Negotiating with Putin now won’t end the war

I live with my Russian wife in Yokohama. Every year, on Feb. 23, we used to celebrate Defender of the Fatherland Day by opening a bottle of wine.

It may seem strange for a Japanese person like myself to be marking a Soviet-era Red Army commemoration but my wife's family once said to me: "Yu, you have great respect for your homeland. For you, the ‘fatherland’ is your family. So let's celebrate together.” I thought this was a good way of interpreting the festivity.

But for the past two years, my family has not celebrated Feb. 23, which falls the day before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. For two years, Moscow's troops have overrun their neighbor, killing over 10,000 civilians, according to the United Nations — though the number of dead soldiers is much higher.

The Russian army, descendant of the Red Army, is taking away lives that will never be returned. I cannot bring myself to celebrate Defender of the Fatherland Day, especially if the fatherland means family.

As a military expert, I predict the war will go on for a long time. Why? Let us begin by considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategic goals.

Before the war began, Putin had voiced a lot of pretenses: The Ukrainian government is dominated by neo-Nazi ideology; Russian people are being massacred; if Ukraine is left to its own devices, NATO will expand, threatening Russia; Ukraine is secretly developing biological and chemical weapons.

But these claims are baseless. Neo-Nazism in Ukraine is very limited, and no such tendencies are evident in the words and actions of its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, or other government officials. International organizations have not reported the massacre of Russians, nor evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO before Russia’s aggression were slim. And Russia has not shown any desire to mount a significant military response to Finland or Sweden recently joining the alliance.

So why did Putin invade Ukraine? The truth is still unclear. What we can say is that, out of all former Soviet countries, the Russian president has shown a strong attachment to Ukraine.

For example, an essay he wrote in July 2021 reveals his reading of history, namely that Ukrainians were originally part of the Russian people. He repeated this assertion in an interview with former Fox News host Tucker Carlson in February.

It appears that the intent to "reclaim" Ukraine is a major objective of Putin's war.

Of course, the Russian president is a shrewd leader, and it is hard to believe that he started the war simply because of historical ambitions. It is my view that his obsession with Ukraine is coupled with an exaggerated perception of the threat that Kyiv poses as a puppet state of the United States.

Since we cannot look inside Putin's head, it will be up to future historians to reveal the real motivations behind this war. But it is probably true that Putin's unease with Ukrainian sovereignty and independence is a major factor.

In this light, calls for a cease-fire in exchange for Ukraine giving up Russian-occupied territories — a sentiment that has grown since the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive launched last year — represent a contradiction.

Currently, just over 18% of Ukrainian land is occupied by Russian forces, but Kyiv’s independence as a state has been preserved. And if I am correct, the current situation is not satisfactory to Putin, given his probable motivations. In fact, the president told Carlson in February, "we haven't achieved our aims yet."

The idea of exchanging land for a cease-fire is unlikely to exist in Putin's calculations. What he is pursuing, instead, is the granting of a cease-fire in exchange for Ukrainian sovereignty. As such, his war is likely to last much longer still.

On the Ukrainian side, a cease-fire while Russian forces are in the lead could mean restrictions on Kyiv’s sovereignty, such as the establishment of a puppet government, forced neutralization, or disarmament — all of which Putin openly demanded at the start of the war.

Simply put, Ukraine would become a Russian protectorate. Unless the Ukrainian military is completely destroyed, Kyiv is unlikely to accept such terms.

Thus, the key to stopping the fighting lies in the battlefield. Unless Ukraine asserts itself over Russian forces, reducing occupied territories to 17%, or even 16% or 15% of its land, there is no hope that Putin will come to the negotiating table.

The opposing argument is that support for Ukraine will only prolong the war, but I disagree. Such support is necessary to end the conflict.

Russia has threatened the use of nuclear weapons, therefore NATO has not been able to defend Ukraine directly, given the heightened level of risk. Instead, it took 11 months for the alliance to provide tanks and even longer to send fighter jets to Kyiv.

Some call this "realism," and they are not wrong. In a realist worldview, major powers (especially military ones) respect each other's spheres of influence and avoid direct conflict. Hence, nonmajor powers are treated as pawns in a geopolitical game and it is unavoidable that they will be dominated by a major power or become a buffer zone.

This may be unjust, but realism’s logic is that it is far better than an all-out war between major powers.

However, Japan is not a superpower. It is affluent and livable, but not militarily strong. If anything, it is more likely to be treated as a pawn, according to realist logic. Therefore, although realism may describe Japan's security situation, it cannot shape its strategy.

It is in Japan's interest to prevent Russia from successfully invading Ukraine. We must not revive Carl von Clausewitz's famous thesis of war as an extension of politics by other means. This would either put Japan in a very vulnerable position or force it to fundamentally rethink its security policy, including nuclear armament — both undesirable scenarios.

Japan's support for Ukraine, however, has been limited. Since the war began, Tokyo has provided $8.6 billion in aid, making it the fourth largest donor, and pledged more. It has also imposed tough economic sanctions on Russia.

But Tokyo has not supplied the military aid, weapons and ammunition that Kyiv’s army desperately needs, reflecting its long-standing policy of arms export controls.

While in a democracy such policies should not be changed without being submitted to the ballot, the possibility of shifting them should be up for debate.

In fact, there are signs that this is already happening. Since the war’s outbreak, Tokyo has eased restrictions, allowing licensed weapons to be exported to the country from which they were licensed. For example, it is expected that Patriot missiles produced under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will be exported to the U.S., allowing Washington to provide Ukraine with extra ammunition.

In Japan, one can disagree with the government's stance, and I believe that protecting this kind of society should be security policy’s ultimate goal.

Yet pacifism does not mean standing by while another country is being invaded. It is time to seriously consider what Japan can do to prevent Russia from succeeding.

I am not saying that Ukrainian troops should occupy the Kremlin, but that Russian soldiers withdraw from Ukraine. At that point, I may consider celebrating Defender of the Fatherland Day again.