing for infrastructure projects across the Indo-Pacific, from Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Philippines to most recently, in Vietnam. Vietnam has managed to play off regional rivals such as India, all while maintaining neutrality.

Secondly, this balancing act is paying off even richer dividends in Vietnam’s quest to ascend in the advanced and critical technology sphere.

Domestically developed EV maker VinFast is rapidly growing in advanced and emerging markets competing with behemoth Chinese automakers such as BYD, Chery and Geely, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. All the while partnering with Chinese battery makers for its EVs, the company is among the very few to offer a competitive price point to take on the Chinese EVs.

In more advanced technology sectors such as semiconductors — where the U.S. and Western economies lead — Vietnam is rolling out the red carpet for Western companies such as Intel and Nvidia. It is seizing on the opportunity with its proposed law on the digital technology industry, providing a slew of incentives in the form of tax breaks and simpler export procedures.

It has done all of this in spite of maintaining skepticism toward Western influence in the nation. The recent backlash against Fulbright University, which was established with U.S. government funds, over local concerns that it might be undermining the state, reflects Vietnam's wariness of Western involvement in education, politics, and culture, even as economic and trade engagement has surged in the past decade.

However, the distrust is mutual. While Western economies have positioned Vietnam as one of their favored friendly shores, they are patently aware of Vietnam’s relations with China.

Hanoi has found itself caught between the Biden administration's restrictions on Chinese solar panels and advanced dual-use sectors such as those involving semiconductors. Washington limits companies like Nvidia from exporting advanced chips to Vietnam over fears they could end up in China. Despite losing access to some high-end technologies due to its middleman role, Vietnam is poised to benefit overall in the dynamics of a Cold War 2.0 scenario.

Lastly, in international relations, Vietnam remains committed to supporting many causes backed by nations in the Global South. At the Global South Summit in New Delhi, it advocated for increased representation for these countries. Even on contentious issues like the conflicts in Gaza or Ukraine, it has aligned with most of the Global South while still benefiting from commercial and technological opportunities with the West.

If Hanoi can sustain its balancing act and maintain high gross domestic product growth rates, it could emerge as a geopolitical winner in the 21st century, setting an example for other nations in the Global South.

Akhil Ramesh is director of the India Program and Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Pacific Forum in Honolulu.